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Abstract 
This dissertation sheds light on the role conservative governments play in 
promoting feminist policies despite an inherent tension between conservative principles 
and feminist claims. It is critical to focus on the process by which conservative 
governments adopt or reject feminist policies not only because we know little about the 
process, but also because conservative governments represent the least likely case. As 
such, we can learn more from the case of conservative governments than from the 
experience of leftist parties as it allows us to understand the influence of variables beyond 
an egalitarian ideology. Specifically, the dissertation will consider feminist policies 
addressing economic inequalities for women: father quotas in parental leave (a specific 
time period reserved exclusively for fathers) and corporate board quotas. This dissertation 
employs a comparative within case study of three cases in Germany with four additional 
preliminary case studies in United Kingdom and Japan utilizing process tracing, 
qualitative content analysis, and elite interviews. The dissertation finds that (a) feminist 
policy adoption under conservative governments is successful when coalition constraints 
facilitate the inclusion of the feminist policy on the policy agenda of the coalition 
government; and (b) when critical actors occupy veto player positions enabling the 
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This dissertation will investigate which conditions and factors prompt 
conservative parties to put feminist policies on the policy agenda and adopt them when in 
government. Focusing on instances of feminist policy adoption under conservative 
governments is a particularly timely concern because we have seen important changes 
within conservative parties when it comes to both the descriptive (or numerical) 
representation and substantive representation of women, i.e., the representation of 
women’s interests. With regard to descriptive representation, in the United Kingdom, the 
Conservative Party doubled its number of female representatives in the 2010 election, 
and the number continued to rise in the 2015 election; in South Korea, conservative Park 
Geun-hye became the first female president in 2013; and in Germany, Angela Merkel of 
the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) has governed as the first female chancellor since 
2005. With regard to substantive representation, we have seen conservative governments 
advance feminist policies such as equitable parental leave policies in Germany and 
corporate board quotas in Kenya, and conservative Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in Japan 
even made womenomics a central pillar of his economic recovery strategy to build a 
society where women can shine. Thus, the old wisdom that conservative parties are 
unsympathetic to demands for integrating women’s concerns and interests into their 
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policy platform requires us to rethink the substantive representation of women in 
conservative parties. 
This dissertation will address instances where conservative governments adopted 
feminist policies in the economic realm. Adoption occurs when conservative 
governments introduce a government bill into the legislative process which is 
successfully passed into law. Specifically, I will focus on the adoption of father leave 
policies and board diversity policies under Merkel’s conservative government in 
Germany as the primary case studies, as well as two additional preliminary case studies 
in the United Kingdom and Japan. Both types of policies aim to achieve, or at least 
improve, economic equality for women and have become more common in the last 
decade. As such these policies are inherently feminist in their nature as they attempt to 
challenge the traditional division of labor both in the private and the public sphere. I 
chose to focus on these specific policies because each policy violates the principles of 
both traditional and liberal conservatism and as such run contrary to the ideological 
underpinnings of conservative parties. While corporate board quotas infringe upon liberal 
conservative values such as limited state interference in the market, father leave policies 
challenge the traditional notions of the male breadwinner and female caregiver. Further, 
both types of policies tend to be opposed by business interests, long-standing and 
important constituencies of conservative parties. 
1.1.  Feminist Policy Solutions to Economic Inequality  
While the lack of political equality has been recognized and accepted as a 
problem to be solved both internationally and within individual countries, the issue of 
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economic equality has only recently entered public awareness and public debate. Despite 
a growing pool of highly educated and skilled female workers, women still make up only 
39.6 per cent of the total paid labor force worldwide, the great majority of part-time 
workers, and only a small fraction of entrepreneurs (OECD 2015). These numbers show 
that politics is not the only arena where women are underrepresented and discriminated 
against. As a result, two topics in particular have gained traction in the past two decades: 
reconciliation policies and equal employment policies. In regards to the latter, countries 
have paid greater attention to the distribution of care responsibilities among men and 
women because women’s caretaker status has been identified as one of the reasons why 
women do not advance in the workplace at the same rate as men. Typically, companies 
are reluctant to hire or promote women because they assume that women eventually will 
drop out of the workforce to take care of their children. As a result, ten countries so far 
have included provisions in their parental leave policies that encourage fathers to take 
time off work to be the primary care taker for their children. The idea behind father leave 
policies is that in a society where both men and women will equally share care 
responsibilities, employers will have fewer reasons to discriminate against women based 
on their childbearing capacities. Thus, several governments have adopted father leave as 
a means to combat workplace discrimination against women. 
In terms of equal employment policies, the lack of women on corporate boards is 
the most glaring economic inequality. In 2014, the percentage of women on boards 
ranges from 0.1 per cent in Saudi Arabia to 40.5 per cent in Norway with an average of 
10.2 per cent per country (‘Women on Boards’ 2015). To date, 16 countries have adopted 
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corporate board quotas (‘Legislative Board Diversity’ 2014, Terjesen, Aguilera, and 
Lorenz 2014), which set specific targets for companies to ensure a balanced gender 
representation on corporate boards. By dictating that companies nominate women for 
board positions, these policies aim to overcome the lasting influence of the so called ‘old 
boys networks’ which still represent an often insurmountable barrier to women’s 
advancement. 
Figure 1: Adoption of Father Leave Policies and Board Quota Policies 
 
Figure 1 shows that father leave policies emerged in the early 1990s and became 
more ubiquitous in this century. In contrast, corporate board quotas emerged only in 2003 
and have experienced an uptake in usage since 2010 when eleven of the 16 board quotas 
were adopted. For both policies, Scandinavian countries were the pioneers: Norway was 
first to adopt both a corporate board quota in 2003 and a father leave policy in 1993 while 
Sweden adopted father policies in 1994, Denmark in 1997, and Finland adopted the 
corporate board quota shortly after Norway in 2005. Conservative governments in 
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Sweden, Iceland, Austria, Germany, and Japan all adopted father leave policies while 
conservative governments in Norway, Kenya, France, the Netherlands, Germany, and 
Japan have adopted corporate board quota policies. 
1.2.  Background 
We still know very little about the representation of women’s interests in 
conservative parties. This lack of knowledge, however, is not surprising. Mazur (2002), 
in a meta-analysis of 27 cases of feminist policy adoption, found that the most common 
explanatory variables were a combination of left-leaning governments and an egalitarian 
political culture. Egalitarian societies usually boast one of the smallest gaps in gender 
equality and were the first to adopt feminist policies such as electoral gender quotas and 
have the most equitable parental leave policies (World Economic Forum 2015; Schmitt, 
Ray, and Gornick 2010). Likewise, feminist policies and left-wing governments are an 
obvious fit because left-wing parties today share a commitment to social equality which 
includes gender concerns (Krook 2006). For example, left- wing parties typically have a 
greater number of women representatives in their ranks, they tend to be allies of the 
feminist movement, and they were the first to adopt electoral gender quotas (Beckwith 
2010; Lovenduski 2010). As a result, a great majority of studies have focused on left- 
leaning parties and governments when investigating women’s political representation, 
both descriptively (by including more women in their parties numerically) and 
substantively (by representing women’s interests). 
This dissertation will address this gap in knowledge specifically as it relates to 
women’s substantive representation in conservative governments. Focusing on the 
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process by which conservative governments adopt or reject feminist policies is 
particularly critical not only because we know little about that process but also because 
conservative governments represent the least likely case of feminist policy adoption. As 
such, we can learn more from the cases of feminist policies approved and promoted under 
conservative governments than from the experience of left leaning governments, as it 
allows us to understand the influence of variables beyond an egalitarian ideology. As 
Morgan (2006, 182) so aptly puts it, “(L)ibrary shelves overflow with books on Social 
Democratic and other Left parties (...) but there have been few volumes on the politics of 
the moderate center right.” 
A new burgeoning literature has started to address the political representation of 
women in conservative parties. These studies focus on the feminization of conservative 
parties which is best considered a process by which conservative parties incorporate 
women (descriptive representation) into the party itself and women’s concerns 
(substantive representation) into their party platforms (Marthaler, Webb, and Childs 
2009). The majority of studies focus on the numerical representation of women.1 Studies 
that focus on the substantive representation of women are illustrative in nature and 
typically count the frequency and type of arguments conservative women MPs engage 
in.2 In the most eminent work on women’s political representation in conservative parties 
                                                
1 For examples, see: Wiliarty and Gaunder (2014) for a discussion of conservative female candidates in 
Japan and Germany; Curtin (2014) on conservative women in executive office in Australia and New 
Zealand; or McIlven (2009) and Campbell et al. (2006) for women in the Conservative Party in the United 
Kingdom.  
2 For examples, see: Kantola and Saari (2014) on conservative women’s gender equality discourse in 
Finland; Piscopo (2014) on feminist claim making and conservative women in Argentina; or Celis and 
Childs (2012) on gendered claim-making by women in the Conservative Party in the United Kingdom.  
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edited by Celis and Childs (2014), only one author discusses the potential factors that 
prompt conservative governments to adopt feminist policies. Thus, even in the literature 
on women’s representation in conservative parties and governments, few studies explore 
the driving forces behind the actual adoption of feminist policies under conservative 
governments. It is this gap in the literature that I will address. 
1.3.  Conceptual Framework 
I argue that the adoption of feminist policies must be understood through a 
conceptual framework that links electoral competition to the dynamics between critical 
actors, policy opponents, and veto players in the policy making process. While the 
constellation of critical actors and veto players is crucial for ensuring the successful 
passage of feminist policies, electoral competition determines whether the feminist policy 
becomes adopted by the coalition government and is thus put on the government agenda. 
In all instances of successful policy adoption of either father leave policies or board 
diversity policies, the conservative party was in a coalition government (see Table 1 
below). It seems that coalition constraints matter specifically when the coalition parties 
have different policy preferences. The strength of coalition constraints is measured by the 
nature of the coalition (i.e., is the coalition one of electoral necessity) and relative 
strength of the coalition partner (i.e., are the coalition partners roughly equal in seats won 













































































































2011 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 
France Board 
Quota 
2011 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Japan Father 
Leave 
2009 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Japan Board 
Quota 
2015 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Germany Father 
Leave 
2006 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 
Germany Board 
Quota 
2015 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 
Iceland Father 
Leave 
2000 1 1 1 0 1 1 - 
Sweden Father 
Leave 
1994 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Norway Board 
Quota 
2003 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Austria Father 
Leave 
2001 1 0 0 1 0 - 0 
The table above also shows that commonly proposed explanations such as a 
critical mass of women in parliament (i.e., over 30 per cent), high female labor force 
participation, demographic pressures, type of welfare regime, egalitarian culture or a 
feminized conservative party cannot explain feminist policy adoption under conservative 
governments3. Thus, my conceptual approach moves beyond macro-patterns to explain 
policy outcomes. 
                                                
3 See for example: Dahlerup 1988, Morgan 2011/2013, Grey 2002 (on critical mass); Dalton 2015 and Karu 
and Poll 2011 (on low fertility); Fleckenstein and Lee 2012 or Henderson and White 2004 (on labor force 
participation); Sainsbury 1999 or Gornick and Meyers 2003 (on welfare regimes); Inglehart and Norris 
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I utilize the critical actor approach adopted in women and politics studies (Childs 
and Krook 2006; Chaney 2006) and combine that approach with the veto player approach 
from comparative politics (Huber et al 1993; Huber and Stephens 2000; Immergut 1990; 
Tsebelis 1995, 1999, 2002) to develop a conceptual framework that will explain why 
conservative governments adopt or fail to adopt feminist policies. Critical actors are 
 . . . those who initiate policy proposals on their own, even when women 
form a small minority, and embolden others to take steps to promote 
policies for women, regardless of the proportion of female representatives 
(Childs and Crook 2006, 528). 
Accordingly, critical actors are typically feminist actors or – at a minimum – 
strong advocates for the policy under consideration. I differentiate between parliamentary 
critical actors, i.e., those who speak up in the media as well as in the legislative process in 
favor of the policy, and extra-parliamentary critical actors, i.e., individuals in civil 
society, business, and academia who speak out in the media in favor of the policy and 
lobby the government to adopt the policy either through petitions, open letters, or 
testifying in front of committees. 
However, I argue that the presence of critical actors is not enough. Critical actors 
also need to command situational power in order to advance their policy proposals 
(Sawer 2012; Annesley and Gains 2010). Speaking up in favor of policies neither 
guarantees that the policy will become part of the policy agenda nor ensures the 
successful passage of the policy. This is why critical actors need to be either in a position 
to influence individuals who occupy strategic decision-making positions, or critical actors 
                                                                                                                                            




need to hold these positions themselves. The welfare literature typically refers to 
individuals who occupy strategic decision-making positions as veto players. Veto players 
are actors whose consent is necessary to adopt a specific policy (Tsebelis 1995) and are 
thus crucial in the policy-making process. Tsebelis (2002) differentiates between 
institutional veto players (set forth by the constitution) and partisan veto players 
(emerging from the political game). A significant shortcoming of Tsebelis’ approach is 
that he treats veto players as black boxes. He assumes that in cases where political parties 
are veto players, each policy is approved by an internal party majority. Yet he does not 
theorize how this approval process occurs. I maintain that veto players are also found 
within political parties in the form of internal party factions. Following Mule (2001), I 
argue that competition among party internal factions is essential in determining the policy 
stance of the political party. Thus, I expand on the veto player approach by recognizing 
the existence and importance of veto players to the policy-making process that precedes 
the drafting of a bill. 
Further, the veto player approach does not theorize the policy preferences of veto 
players. Veto players themselves can be supportive, opposed, or neutral towards the 
feminist policy. I argue that the policy preference of veto players influences their 
likelihood to consent to a policy. For example, policy adoption will most likely stall if a 
veto player is opposed to the respective feminist policy. Similarly, if a veto player 
supports the proposed feminist policy, policy adoption is more likely. Thus, my 
conceptual framework will not only identify the relevant veto players but also specify 
their policy preferences to determine the likelihood of policy adoption. 
 
11 
By combining a modified veto player approach with the critical actor approach, I 
can estimate the institutional resources that critical actors have at their disposal when 
advancing their preferred policies. I expect that in cases where critical actors occupy veto 
player positions, successful policy adoption is more likely. Likewise, it is important to 
locate the position of policy opponents to veto players: I argue that in cases where 
opponents either control veto player positions or can influence veto players themselves, 
the feminist policy will either be stopped or at a minimum weakened. 
1.4.  Research Design  
The dissertation will employ a qualitative comparative case study utilizing 
process tracing, qualitative content analysis, and elite interviews to understand the 
processes leading to either successful or failed policy adoption. Process tracing allows me 
to determine the causal sequence in each case study and test the explanatory power of my 
suggested hypotheses. In order to identify the causal sequence in each case of feminist 
policy adoption, I utilize qualitative content analysis and elite interviews. 
For the qualitative content analysis, I have consulted various primary sources 
including legislative records, verbatim protocols of parliamentary debates and party 
conventions, speeches by the Prime Minister/Chancellor and responsible cabinet 
ministers, policy briefs and statements, press releases by the responsible ministries, and 
coalition agreements and relevant party platforms. Secondary sources include media 
coverage of the policies in major national newspapers. The study of both primary and 
secondary sources helps me to identify the relevant critical actors while also determining 
the primary arguments brought forward in favor of and against the respective policies. I 
 
12 
differentiate between the types of arguments brought forward for or against the policies 
by positional actors (veto player, opponent, or critical actor) as well as by types of actors 
(business representatives, civil society actors, academics etc.). I differentiate between 
feminist arguments and those drawing on economic interests or concerns, international 
examples (both positive and negative) and mandates, demographic realities, cultural 
attitudes, and public opinion. This allows me to gauge the motivation behind the policy 
proposal, particularly whether the policies were motivated by electoral calculation or 
gender equality concerns and whether socioeconomic and demographic pressures 
prompted the adoption of these policies. For example, I show that in Germany, feminist 
concerns were paramount while in Japan, socioeconomic and demographic pressures 
were the motivating factors. 
I also conducted in-depth elite interviews with members of parliament, civil 
servants, civil society actors, journalists, and representatives of women’s organizations in 
Germany and the United Kingdom. Together, the interviews and qualitative content 
analysis allow for an assessment of the influence of critical actors, opponents, and veto 
players during the policy making process. Further, the analysis helps me to understand 
under which circumstances feminist actors have built coalitions within conservative 
parties, across political parties, as well as with business and civil society organizations to 





Table 2: Policy Outcomes Across Countries 
Policy Outcome Policy Proposal Country Legislative Period 
Passed Father Bonus Germany 2005 – 2009 
Not Passed Board Quota Germany 2009 – 2013 
Passed Board Quota Germany 2013 – current 
Passed Father Bonus Japan 2005 – 2009 
Passed  Board Target Japan  2012 – current 
Not Passed Father Quota United Kingdom 2010 – 2015 
Not Passed Board Quota United Kingdom 2010 – 2015 
Specifically, this dissertation considers seven cases across Germany, the United 
Kingdom, and Japan, including four successful cases (the adoption of father quotas in 
Germany 2006 and Japan 2009 and corporate board quotas in Germany and Japan both in 
2015) and three failed cases (corporate board quotas in Germany 2013 and the United 
Kingdom 2013, and the father quota in the United Kingdom in 2013). I chose these 
countries because they encompass seven out of a total of nine cases where conservative 
governments debated both policies with varying success. The other two cases are in 
Sweden where a conservative government adopted a father leave policy but failed to 
adopt a corporate board quota. I chose to exclude the Swedish cases because they are less 
comparable to the other cases based on Sweden’s unique socioeconomic, demographic, 
and political context.  
Comparing successful cases with failed attempts will allow me to isolate the 
importance of veto players, critical actors, and coalition constraints in each case. Further, 
by looking at these cases, I can follow a most-similar research design: all countries share 
important socioeconomic conditions such as fertility rates below replacement levels, 
sluggish economies, and relatively low participation of women in the labor force, which 
are often used to justify these types of feminist policies. They also share important 
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political characteristics such as programmatic parties and a parliamentary democracy. 
Holding these background conditions constant allows me to focus on the explanatory 
variables put forward in my conceptual framework. 
1.5.  Hypotheses 
I argue that two conditions need to hold for conservative governments to adopt 
feminist policies. First, conservative governments must adopt the feminist policy for their 
government agenda. Here, at least one coalition party must be in favor of the policy and 
coalition constraints must be permissive. For the feminist policy to be adopted, the 
constellation of veto players, opponents, and critical actors is such that critical actors 
control veto player positions while opponents remain outside the policy making process. 
Thus, I propose that two conditions are necessary for successful feminist policy agenda 
setting and policy adoption by conservative governments: (1) Coalition constraints must 
be permissive, facilitating the inclusion of the feminist policy on the government agenda; 
and (2) critical actors need to occupy veto player positions in the policy making process. 
If these two conditions hold, the following outcomes are possible: 
1. When the ruling conservative party is against the policy, the 
feminist policy will be adopted when the coalition constraint is 
permissive, and critical actors are able to control and influence 
veto player positions (Germany 2006 and 2015). Here, the 
successful introduction of the bill, its passage, and final policy 
crucially depends on the constellation of critical actors, veto 
players, and opponents. 
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2. When the ruling conservative party is in favor of the policy, the 
feminist policy will be adopted when critical actors occupy veto 
player positions. Coalition constraints do not matter in this case as 
both parties are in favor of the policy. Here, the strength of the 
feminist policy will depend on the ability of opponents to influence 
veto players (Japan 2009 and 2015). 
Further, I show that feminist policies will not be adopted when the coalition 
constraint is weak (i.e., the coalition partner cannot impose demands on the conservative 
coalition party). Here, the constellation of veto players, opponents, and critical actors 
yields to coalition constraints (United Kingdom 2013). Finally, feminist policies will not 
be adopted when neither of the two conditions holds (Germany 2013; United Kingdom 
2011). 
1.6.  Limitations and Scope  
The primary focus of this dissertation is a qualitative comparative within-case 
study of Germany. One inherent weakness is a limited ability to generalize from this type 
of study. To compensate for this limitation, the dissertation includes two preliminary case 
studies in the United Kingdom and in Japan. Analyzing the failed attempts in the United 
Kingdom specifically allows me to test whether the explanatory variables I identified in 
the German cases are indeed absent in the British cases. Demonstrating the absence of the 
explanatory variables in these negative cases increases the confidence in my findings. 
Likewise, by considering two successful cases in Japan, I can probe whether the 
explanatory variables identified in the German cases also hold true in the Japanese cases 
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or whether the variables are unique to the German case and are not replicable in other 
instances. 
1.7.  Significance 
The dissertation will draw equally on key insights from the women and politics 
literature and the comparative welfare state literature to help me develop a framework 
that will better explain why political parties adopt public policies that run contrary to 
their ideological underpinnings. By focusing on the conditions and factors that prompt 
feminist policy adoption under conservative governments, this dissertation will contribute 
to the growing field of comparative gender studies whose aim is to move away from 
explaining women’s political influence or behavior to understanding how specific 
gendered policies are adopted by utilizing both gendered and ungendered concepts 
(Caraway 2010). While the gender literature has focused mainly on how specific actors, 
such as elected women, women’s agencies, or the women’s movement, can individually 
influence the adoption of feminist policies, the comparative literature has for the most 
part ignored the contribution that feminist actors and gendered concepts make to the 
adoption of public policies. Instead, the welfare literature aims to explain welfare policies 
by emphasizing factors such as partisanship (Terjesen, Aguilera, and Lorenz 2014), 
institutionalism (Lambert 2008) or the logic of industrialism (Fleckenstein and Lee 
2012). Yet, in the case of father leave policies and board diversity policies, none of these 
approaches in isolation is sufficient to explain the adoption of these policies. Thus, my 
conceptual framework bridges the divide between gender studies and comparative 
politics by applying both gendered (critical actors) and ungendered concepts (veto 
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players and coalition theory) to create a comprehensive explanatory framework which 
accounts for the full range of potentially explanatory variables rather than just a specific 
few. Further, the impact of this dissertation is not limited to the field of comparative 
gender studies. I have developed a conceptual framework that allows for the general 
study of comparative public policy adoption. Critical actors can more generally be 
understood as policy advocates who, depending on their institutional power both within 
the formal and informal policy decision making process, can shape policy outcomes. 
Further, coalition constraints work across all policy areas and not just feminist ones. 
Due to variances across policy areas and across political systems, neither critical 
actors nor veto players can be defined a priori. That being so, we must remain open to the 
possibility that a variety of actors can be critical actors – men and women, elected MPs, 
civil society actors, or varying collective actors such social movements, organized 
interests, advocacy organizations, etc. – and can influence the adoption of public policies. 
The same is true for the identification of veto players which will differ across political 
systems due to different political traditions and institutional compositions. As a result, the 
conceptual framework remains flexible enough so that the analysis of the policy process 
can travel across varied policy areas, political systems, political cultures, and legal 
traditions. By incorporating the concept of critical actors with the veto player approach I 
am able to outline how critical actors and veto players interact to produce a policy 
outcome for each individual case while maintaining comparability across cases. Thus, by 
drawing on both the gender and welfare literature, I will be able to better answer the who, 
what, where, when, and how questions of public policy adoption. 
 
18 
1.8.  Plan of Dissertation 
The dissertation is split into two parts. Part I establishes the general framework 
for the dissertation. Chapter 2 gives first an overview of the women and politics literature 
and the feminization of conservative party literature. I discuss the most pertinent studies 
that have analyzed the adoption of board diversity and father leave policies as well as 
studies specifically discussing the adoption of either policy in Germany, the United 
Kingdom, and Japan. This chapter then presents the conceptual framework utilized to 
explain feminist policy adoption in Germany. I draw on the study of welfare states and 
the substantive representation of women to build a conceptual framework that 
emphasizes the importance of political background conditions (coalition constraints) and 
the strategic interaction between veto players and critical actors. Chapter 3 presents the 
research design including a discussion of alternative explanations. This chapter also 
contains a more detailed description of the history, spread, and background of both father 
leave policies and board diversity policies. 
Part II applies the conceptual framework to the case of Germany. Chapter 4 
analyzes the adoption of the Elterngeld (parental leave reform) in 2006 focusing 
specifically on the father leave policy contained in the overall reform package. Chapter 5 
discusses the first attempt to adopt a board diversity policy in 2013 which failed despite 
considerable support by conservative women. I show that the failure to adopt the policy 
in 2013 ultimately helped secure policy success in 2015. Chapter 6 focuses on the 
successful adoption of the board diversity policy in 2015. 
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Chapter 7 takes the insight from the German case studies and extends the 
argument to four other cases in the United Kingdom and Japan, which allows me to 
verify the validity of my conceptual framework. In this chapter, I apply my conceptual 
framework to four additional cases in the United Kingdom and Japan to explore whether 
the framework potentially is able to explain these cases as well. In the United Kingdom, 
the chapter considers two instances of failed policy adoption under the Cameron 
government. Both father leave and board diversity policies were publicly debated in 2012 
but the father leave policy was not ultimately included in the parental leave reform while 
the board diversity policy was not introduced into the legislative process at all. For Japan, 
the chapter will consider the successful adoption of both father leave policy in 2009 and a 
corporate board policy in 2015 under two different conservative governments in Japan. 
The final chapter summarizes the arguments developed in the previous chapters 
and assesses the validity of the conceptual framework outside of the primary case studies 
in Germany. The dissertation will conclude with a discussion of the study’s implications 




Literature Review and Conceptual Framework 
In this chapter, I will develop a conceptual framework for understanding why 
feminist policy adoption occurs under conservative governments. The conceptual 
framework is generally grounded in the substantive representation of women literature 
and more specifically in literature analyzing the feminization of conservative parties. In 
this review, I will also touch upon the literature addressing the issue of father leave and 
board diversity policy and those studies that directly discuss the parental leave reform in 
Germany. In general terms, I will argue that the literature on the substantive 
representation of women lacks a consideration of institutional context and resources. 
Likewise, the feminization of conservative party literature cannot explain cases where 
conservative parties are not feminized but nevertheless adopt feminist policies. While 
grounded in the substantive representation of women literature, my conceptual 
framework addresses the identified weaknesses by also drawing on the veto player 
approach and the coalition bargaining literature in comparative politics. When presenting 
my framework, I will show how these approaches complement my conceptual framework 
and increase its explanatory value. 
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2.1.  Literature Review 
2.1.1.  Substantive Representation of Women 
The study of women in politics typically consists of three areas: the descriptive 
representation of women, the substantive representation of women, and the symbolic 
representation of women (Pitkin 1967). Studies of the descriptive representation of 
women explain the numerical presence of women in elected office by emphasizing the 
barriers that women face when running for office (Wängnerud 2009), focusing primarily 
on electoral, socioeconomic, and cultural variables.4 In contrast, the symbolic 
representation of women tries to understand whether female representatives have a 
positive effect on women’s political interest and involvement by serving as role models. 
Symbolic representation also argues that the presence of women in political institutions 
enhances the political legitimacy of these institutions and signals women’s equal status as 
political representatives (Celis and Childs 2014).5 
The substantive representation of women perspective studies how women once 
elected, represent women’s interests (Celis 2009). As Pitkin (1967) argues, being 
substantively represented means ‘acting in the interest of the represented, in a manner 
responsive to them’ (209). Substantive representation consists of representative acts such 
as voting for women-friendly policies, speaking for women (i.e., introducing women’s 
issues and experiences into legislative debates), proposing women-friendly policies, or 
                                                
4 See for example: Wängnerud 2009; Kennworthy & Malami 1999 on the impact of electoral factors; 
Inglehart & Norris 2003 on cultural factors; and Norris & Lovenduski 1995 on socioeconomic context. 
5 See also Joshi and Och (2014) for a discussion on the different forms of representation. 
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testifying (i.e., drawing on personal experience to elaborate women’s issues) (Celis 
2009). These representative acts ultimately are thought to lead to the inclusion of 
women’s concerns, experiences, and interests in the policy-making process. The literature 
always assumes a link between the presence of women and the representation of 
women’s interest as is most clearly put forward by Phillips (1998) and her politics of 
presence argument when she holds that men alone can neither accurately nor adequately 
represent women’s interests as a whole. The underlying assumption is that women have 
different policy priorities than men and are more likely to act for women (Taylor-
Robinson and Heath 2003; Swers 2005). For example, women as a group are thought to 
be more likely to support policies as they relate to children/family, education, health care, 
societal welfare, and the environment (Thomas 1991; Taylor-Robinson and Heath 2003). 
Studies indeed have found that women more often than men engage in and initiate 
debates6 about women’s issues (Chaney 2006 and 2008 on Welsh Assembly, 2011 on the 
Scottish Assembly; Piscopo 2011 on the Argentinian parliament). Women are twice as 
likely as men to support feminist and pro-equality measures (Chaney 2008, 279; Piscopo 
2011; Swers 2005 on US Congress), and women are more likely to co-sponsor or sponsor 
bills addressing women’s issues (Reingold 2008; Swers 2005; Taylor-Robinson and 
Heath 2003 on Honduras).  
There are two major arguments put forward regarding how the descriptive 
representation of women translates into the substantive representation of women: the 
                                                
6 Sixty-seven percent of women initiated a debate on women’s issues in the Welsh Assembly compared to 
36.4 percent of men (Chaney 2006, 701). 
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critical mass and critical actor arguments. The critical mass argument holds that women 
need to make up a certain percentage of the legislature to achieve policy change 
(Dahlerup 1988; Kanter 1977). However, the research is inconclusive on where this 
threshold should be located, locating the threshold between ten and forty per cent (Celis 
and Childs 2012; Bochel and Bochel 2008), and whether critical mass actually matters at 
all (Grey 2006; Studlar and McAllister 2002). Thus, recent studies have argued that the 
link between critical mass and the substantive representation of women is probabilistic 
rather than deterministic (Wängnerud 2009). 
As a response to the inconclusiveness of the critical mass debate, attention has 
shifted to the role of individual women - termed critical actors - in pushing for more 
women-friendly policies. The critical actor perspective argues that even a small number 
of women can make a difference in gendered discourse and outcomes. Critical actors are: 
those who initiate policy proposals on their own, even when women form 
a small minority, and embolden others to take steps to promote policies for 
women, regardless of the proportion of female representatives (Childs and 
Krook 2006, 528). 
Critical actors thus are individuals (male and female) such as femocrats (a civil 
servant dealing with women’s issues), members of parliaments, cabinet ministers, or 
heads of governments or collective actors such as women’s organizations or women 
caucuses. Often, these critical actors share backgrounds as activists or held senior 
positions in women’s organizations prior to becoming politicians (Annesley and Gains 
2010; Chaney 2006). Research has supported the claim that some women are more likely 
than others to act for women: In his analysis of the Scottish and Welsh parliament, 
Chaney (2006 and 2011) found that the same small group of women accounted for the 
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majority of all women-friendly initiatives in the legislature and committees. Similarly, 
Sawer (2012) found that critical actors played an important role in allowing RU 486 (an 
abortion pill) to be sold in Australia.  
This emphasis on the role of women in parliament, the party, and executive office 
in promoting policy change beneficial to women is reflected in the literature on board 
diversity and father leave. Several studies have emphasized the role of individual actors 
such as Angela Merkel or Ursula von der Leyen (the Minister for Families, Seniors, 
Women, and Youth Matters) in ensuring the passage of equitable parental leave in 
Germany. For example, Henninger and von Wahl (2010) ask why Ursula von der Leyen 
was able to push a progressive family policy. The authors find that, among others, Ursula 
von der Leyen’s leadership was crucial in building coalitions. Likewise, Wiliarty (2010) 
sees the political leadership of Ursula von der Leyen as vital to the success of the policy 
reform. She argues that the minister was pivotal in securing support from the business 
community and church groups. Further, she was able to count on Angela Merkel for 
support. Interestingly, von Wahl (2011) finds that Angela Merkel’s gender did not inform 
her decision to support equitable care leave, confirming the claim in the critical actor 
approach that not all women are critical actors. 
Others such as Morgan (2013) and Lambert (2008) follow more closely the 
critical mass argument by holding that the greater descriptive representation of women in 
political parties and parliament in general is linked to the adoption of equitable parental 
leave. Lambert (2008) develops an index of maternal employment policy for 20 OECD 
countries arguing that the adoption of women-friendly maternal employment policy is 
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best explained by a higher percentage of women in parliament, a low number of veto 
points, and centralized and coordinated employer organizations. Lambert argues that 
female representatives are more likely to push for women- friendly policies, including 
maternal employment policies, than their male colleagues because of their personal 
experience with work-family conflicts. Morgan (2013) analyzes the expansion of work-
family policies in the United Kingdom, Germany, and the Netherlands. She holds that in 
addition to electoral calculations, the growing significance of women in political parties 
has prompted the expansion of work-family policies in these three countries (see also 
Morgan 2011). She shows that female party members pressed for equitable parental leave 
policies by pointing out electoral opportunities and the ability to address socioeconomic 
concerns such as declining fertility, welfare dependency, and securing the future of the 
welfare state by increasing workforce participation among women.  
One major weakness in the literature studying the substantive representation of 
women is that few studies specify which mechanisms or factors translate the presence of 
women or feminist claim-making7 into tangible policy outcomes. Studies also tend to 
focus on individual variables thought to facilitate the representation of women’s interests, 
most prominently women’s agencies and caucuses (see Stoffel 2008; Sawer 2012 or 
Mazur 2002) or the women’s movement (see Beckwith and Cowell-Meyers 2007 and 
Weldon 2002). I argue that by testing the impact of single factors on the substantive 
representation of women, such as the influence of the women’s movement in producing 
                                                
7 The gender and politics literature uses the term ‘claim making’ to denote the type of arguments actors 
make for or against a policy. Feminist claim-making describes an instance where actors argue for or against 
a policy utilizing feminist arguments; for example, justifying a equal pay laws because it addresses 
workplace discrimination against women (Celis and Childs 2014). 
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women-friendly policies, these studies may overlook other more useful explanatory 
variables or conditions that might negate the effect of the individual variables under 
consideration. More importantly though, the presence of critical actors is simply not 
enough: speaking out on women’s issues does not guarantee that policies will be adopted. 
This problem has been pointed out most recently by Annesley and Gains (2010) who 
argue that the positional power of women in the policy making process is important in 
determining policy outcomes:  
 . . . (T)o understand where the substantive representation of women 
occurs, it is important to be clear about where the power lies in any 
institutional context as well as process of policy change (…) it is not 
enough to focus on critical actors but (..) it is necessary to place them in 
their institutional context, highlighting that this both enables and 
constrains their ability to make substantive policy changes (…) feminists 
(…) need to hold positions that grant access to power and resources (913). 
Likewise, Mackay (2008) also called for a conceptual approach where the ‘who, 
what, where, when, and how of substantive representation in concrete situations’ (p. 135) 
is not defined a priori but rather ‘traces over time the critical actors, sites, and dynamics 
in context’ (p. 135).  
While my conceptual framework builds on the critical actor concept, I argue that 
the presence of critical actors in the policy process is not enough; instead, the position of 
critical actors in the policy making process is crucial in determining the policy outcome. 
Specifically, I will respond to the calls in the existing literature to put critical actors into 
their institutional context by incorporating the veto player approach from the comparative 
welfare literature. Some studies have already assessed the importance of veto players in 
explaining feminist policy adoption under conservative governments. Veto players are 
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political actors whose consent is necessary to adopt a policy (Tsebelis 1995), and 
consequently occupy important institutional positions in the policy making process. 
Henninger and von Wahl (2011), for example, draw on the veto player approach to 
analyze the composition of the government and the Bundesrat (upper chamber of the 
German parliament) and find it to be a necessary but insufficient condition for the 2006 
parental leave reform. Lambert (2008) asserts that the number of veto points in the policy 
process in addition to the number of women in politics is important for the adoption of 
equitable care leave. Neither Lambert nor Henninger nor von Wahl, however, link veto 
players and veto points to their other explanatory variables, including, most importantly, 
the role of women who push for these policies. I argue that if we want to put critical 
actors into their institutional context, we need to theorize how the institutional position of 
critical actors affects their ability to influence policy outcomes. The veto player approach 
offers us the ability to do just that, as I will explain further below. 
2.1.2.  Feminization of Conservative Parties.  
While the substantive representation of women considers whether and to which 
extent women’s interests are represented in politics, the study of conservative parties and 
women’s representation asks the same question pertaining specifically to conservative 
parties. For a long time, conservative parties have been considered an unlikely place for 
the expression women’s interests. Women’s interests often have a distinct leftist or liberal 
definition, and authors tend to equate women’s interest with feminist interests (Beckwith 
and Cowell-Meyers 2007; Saward 2008; Celis 2009; Celis and Childs 2012). Thus, 
conservative parties were not thought to be places where women’s interests are 
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represented. More recent studies have attempted to broaden the understanding of 
women’s interests by differentiating between feminist and gendered claims (Celis and 
Childs 2012 and 2014). Feminist claims emphasize women as individual right bearers 
and challenge the traditional division of labor among men and women, while gendered 
claims call attention to women’s roles in relation to their status as women and wives. 
Often these gendered claims are unambiguously anti-feminist (Kantola and Saari 2014). 
Thus, by broadening the definition of women’s interests to include gendered claim-
making, the study of conservative parties became possible. The expectation is that 
conservative women will emphasize the traditional role of women as mothers and wives 
while progressive women in left leaning parties will put forward feminist claims that 
challenge the traditional division of labor in the public setting and the home. I argue, 
however, that this conclusion is premature as recent studies have shown that conservative 
women are ‘more likely to adopt a more progressive, liberal, and feminist position than 
their male peers.’ (Celis and Childs 2011; see also: Campbell, Childs, and Lovenduski 
2006; Campbell and Childs 2013; Swers 2005). In my later case studies, I will show that 
conservative women indeed put forward feminist arguments to justify the need for father 
leave and board diversity policies.  
More importantly though, recent changes in the political behavior of conservative 
parties, such as efforts to increase the number of conservative representatives in 
parliaments or the adoption of progressive policies under conservative governments, has 
prompted an interest in the study of conservative parties under the broader framework of 
women’s representation. The process by which conservative parties include more women 
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in the party organizations and in parliament as well as the process by which conservative 
parties promote women’s interests is called feminization (Celis and Childs 2014). 
Feminization has two distinct dimensions: the feminization of descriptive representation 
(i.e., increasing the number of women in the conservative party) and the feminization of 
substantive representation (i.e., proposing policies reflective of women’s interests). It is 
the latter form of feminization that is relevant for my conceptual framework.  
According to the feminization process, conservative parties will advocate for 
feminist policies based on electoral calculation. Not too long ago, women tended to vote 
for conservative parties because women shared the religious attachment and traditional 
family values that conservative parties supported (Inglehart and Norris 2000). This 
phenomenon is referred to as the traditional gender gap. This started to change in the 
1980s. Women’s increased participation in the workforce, the achievement of greater 
educational attainment, the breakdown of the traditional family, emergence of new 
gender roles, and the women’s liberation movement changed women’s political views 
and opinions. A new gender gap – the modern gender gap – emerged when women 
started to align themselves more closely with parties on the left which supported 
women’s equality and progressive roles for women and men. As a result, conservative 
parties lost the women’s vote, and with it, their ability to win elections. The feminization 
literature argues that, once conservative parties realize that women and young voters 
represent the keys to returning to power, conservative parties will try to reform their party 
image. Conservative parties hope to improve their electoral fortunes by recruiting more 
women into their ranks and by incorporating women’s issues into their party platform 
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(Celis and Childs 2014). Winning back the women vote becomes a crucial strategy in 
returning to political power. Electoral calculation is thus the main driving factor that 
explains the adoption of feminist policies by conservative parties. 
This explanation is reflected in several of the studies that look at the adoption of 
equitable care policies. Most notably, Hien (2014) presents a vote-seeking argument to 
explain the adoption of the 2006 parental leave law: after the breakup of the traditional 
electoral cleavages, conservative parties could no longer be sure of women’s support. 
Instead, they had to compete with all other parties for the women vote. Accordingly, 
conservative parties started to feminize the party by encouraging women’s representation 
in their ranks and including women’s issues in their party platform. More specifically, 
Hien argues that the religious realignment after German unification opened a window of 
opportunity for modernizing family policies. Before 1990, the strongest constituency for 
the CDU was Catholic voters; yet with the fall of the Berlin wall the CDU slowly 
realigned itself with a more liberal Protestant constituency in the 2000s. Angela Merkel, 
being from East Germany herself, is considered to have played a major role in 
modernizing the CDU.  
Similarly, Morgan (2013) emphasizes the role of electoral calculation when 
explaining the adoption of work-family policies: she argues that dominant political 
parties in Germany, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands witnessed an erosion of 
traditional constituencies leading to electoral defeats and then embarked on 
organizational reforms and searched for new issues that would allow them to reach out to 
new constituencies. One such constituency is women voters who demand policies that 
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allow women to reconcile work and family life. Fleckenstein and Lee (2012) present a 
similar argument. The authors discuss why traditional male breadwinner countries – the 
United Kingdom, Germany, and South Korea – adopted equitable work family policies 
that are more in line with policies found in dual earner/dual career societies such as 
Sweden. They find that party competition is the key political driver for policy change 
while post-industrialization (particularly women’s increased labor force participation) 
provides the functional underpinnings for these reforms. The authors propose that all 
three cases support the argument that it is electoral competition for new constituencies, 
most notably women and young voters, which has driven the adoption of gender 
equitable family policies. Von Wahl (2011) asks whether Angela Merkel’s gender has 
made any difference for policies that represent women’s interests. She specifically 
considers the cases of the 2006 parental leave law and the anti-discrimination law. The 
study concludes that Merkel’s decision making was less influenced by gender equality 
concerns and more by considerations for supportive electoral alliances and her own 
socialization in Eastern Germany.  
Based on a review of the literature, electoral calculation seems to be an important 
explanatory factor. I agree that this is the case, but nevertheless I have identified two 
problems with emphasizing electoral calculation alone. First, it does not explain why 
conservative parties, which did not undergo a process of feminization, also adopted 
feminist policies. In the empirical chapters that follow, I argue that conservative parties in 
Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom are all cases where a feminization of the party 
did not occur. Rather, conservative parties were pushed by their coalition partners to 
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adopt these policies (Germany, United Kingdom) or used them as a means to achieve 
non-feminist ends (Japan). Second, once conservative parties are in government, electoral 
calculation is not the only motivating factor behind policy decisions. In all cases of father 
leave and board diversity policy adopted under conservative governments, the 
conservative party was in a coalition government. Yet, the influence of coalition 
constraints on policy outcomes is not theorized in the existing literature on the 
substantive representation of women in general or regarding father leave and board 
diversity policies specifically. The exception is a study by Henninger and von Wahl 
(2014) which investigates why the modernization course under Angela Merkel stalled in 
the 17th legislative period. While the 16th legislative period saw the adoption of several 
progressive policies such as the parental leave reform, the anti-discrimination law, and a 
law extending childcare services, no such policies occurred between 2009 and 2013. The 
authors identify three major factors that stymied the modernization course of the CDU: 
first, the government moved towards the center-right of the political spectrum when it 
formed a coalition with the liberal party (FDP) in 2009; second, traditionalists within the 
CDU were able to assert themselves; and third, the CDU aimed to bind conservative 
voters to the party who were unhappy with the ‘social democratization’ of the CDU under 
the previous grand coalition with the Social Democrats.  
I argue that coalition constraints play an important role in determining policy 
outcomes. While I do not dismiss outright the explanatory value of electoral calculation, I 
question its utility in cases where the conservative party is not undergoing a process of 
feminization and where the conservative party is in a coalition government. In these 
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cases, electoral calculation might be a motivating factor but not an explanatory factor in 
itself. 
To conclude then, I argue that the literature on the substantive representation of 
women and the literature on the feminization of conservative parties offers us important 
insights that must be considered when trying to explain why conservative governments 
adopt feminist policies. Rather than dismissing these findings, I will expand on the 
presence of women, the institutional setting, and the electoral context in my conceptual 
framework, to which I now turn. The remaining factors, such as socioeconomic and 
demographic pressures or cultural background conditions will be considered as 
alternative explanations, which I will discuss in the next chapter. 
2.2.  Conceptual Framework  
Based on a critical assessment of the existing literature, I argue that critical actors 
need to be put into their institutional context in an effort to assess their policy impact. To 
do so, I will draw upon the veto player approach in comparative welfare studies. 
Theorizing the link between veto players and critical actors will allow me to identify the 
institutional power that critical actors have at their disposal and to identify how the 
position of critical actors in the institutional context determines these actors’ ability to 
affect policy outcomes. I will draw on the literature on coalition bargaining in 
comparative politics to illustrate that in the case of coalition governments, electoral 
calculations take a backseat to coalition constraints. Together, critical actors, veto 




2.2.1.  Critical Actors 
Following the critical actor literature, I argue that critical actors play a necessary 
part in pushing for the adoption of feminist policies. To reiterate, critical actors are 
defined as: 
 …those who initiate policy proposals on their own, even when women 
form a small minority, and embolden others to take steps to promote 
policies for women, regardless of the proportion of female representatives 
(Childs and Krook 2006, 528) 
According to this definition, for individuals to be critical actors, two conditions 
need to hold: (1) they must initiate policy proposals on their own; and (2) they need to 
encourage others to support women friendly policies. Thus, critical actors, in this 
definition, are considered to be legislators. This, however, is too narrow. For one, in some 
cases policy proposals emerge outside the legislative realm and are picked up by political 
actors. Further, the concept of critical actors does not account for important actors who 
might not be members of parliament but who nevertheless have an important say in 
formulating party policies, such as business or labor interests. Thus, we need to widen the 
concept of critical actors to include both parliamentary and extra-parliamentary roles. I 
therefore define critical actors as  
1. Individuals who advocate for feminist policies in the public realm; and  
2. Individuals who advocate for feminist policies during the legislative 
process  
As a result, I differentiate between parliamentary critical actors and extra-
parliamentary critical actors. Parliamentary actors are critical actors if they act in the 
parliament as well as if they speak out in the media in favor of the policy. This allows me 
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to account for the realities of the parliamentary order of business while recognizing the 
instrumental role parliamentarian actors can play in pushing topics onto the government 
agenda through active participation in public debates. Extra-parliamentary actors are 
critical actors if they advocate on behalf of a policy in the media and/or engage in some 
form of political activism to influence the outcome of the policy process by either serving 
as policy experts – i.e., testifying in committees – or by petitioning the government. 
We also need to acknowledge the possibility that critical actors can be men 
because the main characteristic of critical actors is their support for women-friendly 
policies – or in the case of this dissertation, support for the adoption of father leave or 
board diversity policies – which is inherently independent of gender. If we restrict the 
analysis to women, we risk not only overlooking the contribution men make to feminist 
policy adoption but also other potentially explanatory variables. Once we determine who 
these critical actors are, we need to ask whether they have agenda setting powers, 
whether they can veto policies, and whether they have access to the most important 
decision makers in the policy making process. Because my conceptual framework does 
not limit the range of actors who could have influence on the policy outcome, I can 
account for the varying influence of individuals, such as women members of parliament, 
female members of the Executive, or femocrats, as well as collective entities such as 
women’s agencies, movements, or caucuses, on the adoption of feminist policies.  
It is important to note that the term ‘critical actor’ builds on the term ‘critical 
mass’ to signify a continuation of the importance of women in politics. While the 
literature considers women’s presence to be ‘critical’ in terms of voicing women’s 
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interests, the term should not be confused with actors that are ‘critical’ in the policy 
making process per se. Rather, critical actors should be considered to be advocates for the 
inclusion of women’s interests in public policy. Whether critical actors can be considered 
of crucial importance in the policy making process depends on the position critical actors 
occupy in the policy making process. 
Considering that feminist policies are contrary to conservative principles, one 
might argue that the adoption of these policies reflects purely instrumental reasoning and 
that we will not find critical actors within conservative parties who embrace gender 
equality on ideological grounds. I argue that this is not necessarily the case as research 
has shown that conservative women are often more liberal than their male counterparts 
(Campbell and Childs 2013). Thus, even in conservative governments we will find 
critical actors who support feminist policies not for instrumental reasons alone but also 
for feminist or ideological reasons. However, these policy advocates cannot act on their 
ideological preferences and become critical actors unless opportune political 
constellations open a window of opportunity for the passage of such policies. This 
window of opportunity is two-fold: (1) coalition constraints must be advantageous for 
policy adoption; and (2) critical actors need to be veto players. 
2.2.2.  Coalition Constraints 
In all instances where conservative governments adopted either father leave 
policies or board diversity policy, the conservative party was in a government coalition 
with a junior coalition partner. Regardless of whether a political party has promised to 
adopt a policy once in government, coalition negotiations and the resulting coalition 
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agreement will determine the type of policies a coalition partner can pursue. The goal of 
coalition agreements is twofold: to reduce mistrust and uncertainty among coalition 
partners and to limit policy conflict for the duration of coalition governance 
(Timmermans 2006). Typically, coalition agreements contain the policy agenda, 
distribution of cabinet posts, and procedural rules (Strøm, Müller, and Kare 2000). It is 
the first of these that is of greatest interest to the dissertation. During coalition 
negotiations, both parties will try to push for their preferred policy but will be forced to 
make policy concessions to create a coalition program acceptable to both parties. Most 
political parties will not be able to include their full campaign platform but will have their 
preferred policies amended or rejected during coalition negotiations (Laver and Schofield 
1998). In the end, coalition agreements act as written expectations what type of policies a 
cabinet minister can initiate (Moury 2013) and more broadly set the policy agenda of the 
government (Schermann and Ennser-Jedenastik 2012). Consequently, coalition negations 
represent a window of opportunity for critical actors to include their policy priorities in 
the coalition agreement. 
I hold that coalition agreements can be considered to be an intervening variable 
between election promises and agenda setting (and later policy adoption) under coalition 
governments; yet few studies have paid attention to the role of coalition building in 
influencing feminist policy outcomes. Paying attention to coalition negotiations and 
coalition governance is crucial because the mechanism of coalition building greatly 
influences the chances of policy adoption under coalition governments. In a study of 
Western European countries – where coalition governance has been the norm – Moury 
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(2013) finds that 60 per cent of cabinet decisions originated from the coalition agreement 
and that the majority of cabinet members feels uneasy pursuing policies that are not 
included in the coalition agreement. The sentiment is echoed by Müller and Strøm who 
argue that the coalition agreement is ‘the most authoritative document which constrains 
party behavior’ (2000, 18). Accordingly, we need to ask whether the feminist policy 
under consideration was included in the coalition agreement.  
This is particularly important in cases where coalition partners have different 
policy stances on the policy; the greater the difference among coalition partners in a 
policy area, the less likely it is that the policy will be included in the coalition agreement 
(Schermann and Ennser-Jadenastik 2014). Policy differences have been particularly 
pronounced in regards to feminist policies, with the conservative party typically opposing 
the feminist policy and the coalition partner pushing for the policy to be included in the 
coalition agreement. Coalition negotiations are instrumental especially in this scenario. 
The fate of a feminist policy is influenced by the bargaining power among the 
conservative party and the prospective coalition partner during the negotiations. 
Bargaining power is determined by the share of parliamentary seats each political party 
has won and whether there are alternative coalition partners available (Müller and Strøm 
2000). Accordingly, the more parliamentary seats the coalition partner commands, the 
more likely it can push for the inclusion of the feminist policy in the coalition agreement. 
Bargaining power further increases when the conservative party has no other viable 
option for a coalition partner and a minority government is out of question. Here the 
coalition is one of electoral necessity. Thus, I hold that the inclusion of feminist policies 
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in the coalition agreement is more likely where the coalition is one of electoral necessity 
and where the size of coalition partners (measured in share of parliamentary seats won by 
each party) is roughly equal. 
However, policy issues can emerge as a topic of public debate at any point during 
the legislative period, forcing the coalition government to decide whether it will take 
action or not. In this case, the coalition partners cannot revert back to the coalition 
agreement but must make an ad-hoc decision. Again, coalition constraints are particularly 
pertinent when policy preferences differ among the coalition partners. Contrary to 
coalition negotiations, however, here the nature of the coalition is the only decisive 
factor. If the coalition is one of electoral necessity for the conservative party, the coalition 
partner can threaten with an exit from the coalition if its preferred policy solution is not 
accepted. Further, if explicit or implicit policy agreements in the coalition agreement 
conflict with the feminist policy under consideration, either coalition partner can leverage 
the binding nature of the coalition agreement against the other political party. Thus, these 
instances require individual analysis, but it is reasonable to expect that feminist policies 
will not be supported where (1) feminist policies violate the terms of the coalition 
agreement, or (2) the opposing coalition partner is willing to exit the coalition where the 
coalition is one of electoral necessity. 
To recap then, successful policy outcomes are more likely when the coalition 
government puts the feminist policy on its policy agenda. Inclusion of a feminist policy 
on the government agenda is likely when coalition constraints are permissive. Whether 
this will be the case depends on (a) the bargaining power of each coalition partner 
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measured by the relative share of parliamentary seats and (b) the nature of the coalition in 
cases where policy differences between the coalition partners exist. In instances where 
both coalition partners agree on the feminist policy, the policy most likely will be 
included in the coalition agreement regardless of the bargaining power of each political 
party. Yet the support for feminist policies by the coalition government is not enough. To 
make feminist policy adoption likely (i.e., its passage into law), the constellation of 
critical actors and veto players is crucial.  
2.2.3.  Veto Players 
As discussed earlier, critical actors need to be located in their institutional context 
to understand the institutional resources at their disposal to influence the adoption of 
feminist policies. My assumption is that the more institutional resources critical actors 
have at their disposal, the more likely is feminist policy adoption. I will draw on the veto 
player approach found in comparative politics to determine the institutional resources 
available to critical actors in each instance of feminist policy adoption under 
consideration. 
Comparative welfare studies aim to explain the adoption, retention, and 
retrenchment of welfare programs and policies. One commonly used explanation is the 
importance of veto points and veto players in explaining these policy outcomes. While 
the concepts of veto points and veto players are similar, they are quite distinct from one 
another. Veto points describe institutional elements in the political system that allow 
policy advocates or opponents to influence the outcome of the policy proposal. Veto 
points are ‘aspects of constitutional structure that disperse political power and offer 
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multiple points of influence on the making and adoption of policy’ (Huber, Ragin, and 
Stephens 1993, 722). Typically veto points are expected to be found most frequently in 
federalism, bicameralism, proportional electoral system, and in the presence of popular 
referenda (Huber and Stephens 2000). Immergut (1990) highlights how veto points in the 
policy-making process can impede health care reform because each ‘veto opportunity 
allows political decision to be overturned at different stages of the policy process’ (413). 
The more veto points are present, the harder it is to adopt new policies. This argument is 
confirmed by several studies on parental leave reforms (see Henderson and White 2004; 
Huber and Stephens 2000). For example, Lambert (2008) argues that the adoption of 
women-friendly maternal employment policy is best explained by a higher percentage of 
women in parliament, a low number of veto points, and centralized and coordinated 
employer organizations. Her findings also confirm the common view in the literature on 
welfare expansion that multiple veto points in the decision-making process make it easier 
for opponents, who may oppose equitable family policies on cultural or fiscal grounds, to 
prevent meaningful policy reforms.  
The veto player approach builds on the veto point approach but represents a more 
dynamic framework more suitable to analyzing policy processes. For one, veto points 
remain fixed and are considered access points for political actors to influence policy 
outcomes. However, the dynamics between veto points are not considered. Further, I will 
focus on the veto player approach because counting the number of veto points cannot 
explain differing outcomes. For example, the United Kingdom has few veto points but 
has failed to adopt both a father leave policy and a board diversity policy. Germany, in 
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contrast, has many veto points and has adopted both policies. I also hold that the veto 
player approach subsumes the veto point approach. The majority of the veto points are 
represented as veto players. For example, the veto point bicameralism is reflected as one 
form of veto player in instances where the upper chamber must support a bill before it 
becomes law. Thus, the conceptual framework will emphasize the veto player over the 
veto point approach.  
Veto players are not institutional points in the policy making process but political 
actors who occupy important positions in the policy making process. Veto players are 
“individuals or collective actors whose agreement is necessary for a change of the status-
quo” (Tsebelis 2002, 19). Tsebelis (1995, 1999, 2002) argues that in order for policy 
change to occur, unanimous consent to the policy by all veto players is necessary. Thus, 
the more veto players exist, the more difficult it is to bring about policy change. There are 
two kinds of veto players: institutional and partisan veto players. Institutional veto 
players are identified in the constitution and usually are the parliament, the head of the 
state or head of the government, or the government itself. Partisan veto players are 
generated by the political game, for example which party is the governing party or which 
parties form a governing coalition, or the role of individual members in the cabinet. In 
addition, there are potential veto players such as courts, specific individuals or groups 
whose opinion or support is crucial for policy success and who cannot easily be classified 
as institutional or partisan veto players. However, who these potential veto players is case 
specific. For example, Heidenreich’s (2012) study explains why Norway adopted 
corporate board quotas while Sweden did not. The author concludes that the organization 
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of the business community vis-à-vis the state and the political culture were the decisive 
factors. In Norway, state ownership of companies is extensive and capitalists are small 
and dispersed, which limits their influence on state policies. This is in contrast to 
Sweden, where companies are large private firms which pride themselves on autonomy 
and legitimacy from the state. Thus, in Sweden the business community acted as a de-
facto veto player. Finally, institutional and partisan veto players are not created equal. 
Veto players with agenda setting powers are primary veto players while all other veto 
players are secondary ones. 
In order to identify veto players, Tsebelis proposes a three-step process: The first 
step requires us to locate the veto players in the multi-institutional space (institutional 
veto players). The second step requires us to separate these institutional veto players into 
partisan veto players and specify whether they are individual or collective veto players. If 
they are collective veto players, we need to pay attention to how decisions are made: do 
the decisions require simple or qualified majorities? Are the votes of the government 
party or parties sufficient? This will determine how difficult it is to adopt policy. The 
third step in Tsebelis’ three-step process requires us to apply the absorption rule. Under 
the absorption rule, players who are located in the unanimity core of the other need not 
necessarily be analyzed as separate veto players. For example, when both chambers in a 
bicameral system are dominated by the same party, it is sufficient to only look at the 
governing political party in the more important chamber as the key veto player because 
the upper chamber will automatically agree to any policy proposed in the lower house by 
their own party.  
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One common criticism of the veto player approach emphasizes the difficulties of 
identifying veto players and determining their policy preferences (see Ganghof 2003). It 
is particularly the identification of partisan veto players that sometimes can be 
challenging. Here, detailed knowledge of each case is imperative. To ensure that I 
identify the correct and all of the relevant partisan veto players, a careful reading of 
official documents and media reports as well as elite interviews with key actors were 
indispensable. In contrast, institutional veto players are determined by the constitution or 
the legal framework of each country and are clearly defined. However, the absorption 
rule needs to be applied very carefully in order to not discount the influence of potential 
institutional veto players, such as the upper level of parliament. Here, the political 
realities of each case needs to be well-known to the researcher in order to correctly 
identify all relevant institutional veto players. With regard to determining the policy 
preferences of veto players, this has been done through a precise analysis of published 
interviews conducted with these veto players as well as public statements, biographical 
accounts, and personal interviews with key stakeholders. By consulting a variety of 
resources and through the detailed study of each case, determining the policy preferences 
of veto players is indeed possible. 
Because all case studies under consideration for this dissertation occurred in 
parliamentary democracies, I will now discuss how the veto player approach is best 
applied in this institutional setting. Parliamentary democracy is a synonym for party 
government where the majority party controls the executive and legislative branches of 
government (Müller and Strøm 2000). In the majority of parliamentary democracies, 
 
45 
majority party governments are rare. Instead, coalition or multi-party governments are 
more common. Thus, coalition governance becomes an important focal point when 
explaining policy outcomes. Tsebelis argues that each coalition partner is a partisan veto 
player. However, I follow the assessment of Müller and Strøm (2010) that this is not the 
case (see also Moury 2013): as discussed above, coalitions are governed by detailed and 
complicated coalition agreements that set forth the legislative agenda. Thus, as long as 
policy proposals follow the guidelines outlined in the coalition agreement, each coalition 
party waives its right to veto such a policy. As the authors aptly state: 
Coalition agreements exist, and they are designed to cement deals that 
might otherwise come unstuck. Indeed, one of the main functions of 
coalition agreements is for each of the coalition parties to relinquish any 
veto power over policies to which the coalition specifically commits itself. 
As long as the coalition parties faithfully observe the agreement, their 
mutual veto power has then ceased to exist (Müller and Strøm 2010, 
164/165). 
Another characteristic of parliamentary democracies is that policy making is 
delegated from the legislature to the cabinet (Moury 2013). Executive dominance of the 
legislative process is illustrated by the passage rates for cabinet bills: for example, in the 
United Kingdom, 95 per cent of cabinet bills typically pass (Qvortrup 2011, 87); in 
Germany 73 per cent of cabinet bills passed between 1990 and 2013 (Statistik zur 
Gestzgebung 2014), and in Japan the passage rate for cabinet bills was above 94 per cent 
between 2002 and 2004 (Köster-Riemann 2011, 257). The composition of the cabinet is 
not just important because the majority of bills that are introduced into the policy making 
process consists of cabinet bills and because of their high passage rates but also because 
party governments operate according to the principle of minister discretion, i.e., a 
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situation where only the responsible cabinet minister is in charge of developing the policy 
draft (Laver and Shepsle 1996). Because ministries have more resources than individual 
representatives to develop policy proposals, the minister has full control over the content 
of the policy draft which typically corresponds closely with his or her party’s ideas for 
the optimal policy. Further, each cabinet minister can act fairly independent of the 
minister’s colleagues in the cabinet. That being so, a policy will only be introduced into 
the legislative process if the cabinet minister responsible decides to do so (Müller 2004) 
and the cabinet can only modify the proposal based on the parameters set forth in the 
policy proposal. As such, the cabinet minister responsible has tremendous agenda setting 
power (Laver and Shepsle 1998). Yet cabinet ministers are far from being policy dictators 
(see Laver and Shepsle 1990) because their ability to initiate policies is limited by the 
preference of their political party and the coalition agreements (Moury 2013). Speaking 
to the latter, a study of coalition governance finds that 68 per cent of cabinet ministers 
across four European countries felt constrained by coalition agreements (Moury 2013, 
108). Due to the agenda setting power of cabinet ministers, cabinet ministers are 
preeminent (or primary) veto players in Tsebelis’ framework. In analyzing the 
composition of cabinets, we need to ask which cabinet minister is in charge of the issue 
area pertaining to the feminist policy. For example, when addressing father leave policy 
or board diversity policy, the departments dealing with welfare, labor, or equality issues 
will be more important than traditionally powerful departments such as foreign affairs or 
the defense.  
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Depending on the institutional rules and the rules of the political game, in 
parliamentary democracies, secondary veto players are potentially the cabinet, the head 
of government, the lower or upper chamber of parliament, parliamentary committees, and 
the head of state. Because the institutional rules outlining the steps in the legislative 
process will differ in each case and across policy areas, I will determine the specific 
number of veto players for each case study later on, applying Tsebelis’ three step process 
as outlined above. Further, informal and formal procedures may also establish de facto 
veto players from outside the parliamentary process, such as labor unions, business 
interests, or religious organizations, which also require identification on an ad hoc basis. 
Because parliamentary democracies are characterized by party government, the 
process by which political parties arrive at their policy preferences merits further 
attention. Yet Tsebelis essentially treats political parties as black boxes. He assumes that 
the ‘government proposal has to be approved by a majority of the relevant actors within 
each party of the government coalition’ (Tsebelis 1995, 302) but does not theorize how 
this approval process occurs. He squarely focuses on the formal policy adoption process 
alone and does not consider the prior policy adoption process that occurs internally 
within a party. Tsebelis is not alone in treating political parties as uniform actors – much 
of the political party literature does the same (Timmermans 2006; Müller and Strøm 
2000). Yet it is important to open this black box if we want to understand policy 
adoption, because any policies need to be adopted by the political party before they are 
introduced into the policy-making process.  
 
48 
Before making policy decisions, party leaders need to consider the reaction of the 
electorate, internal groups, and backbenchers (Moury 2013; Timmermans 2006). This is 
important because the party base must ultimately support government proposals (or at 
least tolerate them) to allow for the proper functioning of coalition governance. I argue 
that dynamics between party internal groups and more importantly, the relative influence 
of each group within the party will affect policy adoption within political parties in two 
ways. First, internal group dynamics will influence whether political leaders can pursue 
specific policies during the adoption process. Second, internal group dynamics shape the 
policy content and wording (i.e., the scope, applicability, and effectiveness of the bill) 
during the adoption process. Mulé (2001), for example, explains changes in income 
distribution in four advanced industrialized countries, by referring to factional dynamics 
within parties. She argues that the rise of a new faction, the consolidation of a new 
faction, or the demise of an old faction explains the selection of policies. The emergence 
of a new faction can lead to new social policies particularly when new social forces 
dominate the electoral process. For example, the rising importance of young and female 
voters might bolster the case of modernizing elements in the conservative party that 
advocate for more progressive or equitable social policies. Here, electoral calculations 
intersect with inter-party group dynamics. When a new faction can consolidate its power, 
it might wish to change the party image to better reflect the change of guards, which may 
lead to policy changes. When an old faction weakens, the newly dominant faction then 
has the opportunity to ensure the adoption of its preferred policies without major 
interparty competition. Understanding which factions are powerful and the dynamics 
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among factions within the party is important because it allows us to better understand 
policy adoption and to explain the differences in the proposed and final bill language.  
At least two studies which discuss the 2006 parental leave reform in Germany, 
partially explain the policy outcome by emphasizing internal party group dynamics. For 
example, Hien (2014) argues that German reunification led to a political realignment 
within the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) favoring the influence of protestant groups 
in the party. A power shift from the Catholic constituency to the Protestant one within the 
CDU allowed for the adoption of more progressive family policies. Likewise, Wiliarty 
(2010) emphasizes the importance of the Frauenunion (women’s group within the CDU) 
when adopting gender friendly policies throughout the history of the CDU. She argues 
that whenever the Frauenunion was part of the dominant factional coalition within the 
party, the group succeeded in pushing the adoption of more progressive gender policies.  
Based on the discussion above, I assume that a political party is more likely to 
adopt a feminist policy if women’s groups or other progressive elements in the party are 
the dominant faction. However, because coalition governance in parliamentary 
democracies is typically a political necessity, coalition negotiations affect the ability of 
certain internal factions to push for or against a policy during coalition negotiations. 
Typically, political parties will have to make policy compromises to reach a coalition 
agreement. If coalition constraints are permissive, the need to build a coalition can 
facilitate feminist policy adoption because it increases the leverage of factions supportive 
of the feminist policies while reducing the influence of opposing factions. This is 
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particularly true if the coalition partner makes the feminist policy a non-negotiable item 
during coalition negotiations.   
Once the feminist policy is introduced by the government, we need to shift our 
attention to modifications to the final bill language. While government bills are difficult 
to stop once they have been introduced into parliament, there is still plenty of room for 
party-internal groups and even outside groups such as business associations or women’s 
groups, to modify the proposal before its final adoption. For example, building on Mule’s 
argument on faction politics, I argue that even in cases where a faction opposing the 
policy was unable to stop the policy, the faction still has opportunities to weaken the 
policy or to shape the policy to reflect its concerns during the legislative process. Most 
often this is done in the drafting phase, where factions can voice their concerns publicly 
to win policy concessions, or during the committee stage when they occupy enough seats 
in the committee responsible for deliberating the policy.  
Finally, I will also expand on the veto player approach by assessing the policy 
preferences of veto players and whether they are amenable to changing their initial policy 
preference. While Tsebelis takes the preferences of veto players as a given, I argue that 
veto players will not have formed opinions on every policy but sometimes can be 
classified as neutral or undecided. If the veto player is undecided, critical actors and 
opponents will attempt to convince the veto player to either support or oppose the policy. 
I argue that it is in these scenarios where party internal factions and external groups or 
actors often succeed in either stopping the policy, when the policy proposal did not 
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originate from the coalition agreement, or in weakening the final bill language, if the 
policy is part of the coalition agreement.  
To summarize then, the veto player approach allows us to identify the crucial 
actors in the legislative process that decide the fate of a given policy. Further, opening the 
black box of the partisan veto player is crucial to understanding why (a) a specific policy 
was adopted by the political party and (b) the policy content was modified the way it was 
before its adoption. Finally, by considering that veto players’ interests are not fixed, it 
opens a window of opportunity for various actors to sway a veto player in favor of or 
against a given policy. 
Previously I argued that linking the veto player approach with critical actor theory 
will allow me to better explain the institutional resources critical actors have at their 
disposal when pursuing feminist policies. By doing so, I am able to place critical actors in 
their institutional context in order to explain feminist policy agenda setting and adoption. 
Specifically, I maintain that the ability of critical actors to push for feminist policies will 
vary depending on the constellations of veto players, critical actors, and opponents. I 
expect that the adoption of feminist policies is more likely when critical actors either 
occupy veto player positions themselves or are able to influence veto players. I suppose 
that critical actors are able to influence veto players successfully if they have ongoing and 
good working relationships with those veto players, emerging from either historical 
processes or ideological proximity. Other avenues of influence might be a supportive 
political culture or socioeconomic changes that enable critical actors to overcome their 
external position and to successfully influence veto players. Further, the position of 
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policy opponents vis-à-vis veto players also matters for the policy outcome. I expect 
feminist policies to fail when opponents control veto player positions or are in a position 
to sway veto players in their directions. Thus, I hold that for feminist policy adoption to 
be successful, critical actors need to control, or at a minimum be able to influence, veto 
player positions. 
2.3.  Conclusion 
Having discussed the three separate building blocks of my conceptual framework, 
it is now time to put them all together. I have shown that feminist policy adoption occurs 
in two stages: first, policy support by the political party; and second, policy adoption 
under coalition governance. Inclusion on the policy agenda typically occurs during the 
coalition negotiations where the political parties forming the coalition must agree on a 
common policy platform. Accordingly, coalition negotiations are a necessary but 
insufficient first step and affect whether the coalition government will include the 
feminist policy on the legislative agenda. In addition, any successful adoption of feminist 
policies requires an opportune constellation of political forces that allows critical actors 
to advance feminist policies. Here, critical actors need to control veto player positions to 
successfully shepherd a feminist policy through the legislative decision-making process. 
Accordingly, in case of coalition governments, feminist policy adoption is most likely 
when:  
1. The Conservative Party is in a coalition with a political party supportive of 
the policy; and 
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2. The constellation of veto players, opponents, and critical actors is such 
that critical actors control veto player positions while opponents remain 
outside the policy making process 
If these two conditions hold, the following outcome are possible: 
1. When the ruling conservative party is against the policy, the feminist 
policy will be included in the government agenda when the coalition 
constraint is permissive. The policy will be adopted when critical actors 
are able to control or influence veto player positions. Here, the strength of 
the feminist policy will depend on the ability of opponents to influence 
veto players in the course of the policy making process. 
2. When the ruling conservative party is in favor of the policy, the feminist 
policy will be adopted when critical actors occupy veto player positions. 
Coalition constraints do not matter in this case as both parties are in favor 
of the policy. Here, the strength of the feminist policy will depend on the 
ability of opponents to influence veto players.  
Further, I show that the feminist policy will fail to be adopted when coalition 
constraints are not permissive, i.e., the coalition partner cannot impose demands on the 
conservative coalition partner. In this case, the feminist policy will not be included in the 
government’s legislative agenda and policy adoption becomes impossible. Finally, when 






The guiding research question for this dissertation is: why do conservative 
governments adopt feminist policies? To answer this question, I explore how coalition 
constraints and the constellation of critical actors, veto players, and opponents affect 
policy outcomes across three German cases with additional preliminary case analysis in 
the United Kingdom, and Japan, providing a total of seven case studies focusing on father 
leave policies and board diversity policies. My research seeks to understand how and if 
advocates of feminist policies can push for the successful adoption of these policies when 
an opportune institutional and electoral context exists. This context is measured by the 
institutional resources available to feminist policy advocates (institutional resources) and 
permissive coalition constraints (political resources). I draw on three major sources of 
evidence: parliamentary activities, public and parliamentary discourse, and civil society 
activities. This study is qualitative in its nature and relies on data collected from field 
work including 30 interviews in Germany and 10 interviews in the United Kingdom, and 
a qualitative content analysis of primary and secondary sources, such as verbatim 
protocols of parliamentary debates, policy white papers, and news coverage. 
This chapter begins by providing a background on the type of feminist policies 
this dissertation will focus on and a brief discussion of the universe of cases. I will then 
provide a description of the research design and explanation of the chosen methods. This 
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is followed by an assessment of alternative explanations based on the existing literature 
discussed in chapter 2. The chapter concludes with an overview of the definition of terms 
used throughout this dissertation. 
3.1.  Background of Father Leave Policies and Board Diversity Policies 
3.1.1.  Father Leave Policies 
Father leave policies aim to encourage fathers to take significant amounts of 
parental leave when their children are born. Parental leave is commonly defined as a 
specific time period after maternity leave has ended that allows fathers or mothers, or 
both, to stay home with their newborn child ‘whilst giving them some degree of security 
in respect of employment, social security, and remuneration’ (Drew 2005, 10). Parental 
leave can either be a family right (i.e., the parents can decide which parent will take 
advantage of parental leave) or an individual right (i.e., each parent has an individual 
right to take leave which is either transferable to the other parent or non-transferable) 
(Moss 2013).  
Governments typically opt to adopt one of two types of father leave policies to 
gently push fathers to take over care responsibilities: father quotas or father bonuses. 
Father quotas reserve specific periods of parental leave for fathers. For example, Sweden 
reserves two months of parental leave for the exclusive use of fathers. If the father does 
not use his entitlement, the family loses this designated time of parental leave. In 
contrast, father bonuses aim to reward positive behavior by extending the parental leave 
period for families where the father takes a certain period of parental leave. In Italy for 
example, if the father takes three months of parental leave, the total parental leave 
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entitlement becomes eleven instead of ten months. The adoption of father bonuses is 
considered a weaker commitment to equitable care roles in the home because families do 
not lose their entitlement to full parental leave if the father refuses to take parental leave. 
In this case, families are encouraged to challenge traditional gender care relations but are 
not disadvantaged if they stick with the traditional distribution of care work. In contrast, 
under father quotas, if the father does not take parental leave, the family is penalized with 
a less generous parental leave scheme. Here, the policy actively tries to change the 
traditional care relationship through exercising mild pressure on fathers to stay home and 
care for their children (Leira 2002).  
Three different developments have prompted the rise of father leave policies. 
First, new conceptions of fatherhood have emphasized the need of fathers to care for their 
children and to be involved in their upbringing in order to foster greater father-child 
bonding (Brandth and Kvwande 2009; Barclay 2013; Leira 2002). Second, father leave 
policies are adopted in the belief that changing the sexual division of labor will improve 
gender equality overall, and specifically addresses workplace discrimination against 
women. Because father leave policies explicitly encourage fathers to take over more 
responsibilities in the home, these policies have the potential to remove the care stigma 
from women who tend to be penalized by the labor market for their care responsibilities 
by limited career opportunities, a persistent gender wage gap, and lower incomes and 
pensions over their lifetime (Barclay 2013; Brandth and Kvande 2009; Chronholm 2009; 
Drew 2005; Orloff 2009). Yet for father leave policies to have gender equalizing effects, 
the great majority of men must take parental leave. As long as women remain the primary 
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caregivers, men will continue to be considered the better investment for employers, 
reinforcing work discrimination against working women overall (Ekberg et al. 2013; 
Elingsater 2012). Third, demographic and economic concerns also prompt the need to 
redefine or restructure the traditional care relationships between men and women. This 
policy development must not only be seen against the background of declining birth rates 
in high-income countries but also against stagnating or declining economic growth rates. 
On the one hand, women represent an untapped pool of (economic) resources where 
increasing the participation of females in the paid workforce will increase a country’s 
national economic performances including its competitiveness, efficiency, productivity 
and growth (Annesley and Gains 2013). Once highly educated women exit the labor force 
to care for their children, businesses and the economy lose valuable human capital (Erler 
2011; Ray et al 2010). On the other hand, allowing women to better combine their 
families and careers might also encourage more women to have children (Kamermann 
and Moss 2009; Karu and Poll 2009; Smith 2001). For example, studies have shown that 
fathers who stay at home with their first-born have a higher likelihood of having a second 
child (Barclay 2013). Increasing birth rates much closer to the replacement level would 
also help to keep the extensive social welfare regimes in these states viable. 
In 1993, Norway was the first country to introduce a father quota and since then, 
nine other countries have introduced similar policies that encourage fathers to become 
more involved in the care of their children. Five of these countries adopted father leave 
policies while having conservative governments.  
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Table 3: Countries with Father Leave Policies (as of December 2015) 
Country Year of Adoption 
Type of Father 
Leave Policy 
Adoption under Conservative 
Government 
Norway 1993 quota Yes 
Sweden 1994 quota  
Denmark 1997 quota  
Iceland 2000 quota yes 
Italy 2000 bonus  
Austria 2001 bonus yes 
Finland 2003 quota  
Germany 2006 bonus yes 
Portugal 2008 bonus  
Japan 2009 bonus yes 
Source: International Network on Leave Policy and Research 
3.1.2.  Board Diversity Policies 
A more recent trend in the discourse on gender equality is attention to the gender 
composition of corporate boards. Women now constitute the majority of college 
graduates in many countries, they are active in the labor force, and they occupy one third 
of managerial positions (Matas and Miller 2011; Fagan, Menendez, and Anson 2012). 
However, these economic advances have not translated into greater gains in the top 
echelons of business management. Instead, women remain severely underrepresented: 
globally, only 10.2 per cent of board seats were held by women (‘Women on Boards’ 
2015). While the numbers vary widely among regions and among countries, nowhere did 
women occupy more than roughly a third of board positions in 2013. Scandinavia has the 
highest percentage of women on boards – 40.5 per cent in Norway – while Saudi Arabian 
boards are the least diverse with women occupying only 0.1 per cent of board seats 
(‘Women on Boards’ 2015). Yet research has shown that companies benefit from diverse 
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corporate boards. Greater diversity enhances the decision-making process by bringing a 
greater wealth of knowledge, experience, and opinions to the table and it increases the 
legitimacy with internal and external constituencies that value diversity (Ansòn 2012; 
Stautenberg 2013). Further, companies with greater board diversity tend to outperform 
companies with less diverse boards (Parke 2012), and diverse boards lead to increased 
profits overall (Suk 2012).  
Due to its perceived economic benefits as well as concerns for the slow pace in 
achieving equal representation on corporate boards, several countries as well as the 
European Union have pushed for measures to make corporate boards more representative. 
Board diversity policies can be divided into two measures: hard laws – legislative acts in 
the form of corporate board quotas – and soft law – normative pressure such as codes of 
good governance (Casey et al. 2011). Corporate board quotas set a specific percentage or 
number for the representation of women on boards. For example, Norway’s corporate 
board quota sets a 40 per cent quota for public listed companies, as do quotas in Spain, 
Finland, Iceland, and France. Israel is the only country that requires parity on boards 
while Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands set the quota at one third of board seats 
(Terjesen, Aguilera and Lorenz 2014, 3). In some instances, companies are faced with 
sanctions if they do not comply with board quotas. The most severe sanctions exist in 
Norway where companies can be dissolved or cannot register at the stock exchange if 
they fail to comply with the 40 per cent quota requirement (Terjesen, Aguilera and 
Lorenz 2014, 3).  
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Soft laws are codes of good governance that emanate from different sources such 
as the stock exchange, governments, directors’ associations, managers’ associations, 
professional associations, and investor associations (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra 2004). 
They essentially are best practice recommendations, which can set voluntary targets for 
achieving greater diversity on boards (Fagan, Menendez, and Anson 2012). For purposes 
of the dissertation, I will only concern myself with corporate board quotas because these 
quotas are the ones adopted by governments rather than third parties.  
In 2003, Norway was the first country to adopt corporate gender quotas. Today, 
15 other countries have adopted corporate board quotas. Japan is the only country which 
opted for a variable board target, i.e., companies are asked to set their own board quotas 
rather than dictating a specific percentage of women on boards. So far, six countries have 




Table 4: Countries with Board Quotas (as of December 2015) 
Country Year of Adoption 
Adoption occurred under 
conservative government 
Norway 2003 Yes 
Finland 2005  
Quebec 2006  
Israel 2007  
Spain 2007  
Kenya 2010 Yes 
Iceland 2010  
France 2011 Yes 
Netherlands 2011 Yes 
Belgium 2011  
Italy  2011  
Australia 2012  
Denmark 2012  
India 2013  
Germany 2015 yes 
Japan 2015 yes 
Source: ‘Legislative Board Diversity’ 2014 and Terjesen, Aguilera and Lorenz 2014  
3.2.  Rationale for Research Approach 
The purpose of this dissertation is to understand why conservative governments 
adopt feminist policies by analyzing the impact of the policy process, the actors situated 
in this process, and the influence of political background conditions (coalition 
constraints) on the policy outcome. Policy-making is a complicated process which is not 
easily standardized but varies across countries and even policy areas. The causal 
mechanisms producing certain policy outcomes are often difficult to untangle. The 
qualitative approach is particularly appropriate for studies where the goal is 
understanding and explaining complexity. Because the goal of the dissertation is to 
understand the interplay between coalition constraints, critical actors, veto players, and 
opponents in producing feminist policy outcomes, detailed knowledge of each individual 
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case is necessary to construct the concepts, variables, and causal mechanism (Collier, 
Brady, and Seawright 2010). Under these conditions case-oriented research is particularly 
appropriate (Porta 2008). 
Case-oriented research ‘aims at rich descriptions of a few instances of a certain 
phenomenon’ (Porta 2008, 198). One advantage of a case-oriented approach is that it is 
theory laden yet it is not theory-determined (George and Bennet 2005). For example, a 
case-oriented approach allows me to adjust existing hypotheses to accurately reflect new 
or unexpected findings rather than rejecting the validity of the hypotheses fully 
(McKeown 2004). Likewise, the detailed knowledge of each case enables me to control 
for the effect of contextual and intervening variables (George and Bennet 2005). Thus, a 
qualitative comparative case study allows not only for the testing of hypotheses but also 
their modification in light of new findings reflecting the complicated reality of policy 
making processes. 
Beyond the ability to address complexity and allow for the detailed study of 
individual cases, utilizing a qualitative case study is also advisable if the potential for 
equifinality exists. Equifinality describes the possibility that several causal mechanisms 
lead to the same policy outcome (George and Bennet 2005). Looking at the issue of 
coalition constraints, there are several circumstances under which coalition constraints 
can prevent a feminist policy from being put on the policy agenda or being adopted, such 
as exclusion of the policy matter in the coalition agreement, violation of the coalition 
terms, or an opposing coalition partner. This also means that the conceptual definitions of 
coalition constraints must remain flexible to accurately reflect the political realities in 
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each case study. By using a qualitative case study, I am able to maintain conceptual 
validity across cases because I can refine and adjust concepts such as coalition 
constraints, veto players, and critical actors to accurately reflect the realities in each case 
while still maintaining comparability across cases. Conceptual stretching is thus avoided 
(George and Bennet 2005).  
A qualitative case-oriented approach is also appropriate because this dissertation 
aims to develop a middle range theory instead of generalizations. The goal is not to 
predict the frequency of feminist policy adoption under conservative governments but to 
identify conditions under which the phenomenon manifests itself (George and Bennet 
2005). Here, case studies can determine the scope of conditions under which an 
explanation is valid because most causal mechanism are context specific – knowing in 
which context certain theories are valid is important in its own right (Byrne 2013). The 
potential for generalization is improved by employing a comparative case study across 
multiple national contexts (Della Porta 2008). 
The utilization of a qualitative over a quantitative approach is also necessitated by 
the small number of cases. Conservative governments have adopted either father leave or 
board diversity policies in only eleven instances (Brady and Collier 2004) which makes a 
quantitative analysis unfeasible. Unfortunately, the small number of cases introduces the 
‘many variable, small-n’ problem (Lijphart 1971, 686) which makes it difficult to assess 
the effect of a great number of potential variables. To address this problem, it is 
necessary to hold as many variables as possible constant in order to isolate the effects of 
the potentially causal variables. One way to limit the number of variables is to employ a 
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most-similar system design. By focusing on cases in Germany, the United Kingdom and 
Japan, I have chosen national contexts that allow me to hold several potentially 
explanatory variables constant. As I will discuss below, all three countries share similar 
demographic pressures where fertility rates have remained under replacement levels. 
They also share socioeconomic backgrounds with slowing economies and women 
representing a largely untapped pool of qualified labor. Further, cultural attitudes towards 
working mothers are similar, and all countries share the same political context 
(parliamentary democracy, coalition governments, and party government). Holding these 
variables constant allows me to focus on the explanatory power of my suggested 
explanatory variables.  
Finally, rather than selecting my cases on the independent variable (King, 
Keohane and Verba 1994), I have consciously selected the cases on the dependent 
variable. Selecting on the dependent variable is appropriate in the context of this 
dissertation because its goal is to understand the causal pathways that lead to a specific 
outcome (George and Bennet 2005) and where equifinality is a reasonable assumption 
(Mahoney and Geertz 2006). To increase the explanatory power of my hypotheses, 
however, I am introducing variance in the dependent variable. I have identified instances 
where corporate board quotas and father leave policies were discussed under conservative 
governments but failed to be included on the agenda or adopted. The inclusion of failed 
policy attempts is crucial because studying failures allows me to verify whether factors 
that seem linked to a successful policy outcome are indeed not present in instances of 
policy failures (Bergqvist, Bjarnegård, and Zetterberg 2013, 281). 
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Identifying failed events can be difficult because they are typically less reported 
on. This is particularly true if the failure occurs during the agenda setting rather than the 
adoption stage or when the suggested policy proposal did not make significant waves in 
public discourse. Thus, in order to identify failures in the case of father leave policies, I 
relied on the study of the annual reports of the International Network on Leave Policies 
and Research which includes a section on suggested policy changes in parental leave for 
every country that is part of the leave network, scrutiny of news coverage of parental 
leave policies, and academic studies of parental leave reforms. For corporate board 
quotas, I relied on the leading non-profit organization Catalyst which monitors the 
adoption of board diversity policies across the globe and also compiles a list of pending 
board diversity legislation. In addition, I also scoured news reports and academic studies 
on corporate board quotas to identify failed attempts. Unfortunately, it is impossible to 
catch all instances of failure in either feminist policy area. Luckily, this is not necessary 
because it is sufficient to identify several but not all adoption or adoption failures in order 
to control for the explanatory power of the suggested hypotheses. I will discuss the case 
selection of both successful and failed policy adoptions in the next section. 
3.3.  Research Design – Case Selection 
Conservative governments have adopted either father leave policies or board 
quotas in eleven instances and across eight countries. In four countries, conservative 
governments have debated both types of feminist policies with varying results. This was 
the case in Germany, the United Kingdom, Japan, and Sweden. This dissertation will 
primarily focus on three cases in Germany with preliminary case studies in the United 
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Kingdom and Japan to allow for a most-similar design approach. I decided to exclude the 
cases in Sweden for three reasons: first, Sweden is less comparable because it does not 
share the same socioeconomic and demographic pressures as the other three countries. 
Second, and more importantly, the parties that composed the conservative government 
coalition in Sweden are ideologically much closer to left-leaning parties in the other three 
countries than to their conservative parties (Volkens et al 2015). As a result, both policies 
are much less likely to run against the ideological underpinning of each party. Finally, the 
political culture of Sweden is much more egalitarian than those in Germany, Japan, and 
the United Kingdom, and the country itself is considered to be a pioneer in the promotion 
of feminist policies where gender equality is the accepted norm.  
Table 5: Policy Outcomes Across Countries  
Policy Outcome Policy Proposal Country Legislative Period 
Adopted Father Bonus Germany 2005 – 2009 
Failed Board Quota Germany 2009 – 2013 
Adopted Board Quota Germany 2013 – current 
Adopted Father Bonus Japan 2005 – 2009 
Adopted Board Target Japan 2012 – current 
Failed Father Quota United Kingdom 2010 – 2015 
Failed Board Quota United Kingdom 2010 – 2015 
Adopted Father Quota Sweden 1994 – 1998 
Failed Board Quota Sweden 2002-2006 
The German cases were chosen to be the dissertation’s primary case studies 
because there is variance on the dependent variable and employing a within case study 
allows me to hold important factors constant. Socioeconomic, cultural, and demographic 
variables become background variables rather than possible explanatory factors. Further, 
the influence of political leadership – the Chancellorship of Angela Merkel – is 
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controlled for as well as the influence of political institution. In contrast, my explanatory 
factors, critical actors, veto players, and coalition constraints, vary across the three cases 
allowing me to test for their influence under an otherwise constant framework. This will 
provide me with important insight on the explanatory power of my conceptual 
framework.  
Beyond the merits of a within-case study, the German cases also represent the 
least likely case, or outlier, for feminist policy adoption under a conservative 
government. Germany is considered to be an archetype of a conservative welfare regime 
(Esping Andersen 1990). At the heart of the conservative welfare regime is the male 
breadwinner model which emphasizes the traditional sexual division of labor by placing 
unpaid caregiving in the private sphere and limiting women’s access to the paid labor 
force (Lewis 1992, 2001; Orloff 2009). For example, until the parental leave reform in 
2006, parental leave in Germany was designed to encourage and enable women to stay at 
home to care for their children covering a total of 36 months with a flat fee of 600 DM or 
300 Euros for the first 24 months (Erler 2009; Geisler 2012; Leitner 2010). While the 
parental leave scheme was intended to be gender neutral, the length and low payment 
essentially reinforced the male breadwinner model by making it unattractive for men – 
who typically earn more – to stay home. This trend was also reinforced by the tax code 
which gives tax savings to couples where one parent stays home to care for the children 
full-time (Geisler 2012).  
Further, German culture tends to be less gender-egalitarian and more traditional 
when it comes to child caring. In general, German society assumes that children should 
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be looked after in the home, and preferably by the mother, while the father supplies the 
income for the family (Leitner 2010). For example, 40 per cent of parents agree that 
children under three years old should be cared for by a stay at home mother (BMFSFJ 
2010, 16). Similar, a survey by the Allensbach Institute found that 56 per cent of 
respondents in West Germany think it is best if the mother puts her career on the 
backburner while caring for her children, and a mere eleven per cent of West German 
mothers work full-time after the birth of their child, compared to roughly a third in East 
Germany (Thelen 2015). Thus, the adoption of feminist policies under a conservative 
government in Germany is particularly noteworthy.  
Finally, as I will discuss in the following chapter, the conservative parties in 
Germany – the Christian Democratic Union and its Bavarian sister party the Christian 
Social Union – have never made serious attempts to feminize the party’s platform. 
Neither the father leave policy nor the corporate board quota were adopted by the party 
convention for inclusion in the election manifestos in 2005, 2009, or 2013. Quite the 
contrary, the party platform stresses the importance of remunerating stay at home 
mothers for their care work through pension credits and a so-called ‘stove premium’ 
(Herdpremie). The issue of women’s underrepresentation on corporate boards also did 
not play a role in the party’s policy program. Thus, Germany represents an unlikely case 
where a conservative party did not undergo a process of feminization but nevertheless 
adopted feminist policies. 
Because of the inherently limited generalizability of findings from within case-
studies, this dissertation will consider four additional cases in the United Kingdom and 
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Japan. These countries not only share a consideration of these two policies under 
conservative governments but they are also characterized by fairly similar socioeconomic 
conditions, political characteristics, and cultural attitudes. Germany and Japan are much 
more similar in regards to all three elements than the United Kingdom, as I will illustrate 
below. This minimal variance in macro patterns, however, is desirable because it allows 
me to judge the importance of these conditions on policy outcomes. While I hold that 
socioeconomic macro-patterns never cause a public policy to be adopted (see Seeleib 
Kaiser and Toivonen 2011), I am open to the possibility that these macro variables might 
have an impact on the ability of critical actors to rally support for these policies making 
their adoption more likely. I will test for this possibility by analyzing how critical actors, 
veto players, and opponents frame the need for the adoption of these policies and whether 
one particular framing of a policy dominates the policy discourse in each case.  
In the United Kingdom, both father quotas and corporate board quotas were 
discussed under Prime Minister Cameron’s first government (2010 to 2015) but failed to 
be put on the legislative agenda. Specifically, the case of father leave policy will enable 
me to test the explanatory power of the coalition constraint variable. After the 
government put a shared parental leave policy on the policy agenda, Nicholas Clegg, 
deputy prime minister and leader of the junior coalition party, advocated for including a 
father quota in the parental leave policy. The policy proposal was not part of the original 
coalition agreement. His proposal was ultimately rejected by the Conservative Party after 
a public debate about its merits. If the policy proposal failed due to coalition constraints, 
it would increase the explanatory power of this variable. The British case on board quota 
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adoption is particularly interesting because the United Kingdom and Germany were the 
most vocal opponents against an EU wide corporate board quota which led to a defeat of 
the European board quota proposal in 2012 (Fontanella-Khan 2012). While Germany 
changed course, the United Kingdom continues to oppose quotas. While the issue of 
board diversity was mentioned in the coalition agreement, it only stated that the 
government would investigate the issue of board diversity; it did not propose a specific 
policy on how to address the problem. Shortly after the election, the government 
established a commission spearheaded by Lord Davies to assess the status of women on 
UK boards and to develop policy recommendation on how to address the issue. After a 
long and detailed consultation with the public and business, Lord Davies’ first report 
concluded that a voluntary approach is most adequate to tackle women’s 
underrepresentation on boards and rejected a legal quota unless voluntary measures 
should proof futile. Investigating two instances of failed feminist policy adoption under a 
conservative government is crucial because it allows me to explore whether my proposed 
hypotheses can explain policy failure beyond the German case.   
In 2009, the conservative government under Prime Minister Taro in Japan 
amended the Act on the Welfare of Workers Who Take Care of Children and other 
Family Members Including Childcare and Family Leave. The amendments included a 
father bonus identical to the one in Germany in 2009, where parental leave benefits were 
extended to 14 months if the other parent took at least two months of parental leave. As 
in Germany, this provision was intended to encourage more fathers to take parental leave. 
In August 2015, the conservative government under Prime Minister Abe introduced a 
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workplace equality law which stipulates that companies with more than 300 employees 
must set numerical targets for the employment and promotion of women (Mizuho 2015). 
There are no sanctions for non-compliance. In contrast to Germany, Japan’s policy 
solution to gender board diversity has been more timid and noncommittal than the 
German policy approach which set a numerical quota of 30 per cent while Japan leaves it 
up to the individual companies to set their own quotas.  
The Japanese cases are particularly interesting because they are the only instances 
where the conservative party originally supported the feminist policy without pressure to 
adopt the policy from a coalition partner. Thus, studying the Japanese cases will allow me 
to assess whether the second part of my hypothesis – constellation of critical actors, veto 
players, and opponents – is sufficient to explain feminist policy outcomes in cases where 
the conservative party is supportive of the feminist policy. Unfortunately, the Japanese 
case studies are less developed than the United Kingdom preliminary case studies 
because I had to rely on primary and secondary sources where they were available in 
English. Thus, the findings in the Japanese context must be taken with caution until I am 
able to analyze original documents in Japanese and conduct elite interviews with the 
major actors in the Japanese policy process. This however will require more research 
time and effort (i.e., paying for translation services to analyze original documents and 
conduct interviews in Japan) that is outside the scope of the dissertation.  
3.4.  Research Design – Date Collection Methods 
The dissertation will employ process tracing to answer why conservative 
governments adopt feminist policies utilizing both qualitative content analysis and elite 
 
72 
interviews to identify each steps in the causal sequence that leads to the policy outcome. 
Process tracing in general is defined as: 
the analysis of evidence on processes, sequences, and conjunctures of 
events within a case for the purpose of either developing or testing 
hypotheses about causal mechanisms that might causally explain the case 
(Bennet and Checkel 2014, 7). 
Process tracing is particularly useful for a qualitative case study as it allows me to 
turn a simple narrative of events into causal sequences singling out the key explanatory 
variables (Dumont, de winter, and Andeweg 2011). Using process tracing I can integrate 
a deductive approach by testing a priori hypotheses and modifying these hypotheses 
based on inductively derived conclusions (Bennet and Checkel 2014). This allows me to 
confirm whether the hypothesized cause of feminist policy adoption is indeed evident in 
the sequence and variables of the case (George and Bennet 2005). Further, process 
tracing is particularly equipped to analyze causal mechanisms in the context of complex 
decision making by drawing on a multitude of different sources such as interviews, 
archival research, news articles, and other documents (Tansey 2007). In order to identify 
the causal sequence in each case of feminist policy adoption, I will utilize a qualitative 
content analysis with elite interviews. Qualitative content analysis is a means to analyze 
written and verbal communication in order to identify critical processes that lead to the 
policy outcome as well as to identify key actors in the policy process in question (Elo and 
Kyngäs 2008). 
For the qualitative content analysis, I consulted a variety of primary sources such 
as legislative records, verbatim protocols of parliamentary debate and party conventions, 
speeches by the head of government and responsible cabinet ministers, policy briefs and 
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statements, press releases by the responsible ministries, and coalition agreements and 
relevant party platforms. Secondary sources analyzed include media coverage of the 
policies in the major national newspapers, interviews with critical actors, opponents, and 
veto players, as well as documents by women’s organizations. The study of both primary 
and secondary sources helped me to identify the relevant critical actors and opponents 
while also helping me determine the primary arguments brought forward in favor and 
against the respective policies. Specifically, all documents were coded to account for the 
following elements: Who contributed to the debate of the feminist policy; was the 
statement supportive or opposing; and what kind of argument did the actor make in 
support or opposition of the policy? Especially concerning the latter, I included a measure 
of feminist claim making. I coded all statements as feminist if they included statements 
about changing the division of labor at home, referred directly to gender equality 
concerns, or spoke about sex discrimination in society. I only coded direct quotations by 
actors when explicitly discussing the feminist policy under consideration. 
Further, I conducted elite interviews with key actors who were intimately 
involved in the policy process and thus possess knowledge not necessarily attainable 
through a qualitative content analysis alone (Tansey 2004). I utilized these interviews to 
confirm the findings from the qualitative content analysis, reconstruct the sequence of 
events, and identify the motivations of individual actors. Thus, instead of random 
sampling, I contacted potential interview partners based on their knowledge of the policy 
process (purposive sampling) while also including snowball sampling to ensure that I 
included important political actors who might have operated outside the public eye. 
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Interview partners were drawn from all major groups that participated in the policy 
making process, including both policy advocates and policy opponents: members of the 
coalition parties, civil servants in the responsible ministries, representatives of civil 
society organizations and the business sector, as well as journalists who have covered the 
policy issue.  
3.4.1.  Data Collection – Germany  
I conducted 30 interviews with members of the Bundestag and Bavarian Landtag 
including representatives from all political parties except Die Linke. While it is 
unfortunate that I was not able to secure an interview with a member of the Die Linke, 
this will not significantly impact the results of the case studies because the party was in 
the opposition and as such had little influence or insight into the inner workings of the 
government coalitions. Additionally, I also interviewed selected civil servants in the 
responsible ministries, journalists who covered the issues, as well as leaders of all 
relevant women’s organizations. Interviews typically lasted 30 minutes and either were 
conducted in person or via phone. Some individuals also filled out written questionnaires. 
These interviews allowed me to corroborate my initial findings of the qualitative content 
analysis and explore issues left open or ambiguous in the content analysis. 
For the qualitative content analysis, I coded a total of 558 documents including all 
verbatim transcripts of all relevant parliamentary debates, committee hearings, and the 
debates in the Bundesrat. I also included relevant media articles by the major national 
German newspapers (Der Spiegel, Die Zeit, Frankfurter Allgemeine, Der Stern, Die 
Süddeutsche, Die Welt) as well as documents published by the Federal Minister for 
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Family Affairs, Seniors Citizen, Women, and Youth; speeches by Chancellor Merkel and 
the responsible cabinet ministers; election manifestos of each party in the coalition 
government; all coalition agreements; and party platforms of all relevant political parties. 
In total, I identified 53 actors who actively took part in the debate around the 
father leave policy by either speaking up in news media or participating in the legislative 
process. Thirty-eight actors were supportive of the proposal including the two main 
churches (Protestant and Catholic Church), the Confederation of German Trade Unions, 
and a great majority of CDU/CSU women both at the state and federal level while 14 
political actors opposed the policy including the political parties of the CSU and the FDP. 
In regards to the failed attempt to adopt board quotas, I identified 163 actors who actively 
participated in the public debate. Of them, 48 actors, mostly from the business sector, the 
FDP, and the traditional wing of the conservative party, opposed the idea of a corporate 
board quota law while 115 welcomed the idea. When the board quota was successfully 
adopted, 71 actors actively participated in the policy making process with 19 actors from 
the business community and those representing business interests within the conservative 
party continuing to oppose the policy. 
3.4.2.  Data Collection – United Kingdom 
For the qualitative content analysis, I coded a total of 69 documents including 
verbatim protocols of debates in the House of Commons, the House of Lords, committee 
hearings, policy white papers by the Department for Business Innovations and Skills, 
government reports, and relevant media articles in the major British newspapers such as 
the Times, The Guardian, the Daily Mail, The Telegraph, and from the BBC. I identified 
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a total of 21 relevant actors in the father leave policy debate. Eleven actors were 
supportive of the policy. Nine opposed to the policy. For the corporate board quota 
debate, I identified a total of 60 relevant actors. Of those, 15 supported legal quotas. In 
total, I conducted 12 interviews with former members of government, civil society actors, 
and academic experts.  
3.4.3.  Data Collection – Japan 
For Japan, I only conducted a qualitative content analysis for this dissertation. I 
coded 31 documents including government white papers when available in English and 
reports published on the English website of the Gender Equality Bureau Cabinet Office. 
Mostly, the analysis relied on secondary sources from news outlets such as the Japan 
Times, a national newspaper published in English. Because of the limited availability of 
documents in English, I also consulted academic publications on the subject matters to 
gain greater insight into the topic. I identified a total of 11 actors who participated in the 
public debate for father leave policies and a total of 17 actors that were involved in the 
corporate board quota debate. The majority of actors opposed the adoption of a corporate 
board quota which might explain the adoption of an unspecific board target rather than a 
board quota. In contrast, the father leave policy was broadly supported throughout the 
government and political parties with little opposition from businesses.  
Together, the interviews and qualitative content analysis enable an assessment of 
the influence of critical actors, opponents, and veto players during the decision making 
process. Further, interviews and the conducted document analysis will help me 
understand under which circumstances feminist actors can build coalitions within 
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conservative parties, across political parties, as well as with businesses and civil society 
organizations to push for feminist policies despite potential opposition by other groups 
within the conservative parties. 
3.5.  Alternative Explanations 
The existing studies on the adoption of father leave policies and board diversity 
policy include several alternative explanations that warrant closer investigation. The 
majority of them concern the influence of macro-patterns such as socioeconomic 
conditions, demographic trends, cultural and historical context, as well as more specific 
variables such as political characteristics of the coalition government and the political 
parties. I will discuss each in turn. 
3.5.1.  Socioeconomic Conditions. 
The analysis of the political discourse around corporate board quotas and father 
quotas has shown that these policies are typically debated under three broad categories: 
demographic pressure caused by low fertility rates and a rapidly aging population, 
economic pressures because of anticipated labor shortage due to demographic pressures, 
and the activation or retention of a highly skilled female labor force as a solution to labor 
shortage and to maintain economic growth. These arguments reflect the concerns with 
specific socioeconomic pressures that these countries face. The shared socioeconomic 
conditions of these countries allow me to, by comparing them, assess the importance of 




Table 6: Socioeconomic Conditions across Germany, Japan, and the UK 
Socioeconomic Variables Germany Japan UK 
Fertility Rate (2013) 1.38 1.43 1.92 
GDP Growth Rate (2014) 1.6 -0.1 2.55 
Age at first marriage 31.7 29.7 31.8 
Labor force, female ( per cent of total labor 
force, 2013) 
45.86 42.63 45.91 
Labor participation rate, female ( per cent of 
female population ages 15+, 2013) 
53.59 48.79 55.7 
Part time employment, female ( per cent of 
total part time employment, 2012) 
78.69 70.8 73.8 
    Source: World Bank Gender Statistic Database 
It is evident from Table 6 that Japan and Germany face very similar 
socioeconomic challenges. Both countries are ‘very low fertility countries’ (Atoh 2011) 
with a fertility rate that has dropped below 1.5 and has never recovered past this point. 
Both are faced with a declining population: Japan’s population is predicted to shrink to 
89 million by 2055 from 127 million in 2013 (Dalton 2015, 49) while Germany’s 
population is predicted to shrink to 66 million by 2060 from 80 million in 2013 (Blake 
2013). Looking at the 2012 growth rates, both Japan and Germany had negative growth 
rates: -1.69 per cent for Germany and -0.2 for Japan (‘Population growth (per cent 
annual)’ 2014). One reason for the low fertility rate is that women are postponing both 
marriage and childbirth because work-life balance is still elusive in both Japan and 
Germany, with limited childcare available for children under 3 years old and cultural 
expectations that women stay home to care for their children. 
In contrast, the United Kingdom is a ‘low fertility country’ where the fertility rate 
never dropped below 1.5 but remains below the 2.1 rate necessary for replacement levels 
(Atoh 2011). Further, the population in the United Kingdom is predicted to grow to 73 
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million by 2035 from 64 million in 2013 (‘What do the 2014-based national population 
projection show?’ 2015) and its population growth rate has never dipped into negative 
digits (World Bank 2015). Considering that the United Kingdom has failed to adopt both 
policies, it is possible that the absence of demographic pressure makes a country less 
likely to adopt these policies. While socioeconomic pressures do not necessarily prompt 
countries to adopt these policies – after all Germany has been a ‘very low fertility 
country’ since 1975 and Japan since 1993 (‘Population growth (per cent annual)’ 2014) 
without low fertility becoming an urgent policy issue until early this century – it might be 
the case that pressing demographic pressures increase the likelihood for action once 
critical actors were successful in putting the policy on the policy agenda. 
Faced with an aging population and low fertility, Japan and Germany (and to a 
lesser degree the United Kingdom) have looked towards women to counteract labor 
shortage particularly in terms of highly skilled workers. In all three countries, the female 
labor force is under-utilized. Less than half of the total labor force in each country is 
female while only half of the total female population aged 15 and above is working. 
Further, women make up the great majority of part-time workers in all three countries. 
This is despite the fact that more women than men have a tertiary education in Germany 
and Japan with the same levels of tertiary education in the United Kingdom (‘Educational 
attainment by gender and expected years in full-time education’ 2016). Thus, in each 
country women represent a significant untapped pool of skilled labor, which is 
particularly true for the number of women on corporate boards. Because all three 
countries are very similar with regard to the economic conditions above but vary in their 
 
80 
policy outcomes, the importance of integrating women into the labor market will inform 
the policy solution but does not prompt a government to take action by itself. 
3.5.2.  Political Characteristics 
In terms of political characteristics, all three countries are parliamentary 
democracies with Japan and Germany sharing a similar electoral system – a mixed 
member proportional system, which uses both a proportional list and first-past the post 
system – and the United Kingdom having a first-past-the-post system. Likewise, in all 
three countries the executive dominates the legislative process, playing the crucial role in 
initiating and drafting policy proposals. Further, in all cases the conservative party was in 
a coalition government. All coalition partners, except in the case of Germany, were 
center-right parties. While the German cases were only successful when the conservative 
party was in a ruling coalition with the social democratic party, the conservative party in 
Japan adopted both policies in coalition with a center-right party, while the Conservative 
Party in the United Kingdom rejected both policies when in a governing coalition with a 
center-right party. Thus, the success of feminist policy agenda setting and adoption seems 
not to be dependent on the presence of a left party in the government coalition.  
Table 7: Party Ideology of Coalition Parties 
Party family Germany Japan United Kingdom 
left Social Democratic 
Party 
  
center Christian Democratic 
Union 
Christian Social Union 
Clean Government 
Party (New Komeito) 
 




Source: Armingeo et al. 2015 
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Further, the conservative parties in government also share a similar equality 
commitment based on the analysis of their party platforms (see Table 8): each party 
dedicated between 0 and 5 per cent to the issue of equality in their party manifesto 
(Volkens et al. 2015). This shows clearly that the adoption of feminist policy under 
conservative governments is driven by something other than an inherent concern with 
gender equality by the conservative party in the government coalition. 
Table 8: Commitment to Equality Issues in Party Platform (in per cent) 
Political Parties – Equality 
commitment Germany Japan United Kingdom 
Government Composition (Father 
Quota – Success) 3.57 (11.1) 0.45 (n.a.)  
Government Composition (Father 
Quota – Failure)   0.99 (3.19) 
Government Composition (Board Quota 
– Failure) 4.93 (4.22)  0.99 (3.19) 
Government Composition (Board Quota 
– Success) 2.68 (9.35) 0.45 (n.a.)  
Source: Volkens et al. 2015 
3.5.3.  History of Gender Equality Policy 
The adoption of affirmative action policies to address gender inequality in the 
past, such as the adoption of electoral gender quotas, is often thought to facilitate the 
adoption of affirmative action later on. For example, the most recent study on corporate 
board quota adoption by Terjesen, Aguilera, and Lorenz (2014) finds that corporate board 
quotas are more likely in countries that have a longer history with other gender equality 
policies such as electoral gender quotas. However, all three conservative parties have 
been reluctant to address gender equality with affirmative action measures in the past. In 
Germany, the introduction of electoral gender quotas by the Green Party in 1986 raised 
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awareness about affirmative action among the German public (Peters 1999). Today, all 
political parties except for the Free Democratic Party (FDP) have electoral gender quotas. 
Today, the CDU has a quota of 33 per cent for electoral lists and internal leadership 
positions while her sister party the CSU has a 40 per cent quota for all leadership 
positions. Yet neither the CDU nor the CSU has adopted electoral gender quotas because 
these parties have believed in the intrinsic value of quota measures. Rather, this is a story 
where party competition has led to a contagion effect prompting other parties to adopt 
electoral gender quotas out of fear of being perceived to be backwards or not modern 
enough in terms of gender equality (Brzinski 2003). 
In contrast, the Conservative Party and Liberal Democratic Party in the United 
Kingdom as well as the Liberal Democratic Party in Japan have been more reluctant to 
consider electoral gender quotas despite constant pressure to address the lack of women 
among their ranks in parliament. The Conservative Party used an A List in 2006 to 
increase their number of women: when selecting candidates local party organizations 
were expected to choose a candidate from this A list of priority candidates of which 50 
per cent were women (Annesley and Gains 2014). However, the party is no longer 
utilizing the A List and remains opposed to any electoral gender quotas (Campbell and 
Childs 2015). Currently only 21 per cent of all conservative representatives are female. 
The Liberal Democratic Party (LibDems) in the United Kingdom has a 40 per cent target 
yet has no female representatives in the House of Commons (Keen 2015, 4; 
Interparliamentary Union 2015). Similarly, the Liberal Democratic Party in Japan has 
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resisted all calls for electoral gender quotas despite dismal numbers: in 2012, only eight 
per cent of all LDP representatives were female (Masuda 2012).  
This brief overview of affirmative action in the political realm shows that 
conservative parties in all three countries have been reluctant to embrace positive action 
to address gender equality. Even in Germany where two of the three conservative parties 
now have electoral gender quotas, the CDU and CSU were the last parties to adopt them 
and did so only after electoral pressure from parties on the left. The example of electoral 
gender quotas shows that none of the conservative parties in these countries are 
predisposed to look at affirmative action policies to address gender equality which, in 
essence, both board quotas and father leave policies are. Thus, a history of affirmative 
action policies in the respective countries seems to be of limited importance in explaining 
the policy outcome across these cases. 
3.5.4.  Cultural Attitudes 
Finally, these countries are also comparable in terms of cultural factors. Japan and 
Germany in particularly have shared a strong commitment to the male breadwinner 
model in the post-war era (Wiliarty and Gaunder 2014). As discussed earlier, the male 
breadwinner model privileges the male wage earner who typically earns a family wage to 
allow him to take care of his dependents, i.e., his wife and children. The wife’s 
contribution is not in the labor market but at home by raising children and taking care of 
the elderly. As a result, family policies are designed to support this particular family 
model: both Germany and Japan have tax exemptions for stay-at-home wives. For 
example, in Japan families can claim a tax exemption if the wife earns less than 1.03 
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million yen (about 10,000 US Dollars) per year (Kingston 2013). Likewise, Germany 
offers a tax splitting benefit which encourages women to stay home or only work part-
time (Gottfried and O’Reilly 2002). Further, in both countries public daycare for under 
three years old is lacking. Together, these factors contribute to low female labor market 
participation despite the fact that women are better educated.  
That these conservative ideas about family and gendered roles still play an 
important role is illustrated when citizens were asked to agree or disagree with the 
following statement in 2003: ‘Husband works outside, and wives takes care of the home’ 
(Atoh 2011). In Japan, 46.5 per cent of men and 31.8 per cent of women agreed with this 
statement. This should not come as a surprise because Japanese culture has not been able 
to shake the social conservative views of gendered roles: women are expected to drop out 
of the workforce once they are married or have children, a notion that is strengthened by 
the ‘maternal myth’ that children must be raised by their mothers while they are young 
(Dalton 2015). Underlining this expectation is the fact that in Japan “over 85 per cent of 
women agreed with the statement ‘until her child is about three, a mother should not have 
a job but should concentrate on childcare” (Dalton 2015, 49). As a result, about 62 per 
cent of women leave their job and, of college educated women, 74 per cent leave the 
labor force (Kingston 2013, 424, 443). That number is much higher than in Germany 
where only 35 per cent of college educated women leave the labor force (Kingston 2013, 
443). And as a result, men are expected to devote their full attention to the company by 
working long hours and over-time as the company expects that the woman is taking care 
of the home and family without the help of the husband (Morrone and Matsuyama 2010). 
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Further, the Japanese labor market also reflects these conservative social values. 
Individuals are typically hired for two types of tracks: the employment track that 
emphasizes routine work and the promotion track stressing lifelong employment and 
career advancement based on seniority (Atoh 2011). Women are typically relegated to the 
employment track while men are hired for the promotion track (Takeda 2011). In 2010, 
only 12 per cent of new hires for the promotion track were women (Kingston 2013, 442).  
In contrast, the United Kingdom is more closely aligned with the market-oriented 
gender policy model (Korpi 2000). This means that the state takes a neutral approach to 
gender or family relations and lets market forces shape gender relations. It is up to the 
individual to determine the distribution of roles within the family by either utilizing 
market solutions such as private childcare services or by finding private solutions, for 
example by ensuring that the grandmother takes care of the children while the mother is 
at work. Nevertheless, social attitudes are still fairly traditional – more traditional than 
those found in Germany but more egalitarian than those found in Japan. For example, 
when asked whether ‘being a housewife is fulfilling’ (‘World Value Survey Wave 5: 
2005-2009’) – more people in the United Kingdom agreed with the statement than in 
Germany. In Japan, agreement with the statement was the highest among all three 
countries. Further, looking at the Equality sub-index (‘World Value Survey Wave 5: 
2005-2009’), Germany ranks the most egalitarian, followed by the United Kingdom, and 
then Japan. Accordingly, even though the United Kingdom is not a male breadwinner 
model, traditional social attitudes are still common. Thus, I argue that cultural attitudes 
and the type of welfare model cannot explain the success or failure of feminist policy 
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adoption as conservative governments embedded in two traditional cultures have adopted 
feminist policies while the government in a more egalitarian context failed to do the 
same. The same holds true for the type of welfare regime where policies were successful 
under male breadwinner models but failed in market-oriented models. 
3.5.5.  Women in Politics 
One common thread in many studies is the argument that an increase in the 
number of women in parliament overall makes the adoption of feminist policies – 
whether father leave or board diversity policies – more likely (see for example: Morgan 
2013; Terjesen, Aguilera, and Lorenz 2014; Lambert 2008). Yet by looking at the 
percentage of women in parliament across all cases, we can see that this explanatory 
variable is insufficient. For example, the conservative government in Japan adopted both 
policies despite dismally low numbers of women in parliament where the percentage of 
women has hovered around 9 per cent for the past decade (IPU 2015). In Germany, the 
conservative government rejected the adoption of board quotas even with a sizeable 
number of women in parliament, i.e., 32.9 per cent in 2013 (Interparliamentary Union 
2015). Thus, the percentage of women in parliaments alone is not sufficient to explain 
feminist policy outcomes. 
3.6.  Definition of Terms 
In the course of this dissertation, I refer to seven key concepts: conservative 
parties, conservative governments, feminist policies, policy agenda setting, policy 
adoption, board quotas, and father leave policies. Each term is defined in turn. 
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Conservative governments and conservative parties: A party is considered to 
be conservative when it is classified as such by the Manifesto Project (Volkens et al 
2015). A government is deemed to be conservative when their government score in the 
Comparative Political Data Set III 1990-2012 is either classified as ‘hegemony of the 
right’ (score 1) or ‘dominance of the right’ (score 2) (Armingeon et al 2015). In the case 
of a balanced government (score 3), the government is considered conservative when the 
main coalition partner (the majority party) is classified as conservative by the Manifesto 
Project. 
Feminist policies: The debate on how to define feminist policies or women’s 
interest is long and multifaceted.8 For purposes of this dissertation, feminist policies are 
defined as any policies that challenge the traditional division of labor among men and 
women either in the public or in the private sphere. These policies aim to “dismantle 
hierarchies of power that privilege men and the masculine, a sexual division of labor that 
devalues women and the feminine, and the institutionalization of normative 
heterosexuality” (Htun and Weldon 2010, 208).  
Recognizing that women’s interests are not a homogenous entity and that claim 
making on behalf of women does not have to be feminist, I nevertheless argue that it is 
                                                
8 The notion of ‘women’s interest’ is highly contested in the literature. Most typically, women’s interests 
have a distinct leftist or liberal definition and/or authors equate women’s interests with feminist interests 
(Beckwith and Cowell-Meyers 2007; Saward 2008; Celis 2009; Celis and Childs 2012). Common 
definitions of women’s interest in the literature define women’s interest based on the unique division of 
labor between the sexes, policies that affect women exclusively based on biological (reproductive rights) or 
societal reasons (child rearing and sex equality), issues promoted by the women’s movement, or central 
tenants of international women’s rights treaties or conventions. These prevalent definitions tend to ignore 
not only division and differences among women along class, race/ethnic, or identity lines but also ignore 
conservative women. Thus, women’s interest should not be defined a priori. 
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more useful for the purpose of this study to employ the definition of feminist policies in 
its traditional leftist meaning (see Celis and Childs 2012 for a discussion of the topic). 
While the debate surrounding the usage of women’s interests in the face of conservative 
claims is very important and timely, it is insubstantial for this particular research. The 
particular puzzle that this dissertation addresses is why conservative governments support 
policies that by normal standards would be considered leftist or feminist and thus would 
not fall under the purview of conservative governments. Thus, the definition of ‘feminist’ 
as challenging the traditional division of labor is justified in the context of this study. 
Policy agenda setting and policy adoption: Policy agenda setting and policy 
adoption refer to two different stages in the policy process. Policy agenda setting occurs 
when a political party consents on supporting a specific policy. As such, policy agenda 
setting is most likely to occur during the coalition negotiations. Outside of coalition 
negotiations, policy agenda setting occurs when a political party agrees to pursue the of a 
feminist policy. In contrast, policy adoption has taken place when the coalition 
government’s proposal successfully becomes a law, i.e., when a proposed government 
bill containing the feminist policy has successfully passed through the legislative process.  
Corporate board quotas: Corporate board policies can be divided into two 
measures: hard laws (legislative acts in the form of corporate board quotas) and soft law 
(normative pressure such as codes of good governance) (Casey, Skibness, and Pringle 
2010). I will focus on hard laws only, as they are proposed and adopted by political 
parties and thus signal an important public sign that a party considers gender inequality in 
the corporate sector a problem. Soft laws on the other hand are often adopted and 
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administered by private entities, such as the stock market (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra 
2004), and even the support of such soft laws by political parties does not signal the same 
commitment that corporate board quotas do.  
Father leave policies: This dissertation differentiates between father quotas and 
father incentives. Father quotas set a specific period of parental leave aside for the 
exclusive use of fathers. If fathers do not use the leave, parental leave is shortened by that 
period. In contrast, father incentives reward families with longer parental leave if the 
father takes a certain period of parental leave. 
3.7.  Conclusion 
Above, I have introduced the qualitative comparative case study approach which I 
will utilize in this dissertation to test the explanatory power of my proposed hypotheses. I 
have chosen to focus on a most similar case design that includes variances on the 
dependent variable to better judge the influence of individual variables – such as coalition 
constraints, veto players, and critical actors – and to ensure that positive findings in 
successful cases are absent in failed cases of feminist policy agenda setting and adoption.  
The following chapters are dedicated to the individual case studies in Germany, 
the United Kingdom, and Japan. Chapters 4 through 6 will discuss the successful 
adoption of father incentives and corporate board quotas as well as the failed attempt to 
adopt board quotas in 2013 under the conservative government of Angela Merkel in 
Germany. Chapter 7 will expand the argument developed in this dissertation to cases in 
the United Kingdom and Japan. The final chapter will summarize the findings from the 




Germany: The Adoption of the Partnermonate 
The purpose of this dissertation is to understand why political parties adopt 
policies that ostensibly violate their ideological underpinnings. I hope to shed light on 
this question by focusing on conservative governments and feminist policy adoption. 
Studying instances of feminist policy adoption under conservative governments in the 
German context is particularly worthwhile because cases in the German context represent 
least likely cases, as I have argued in the previous chapter. First, Germany has been a 
traditional female breadwinner welfare regime that emphasizes the classic division of 
labor with a wage earning husband and a stay at home wife. The adherence to the male 
breadwinner model has not changed much in the postwar period when even the Social 
Democratic Party has supported policies such as tax benefits for traditional families, 
limited childcare services for children under three years old, and long and lowly paid 
parental leave (Leitner 2010). Second, I argue that, contrary to assumptions in the 
literature on conservative parties and feminization, neither the Christian Democratic 
Union (CDU) nor the Christian Social Union (CSU) have been feminized to an extent 
that feminist policy adoption is pursued strategically to win over women voters. Third, 
since Angele Merkel became the Chancellor in 2005, she has overseen the adoption of 
several feminist policies. Prominent examples are the anti-discrimination law, equitable 
parental leave, and corporate board quotas, and an equal pay law is currently under 
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discussion. At the same time, several attempts to pass corporate board quotas failed 
before the conservative government adopted the policy in 2015. Thus, feminist policy 
adoption under Merkel’s conservative government cannot be considered a given. 
I will focus on three instances of feminist policy adoption which encourages 
women’s participation in the workforce under the conservative government of Angela 
Merkel: the 2006 Bundeselterngeld- und Elternzeitgesetz (BEEG) which introduced the 
father leave policy (Partnermonate) into the parental leave scheme; the 2013 law 
mandating corporate board quotas, Gesetz zur Förderung gleichberechtigter Teilhabe von 
Frauen und Männern in Führungsgremien (GlTeilhG,) which failed; and the successfully 
adopted corporate board quota law in 2015, Gesetz für die gleichberechtigte Teilhabe von 
Frauen und Männern an Führungspositionen in der Privatwirtschaft und im öffentlichen 
Dienst. Comparing two successful cases with one failed one allows me to hold important 
factors constant such as macro-patterns (socioeconomic conditions, cultural attitudes, 
demographic pressures, percentage of women in politics) while introducing variance in 
my explanatory variables: coalition constraints and the constellation of critical actors, 
veto players, and opponents. In all cases under consideration, the CDU/CSU was in 
opposition to the proposed feminist policy. Thus, coalition constraints were instrumental 
for the adoption of the feminist policy during the coalition negotiations and later to 
ensure adoption as well. I argue that feminist policies are adopted when two conditions 
hold: 
1. Coalition constraints are permissive: the coalition partner is strong enough 
to include the feminist policy in the coalition agreement; and 
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2. Critical actors occupy veto player positions while opponents are not in a 
position to prevent feminist policy adoption. 
This chapter will proceed as follows. I will first show that the CDU has not been 
feminized. Accordingly, feminization, i.e., the adoption of feminist policies to attract 
women voters, cannot explain the adoption of the father leave policy in 2006. Then, I will 
provide a general background on the issue of parental leave policies in post-war 
Germany. In the following section, I will show that permissive coalition constraints 
facilitated the inclusion of the father leave policy in the coalition agreement against the 
opposition of most internal party groups within the CDU. What is interesting in the 
German cases is that internal party factions in the CDU/CSU – most notably the 
traditional wing and the business interest groups – were not able to stop the policy, but 
nevertheless succeeded in weakening the original bill draft before its final passage to 
limit the impact of the policy in scope and effectiveness. Thus, throughout the case 
studies I will pay attention to the influence of party-internal factions and their ability to 
influence policy outcomes. Further, I will illustrate how Ursula von der Leyen, the 
minister responsible for parental leave policies, was able to ensure successful adoption of 
the bill against opposition from internal group factions due to controlling the primary 
veto player position and being helped by an overall advantageous constellation of critical 
actors, veto players, and opponents. Finally, I will demonstrate that the case for the father 
leave policy was framed decisively in feminist terms rather than justifying the policy in 
terms of demographic or socioeconomic pressures faced by Germany due to a declining 
birth rate, an aging population, and anticipated labor shortage. 
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4.1.  The CDU – Lacking a Process of Feminization 
The 2006 parental leave reform in Germany broke new ground as it transformed 
the German welfare regime from a traditional male breadwinner to a dual earner/carer 
model. This radical break with the past has since attracted much scholarly attention and 
many studies have explained this turn of events by attributing them to an ongoing 
feminization process facilitated by Angela Merkel after she became party chair in 2000 
(see: Henninger and von Wahl 2014, von Wahl 2011, Hien 2014, Wiliarty 2010). 
According to these studies, we see two developments: attempts to court female voters by 
the CDU leadership and a feminization of the CDU party platform. In both respects, 
Angela Merkel is considered to play a key role. Below, I will argue that the CDU is not 
pursing an electoral strategy centered on winning over women voters and that a 
feminization process has yet to occur in the CDU. Instead, modernizing efforts within the 
party are the result of internal party faction competition rather than the result of conscious 
feminization attempts. 
Contrary to the existing literature, I argue that reaching out to female voters does 
not feature prominently in the CDU election strategies. A closer look at the electoral 
analysis conducted by the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, the political foundation of the 
CDU, the general literature on German elections, and personal interviews with election 
analysts, all confirm this assumption. First of all, the modern voting gender gap, i.e., the 
preference of female voters for left leaning parties, emerged much later in Germany than 
in other advanced industrialized countries. This trend has only emerged in the 1990s 
(Inglehart and Norris 2000, 450), and the electoral gender gap is relatively minor, 
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especially compared to the gender gap in the United States which was twenty percentage 
points in the 2012 election and 14 points in the 2008 election (Jones 2012). In Germany, 
the gender gap varies from +0.5 per cent in 2005 to +5.8 per cent in 2013 (Der 
Bundeswahlleiter 2014), casting doubt over whether the gender gap is decisive for 
electoral outcomes. Neu (2004, 2009), for example, argues that the gender gap does not 
decide elections in Germany even though the CDU has had a small advantage with 
female voters since 2005. Second, there is no evidence supporting the claim that women 
prefer left parties over conservative parties in Germany. Of the 14 elections in postwar 
Germany, women only preferred left parties over conservative ones in 1980, 1983, 1998, 
and 2002 (Neu 2004). Wrestle and Kühnle (2014) also assert that there is no gender gap 
in voter preference and gendered voting did not play an important role in 2002 or 2005. 
Third, the core constituency of the CDU are seniors (60 years and older), 
Catholics, farmers, and business owners (Walter, Werwath, and Antonio 2011). Older 
women in particularly, have always been a strong support base for the party. Electoral 
analysis reveals that whenever the CDU lost the support of women in this age group, it 
negatively affected the electoral outcome (Graf and Neu 2002). Older women represent 
31 per cent of eligible voters, thus a dip in this constituency is noticeable. For example, in 
1998 the CDU lost eight percentage points in this voter group and one percentage point in 
2002. Despite a parallel gain of six percentage points in the group of 35 – 44 years old 
women, the CDU was not able to make up the loss in the older voter group. If the CDU 
was trying to gain back the older women vote, feminist policies such as father leave 
policies or corporate board quotas can hardly be considered to be targeted at this 
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particular constituency. Fourth, in a personal interview with an election expert, the 
individual maintained that electoral behavior does not differ for women and men. Instead, 
a gap typically emerges based on religion, education, and age, which are far more 
important determinants of electoral behavior than gender. Electoral losses for the CDU 
are never due to the loss among a specific constituency, for example young women, but 
are felt across all groups. Finally, the political leadership of the CDU did not commission 
a detailed electoral analysis after the defeats of 1998 and 2002 (Walter, Werwath, and 
Antonio 2011). Instead, the election losses were attributed to an unlucky coincidence in 
history rather than the emergence of a permanent problem with a specific voter 
demographic. We can conclude then, that targeting women as an electoral group is of 
little importance in the CDU election strategies. 
One aspect of the feminization argument is that conservative parties should adopt 
feminist policies prior to the election in an effort to attract women voters. Thus, an 
analysis of election manifestos and party platforms should include father leave or board 
diversity policies. The CDU election manifesto neither included a commitment to a dual 
earner/carer type of parental leave reform nor support for a corporate board quota in 2005 
and 2009. And the inclusion of a corporate board quota policy in the 2013 election 
platform was very vague and postponed to 2020, reflecting a compromise that the party 
leadership made with prominent women within the CDU to avoid the adoption of a 
proposed quota law initiative by the opposition parties in 2013. Further, an analysis of the 
verbatim protocols of the CDU party conventions shows that neither in 2008 nor in 2012 
did the terms gender policy (Frauenpolitik) or gender equality (Gleichberechtigung) 
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appear in the verbatim protocols (Protokol. 22. Parteitag der CDU Deutschlands 2009; 
Protokol. 25. Parteitag der CDU Deutschlands 2012). When the issue of parental leave 
was discussed at the convention in 2003, a modernization of existing reconciliation 
policies was not suggested (Protocol. 17. Parteitag der CDU Deutschlands 2003). 
Instead, the CDU called for pension credits for stay at home mothers, emphasizing the 
importance of women as mothers rather than as workers. Moreover, the CDU party 
platform of 2007 does not include a discussion of equitable care leaves or corporate board 
quotas. It simply states that gender equality represents a fundamental human right and 
that women should be active across all parts of society (Das Grundsatzprogramm 2007). 
Further, the platform emphasizes the importance of traditional marriage as the best and 
most reliable form of family. While the CDU calls for better work reconciliation policies 
and an active engagement of fathers in childrearing – these calls are nowhere close to the 
changes the CDU adopted later in its parental leave reform. 
While the CDU overall does not seem to undergo a feminization process, what 
about the personal impact of Angela Merkel? After all, as the Chancellor she can set the 
policy guidelines for the government, and as a party chair she is in a position to set policy 
directions for the party. Further, many studies argue that Angela Merkel was instrumental 
in modernizing the social policy platform of the CDU. To a certain extent, this is true. 
For example, Angela Merkel was crucial in shifting the CDU towards a more modern 
family image. She promoted the Erfurter Leitsätze (guidelines of Erfurt) in 1999 which 
encouraged an honest and critical debate about controversial subjects across many issue 
areas including but not limited to educational, social, and family policy (Walter, 
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Werwath, and Antonio 2011). But Angela Merkel must walk a fine line between desires 
to modernize the party platform and ensuring the support of the traditional wing of the 
CDU which is still powerful. As a result, Angela Merkel later turned her back on more 
progressive family and integration policies to reassure the conservative wing of the party 
and continued to emphasize the three key elements of the CDU: social, liberal, and 
conservative. Likewise, to appease the conservative wing, the CDU campaigned on a 
decisively liberal market platform and Angela Merkel appointed Kristina Schröder – who 
is a member of the young conservative wing – to the 2009 cabinet. 
Further, Angela Merkel has dedicated little time to gender issues in her internal 
party speeches. In none of the party convention speeches did Angela Merkel mention the 
issue of gender equality or gender policies. Angela Merkel did mention the issue of board 
quotas in her speech in 2013, emphasizing that companies needed to fulfill their promise 
to nominate more women for their boards, and expressed her support for the so-called 
‘flexi-quota’, a quota law which would allow companies to set their own corporate board 
quotas. That said, her statements must be understood in the context of the events 
unfolding in 2013 when corporate board quotas were a hotly contested topic which 
internally divided the CDU into quota supporters and opponents. Embroiled in this 
conflict were two ministers: Ursula von der Leyen (then Labor Minister) and Kristina 
Schröder (then Minister for Family, Seniors, Women, and Youth), the former pushing for 
a strict quota law, and the latter promoting a compromise between a hard law and soft 
voluntary measures (the so-called flexi quota). Thus, Merkel’s comments need to be 
interpreted as a plea to put the debate to rest rather than her support for a quota law which 
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she opposed (personal interview with head of a women’s organization). Merkel herself 
opposed a corporate quota law, and she helped to derail a similar quota law on the 
European Union level (Barber 2014). 
Yet Merkel is open to modern social policies even if she has not personally 
pursued them (CDU member, personal interview). Evelyn Roll, a biographer of Angela 
Merkel, argues that there is little evidence that her sympathetic attitudes have translated 
into a drive to turn the CDU into a more women-friendly party or active strategies to 
pursue a feminization of the party. As a result, the modernizing attempts have been 
modest (albeit surprising from a conservative standpoint) and even the modernizing 
attempts outlined above in the realm of family policies and gender equality fall short of 
the policies eventually adopted in 2005 and 2009. As a member of parliament put it in 
one interview: ‘Angela Merkel takes a neutral position’9. This sentiment that Merkel has 
no programmatic goals and passion was echoed by the majority of my interview partners 
across parties and women’s organizations. They all agree that Angela Merkel’s leadership 
style is ‘situational’ and pragmatic rather than driven from an ideological perspective. 
This pragmatism motivates Merkel to lead from the center: she attempts to position the 
political party in the center of politics where the majority of voters are located to ensure 
the continued success of the CDU at the ballot box (‘Power Profile: Angela Merkel’ 
2015). Concerns with women voters specifically are only relevant to the extent they 
inform overall public opinion. Thus, I argue that Angela Merkel has not followed a 
course of feminization for the CDU. Instead, any modernizing tendencies are the result of 
                                                
9 Original quota: Angela Merkel ist ein Neutrum 
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a continuous tug of war between the traditionalist and modernizing faction within the 
party, moderated by Angela Merkel’s objectives to reach out to the median voter.  
To conclude then, I have illustrated, first that the CDU has not undergone a 
process of feminization and second, that Angela Merkel herself is not pursing a 
feminization agenda. Thus, we must look at explanations beyond the feminization 
argument to understand why the conservative government under the leadership of Angela 
Merkel adopted feminist policies. I argue that a combination of permissive coalition 
constraints and institutionally powerful critical actors prompted first the inclusion of 
feminist policies in the coalition agreement and then the successful adoption of those 
policies. 
4.2.  The Groundbreaking Nature of the 2006 Parental Leave Reform 
When Merkel’s government adopted the Bundeselterngeld- und Elternzeitgesetz 
(Federal Parental Money and Parental Time Law) in 2006, it broke new ground: not only 
did this policy resemble the Scandinavian parental leave models, but Germany also 
joined a small but growing number of countries which designate a specific period of 
parental leave for the exclusive use of fathers alone. As such, the new law evoked much 
controversy, praise, and astonishment. This was particularly true for the provision of a 
father bonus which was included in the law after much heated debate. Thus, before we 
turn to the analysis of this particular case study, we need to understand why the adoption 
of the 2006 parental leave law was so remarkable.  
Germany, being a traditional conservative welfare state surprised many when a 
conservative Minister for Family – Ursula von der Leyen – with the support of Angela 
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Merkel pushed for radical progressive reforms, essentially dismantling the long-
established male breadwinner model. The new parental leave law established a dual 
earner/carer model which is based on the assumption that both women and men will be 
engaged in unpaid care work and paid employment at some point in their lives. As a 
result, it aims to strengthen mothers’ ties with employment and men’s involvement in 
unpaid care work and as such is much more egalitarian in terms of gender roles than the 
male breadwinner model. In general, the extent of egalitarianism in parental leave is 
determined by the portion of paid leave available to fathers exclusively and the 
percentage of earnings replaced by the benefit (Ray, Gornick, and Schmitt 2010). 
Because men typically earn more than women, the higher the percentage of replaced 
wage, the higher the likelihood that the father will take leave. Reserving a certain number 
of weeks for the exclusive use of fathers encourages fathers to take up unpaid care work 
and challenges the traditional division of labor. Further, the length of parental leave 
influences the labor force attachment of women and potentially can increase gender 
equality in the labor force (Ray, Gornick, and Schmitt 2010). A parental leave period of 
about a year makes it more likely that women return to work, thus raising the 
employment rates of mothers, narrows the pay gap between child-free women and 
mothers, and limits the number of mothers who exit the labor force completely. 
Before the reform, parental leave encompassed a period of three years of which 
two years were paid at a flat rate of 300 Euros per month. In 2000, the flat rate was 
increased to 450 Euros if parents opted for just one year of leave (Leitner 2010). 
However, this new option essentially meant that women who returned to work early gave 
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up 1,800 Euros in parental leave benefits, making it less likely that parents would opt for 
a shorter leave and thus encouraging the male breadwinner model. In addition, children 
were only eligible for a childcare spot once they were three years old and only for part-
time childcare. Thus, women wanting to return to work confronted a lack of childcare 
options. Similarly, the emphasis of parental leave as a traditional family benefit is 
exemplified in the extension of the benefit to non-employed mothers, small flat rate 
benefits, and the long duration of leave (Leitner 2010). Finally, the entitlement was a 
family entitlement and no time was reserved for the exclusive use of fathers. 
In contrast, the 2006 Bundeselterngeld- und Elternzeitgesetz (BEEG) broke with 
tradition by making crucial changes to the generosity of parental leave, both in duration 
and benefit levels (Blum and Erler 2014). First, parental leave benefits were changed 
from a family to an individual entitlement. Further, the parental leave benefits were paid 
at 67 per cent of the parent’s average wage with a ceiling of 1,800 Euros a month. This 
allows fathers to seriously consider taking time off to care for their children. Second, the 
paid period was shortened to twelve months encouraging women to return to work after 
parental leave. Third, benefits are paid for an additional two months if the father takes 
two months of leave. While these two months are intended to be of exclusive use for 
fathers, they act as an incentive: families that opt for the traditional division of labor are 
still eligible for the full twelve months of parental leave. Families where the father 
decides to stay home for at least two months are rewarded with two extra months of paid 
parental leave. Thus, rather than a quota, the law established a father bonus. As a result of 
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these changes, the new parental leave scheme has distinct egalitarian traits and has moved 
the German parental leave model from a male breadwinner to a dual earner/carer model. 
This chapter will explain why Merkel’s government adopted a father leave policy. 
To this end, I will argue that the adoption of the father leave policy can be ascribed to (1) 
the undue influence of the SPD during the coalition negotiations and (2) the leadership of 
Ursula von der Leyen who is herself a supporter of father leave policies despite the 
ideological opposition to them within the CDU/CSU.  
4.3.  Inclusion of the Father Leave Policy in the Government Agenda 
To understand why a father leave policy was adopted in 2006, we first need to 
find out how the policy became part of the coalition agreement. This is important for two 
reasons. First, the CDU campaigned with an election program that did not include the 
policy. Second, the coalition agreement sets the legislative agenda of the government for 
the upcoming legislative period which is the sine qua non for the father leave policy to 
become a reality. Thus, the key question is: why was a father leave policy incorporated 
into the coalition agreement? 
The 2005 German Bundestag elections were called early after Chancellor 
Schröder (purposefully) lost the confidence vote in the Bundestag. Schröder hoped that 
the elections would deliver him a strong popular mandate to continue his reform politics 
(Helms 2006). The contrast in campaign promises in regards to family policies could not 
have been starker between the CDU and SPD. While the SPD detailed at great length its 
proposed policies to achieve greater gender equality overall and a change in parental 
leave policies from a male breadwinner model to a dual earner/carer model, the 
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CDU/CSU party manifesto barely mentioned family policies (Ludwig and Mayer 2005, 
52). Specifically, the SPD program read: 
We want young people to fulfill their dreams of becoming parents. 
Children are our future, children create happiness. Mothers and fathers 
want to live together in an equal partnership and share their care and 
professional obligations. To maintain the fabric of our society, as well as 
for growth and prosperity, we need strong families with more children. 
Excellent child care, time for children and family, adequate financial 
support for family policy, supporting the desire to have children of most 
young people – this is our family policy10 (Vertrauen in Deutschland. Das 
Wahlmanifest der SPD, 2004, 30).  
By emphasizing egalitarian partnerships and the ability to reconcile family and 
work, the SPD specifically called for a change to a dual earner/carer approach to parental 
leave by suggesting the transformation of the flat-rate benefit system (Erziehungsgeld) 
into an income-related benefit. The party justified this by specifically stating that this 
policy change would lead to greater gender equality for women as well as encouraging 
fathers to stay at home. 
In contrast, the CDU/CSU manifesto emphasized the low fertility rates and the 
need to protect families: 
Even though the majority of German citizens considers the founding of a 
family a life goal, fewer and fewer people have children. Germany has the 
lowest fertility rate in Europe! The federal government has weakened the 
value of marriage and family in the past years. Family is the most 
important form of living together. We stand for the special protection of 
marriage and family. People want personal happiness. Marriage, family, 
and other forms of cohabitation can convey a purpose in life, a sense of 
security, and happiness. Because we want a future, this is our benchmark: 
priority for families and children! This is why we will generate better 
                                                
10 Original text: Wir wollen, dass junge Menschen sich ihre Kinderwünsche erfüllen können. Kinder sind 
Zukunft, Kinder haben macht Freude. Mütter und Väter wollen partnerschaftlich zusammenleben und sich 
familiäre und berufliche Pflichten teilen. Unsere Gesellschaft braucht für ihren Zusammenhalt, auch für 
mehr Wachstum und Wohlstand, starke Familien mit mehr Kindern. 
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conditions for families and children.11 (Deutschlands Chancen Nutzen, 
2004, 24).  
To this end, the CDU/CSU proposed the following policies: an 8,000 Euro tax 
credit for children, a monthly 50 Euro children retirement bonus for mothers to recognize 
mothers’ care work, and a premium-free insurance for all children. Further, the 
CDU/CSU stated that it would promote the reconciliation of work and family by 
‘accelerating the expansion of childcare’ (Deutschlands Chancen Nutzen, 2004, 25). 
Thus, egalitarian family models which encourage mothers to return to work played no 
role in the CDU/CSU manifesto. Quite the contrary, all proposals are in line with the 
traditional male breadwinner model.  
The switch to a dual earner/carer model is the brainchild of Renate Schmidt, the 
former Minister for Family, Seniors, Women, and Youth of the SPD, and represents an 
important turning point in the parental leave approach of the SPD which until then did 
not prioritize it. In fact, in 1998 then Chancellor Schröder referred to family policies as 
‘family and all that other hullabaloo’ – a remark he could never shake off (Erdman 2009). 
When Renate Schmidt became Minister for Family and Women in 2002 she praised the 
Scandinavian parental leave model and proposed a policy reform that included the 
introduction of an income-related benefit and shorter parental leave periods to encourage 
                                                
11 Original text: Während viele Mitbürger in Deutschland mit überwältigender Mehrheit die Gründung 
einer eigenen Familie als persönliches Lebensziel ansehen, verwirklichen immer weniger Menschen den 
bestehenden Kinderwunsch. Deutschland ist bei der Geburtenrate Schlusslicht in Europa! Die 
Bundesregierung hat den Stellenwert von Ehe und Familie in den letzten Jahren zunehmend relativiert. Die 
Familie ist die wichtigste Form des Zusammenlebens. Wir stehen zum besonderen Schutz von Ehe und 
Familie. Die Menschen wollen in glücklichen persönlichen Verhältnissen leben. Das können Ehe, Familie 
und andere Formen des Zusammenlebens sein, die Lebenssinn, Geborgenheit und Glück vermitteln. Weil 
wir Zukunft wollen, ist unser Maßstab: Vorrang für Familien und Kinder! Deshalb schaffen wir bessere 
Rahmenbedingungen für Familien und Kinder. 
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mothers to return to work after giving birth. Further, she established the Alliance for 
Families to recruit the support of business and corporations for the reconciliation of 
family and work as well as the increased participation of women in the labor force. The 
Schröder government discussed the policy proposal in 2004, and in a cabinet retreat in 
the same year decided on placing the parental leave reform in the overall policy program 
to improve gender equality among men and women in the home (Mayer and Rössler 
2013).   
Interestingly enough, the idea of a father leave policy was not included in the SPD 
party manifesto before the election, yet the policy was included in the coalition 
agreement:  
The parental leave period of twelve months can be shared between both 
parents. Two months are reserved for the father and two months for the 
mother12 (Gemeinsam Für Deutschland – Mit Mut Und Menschlichkeit 
2005, 101).  
Thus, we need to understand why the policy proposal became part of the coalition 
negotiations despite the fact that it was not part of either the CDU/CSU or the SPD party 
manifestos. The addition of the policy proposal is particularly surprising because party 
manifestos are the basis for the variety of policies subject to coalition negotiations. As a 
consequence, a policy idea first needs to become part of the election manifesto and only 
then does it have a chance of becoming part of the coalition agreement (personal 
interviews). Yet paradoxically this was not the case for the father leave policy.  
                                                
12 Original text: Die zwölf Monate des Bezugszeitraums können zwischen den Eltern aufgeteilt werden. 
Zwei Monate bleiben dem Vater, zwei Monate der Mutter reserviert.  
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To understand this paradox, I will now turn to the 2005 coalition negotiations. 
Coalition negotiations do not occur in a vacuum but rather are shaped by the unique 
circumstances of the national election as well as the election results. These factors play 
an important role in determining the negotiation power of both parties as well as the 
negotiation outcomes. The 2005 elections results could not have been any closer. The 
CDU/CSU emerged as the strongest party in the Bundestag but its majority was paper 
thin with only four seats. Because of the narrow results between the SPD (222) and the 
CDU/CSU (226), then Chancellor Schröder claimed that the SPD had the right to form 
the government. The reality was that none of the major parties could form a majority 
coalition with their traditional coalition partner. While many coalition options were 
tossed around (‘Stoplight coalition’ of the SPD, the Greens, and the FDP and the 
‘Jamaica coalition’ of CDU/CSU, the FDP, and the Greens), it soon became clear that the 
only real option was a grand coalition of the CDU/CSU and the SPD, especially as this 
coalition was the direct translation of the election results and public preferences 
(Fleischhauer et al 2005; Helms 2006a). However, both the SPD and the CDU/CSU 
insisted on their right to name the Chancellor. After several exploratory talks between the 
two parties preceding the coalition negotiations, a compromise emerged (Jun 2008): the 
SPD would support Angela Merkel as Chancellor as long as the CDU/CSU would make 
considerable personnel and policy concessions (Volkery 2005).  
With this compromise, formal coalition negotiations could begin which the SPD 
entered as an equal coalition partner with a major say on personnel and policy decisions. 
The coalition negotiations were conducted among a total of 420 participants (Jun 2008, 
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37). The ‘central commission to negotiate the grand coalition’13 consisted of 32 members. 
In addition, the coalition negotiations included a steering committee with four chief 
negotiators, 16 issue specific working groups of 12 members each, and 32 issue specific 
internal party working groups consisting of roughly 22 members each. While the 
coalition negotiations were held among many political actors, only a few of the actors 
were relevant to my analysis. The actors whose consent was ultimately necessary were 
the chief negotiators and the two leaders of the issue specific working group for family, 
seniors, women, and youth policies. It was the agreement of these six people that was 
necessary to move the coalition agreement forward: 
1. Franz Müntefering (later replaced by Matthias Platzeck), SPD  
2. Gerhard Schröder, SPD 
3. Angela Merkel, CDU 
4. Edmund Stoiber, CSU 
5. Renate Schmidt, SPD 
6. Ursula von der Leyen, CDU 
Ursula von der Leyen (CDU, designated Minister for Families, Seniors, Women 
and Youth) and Renate Schmidt (SPD, former Minister for Families, Seniors, Women 
and Youth) were the chief negotiators for the working group for family, seniors, women, 
and youth policies and as such determined the content of the family policies within the 
realm of possibilities set forth by their respective political parties. Because of the close 
                                                
13 Zentrale Große Kommission zur Verhandlung der Großen Koalition 2005; Große 
Verhandlungskommission, GVK, 2005)  
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election results and the elevated negotiation position for the SPD, the sitting Minister 
Renate Schmidt declared that the SPD would push the CDU/CSU to continue the family 
policies of the SPD. She emphasized that she would make sure that the Elterngeld would 
be part of the coalition agreement having the tacit support of the CDU women (‘SPD 
Schlägt Abgespeckte Bürgerversicherung vor’ 2005). Renate Schmidt did not have to 
press hard for her preferred parental leave reform because Ursula von der Leyen agreed 
with her on this very subject matter (personal interviews). 
The question is how the father leave policy was incorporated into the proposal. 
While Renate Schmidt always supported the idea of a father leave policy, the key 
question is whether Ursula von der Leyen, as a conservative politician, was supportive of 
this idea. Von der Leyen is often described as a non-conforming or atypical CDU 
politician (personal interviews). Some fellow party members have even accused her of 
being a social democrat in disguise (Dausend and Niejahr 2015). In an early interview 
with Der Stern, von der Leyen argued that society must allow women to have both a 
career and children because otherwise highly educated women will forgo motherhood 
(Güßgen 2005). In the same interview, she highlighted the positive example of Sweden 
where society fully embraces men who take care of their children. In a radio interview 
with Deutschlandfunk (Leyen 2004), von der Leyen emphasized the need for girls to 
consider typical male professions and stated that boys should be encouraged to consider 
traditional female (care) professions. In the same interview she also drew attention to the 
important role fathers play in a child’s life and the ability of men to learn new and 
important social skills when they stay home to care for their children. Finally, von der 
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Leyen has also emphasized in the past that an equal division of labor among men and 
women in the home is necessary (‘Von der Leyen will die Männer Umkrempeln’ 2005). 
Thus we can be confident in the assessment that Urusula von der Leyen not only 
supported the policy itself but also supported the underlying goals of the policy such as 
greater equality in the home and better reconciliation of work and family for mothers – 
both feminist values. 
Her progressive family views are often linked to her personal upbringing: as a 
child, von der Leyen attended an all-day school in Brussels when her father worked for 
the European Commission. She lived in the United States as a young adult. It was in the 
United States that she witnessed how women did not stop their careers once they had 
children and that balancing work and family responsibility was not only possible but 
desirable. Von der Leyen herself also never stopped working as a physician while having 
seven children. As she said in an interview with Die Welt: 
Big changes have already occurred in the United States. Young, 
particularly well qualified men are no longer able to find equal partners if 
they are not willing to take over new roles. In Germany, changes in the 
role of men and fathers towards equal partners is more than necessary. 
Men, who are not willing to break with traditional roles, will no longer 
find a partner14 (Siems 2005). 
She continues that she was willing to break with her belief in the conservative 
principle of freedom of choice because:  
                                                
14 Original text: In den USA hat demnach bereits eine große Veränderung stattgefunden. Junge, 
insbesondere qualifizierte Männer fanden nur noch dann Frauen ihresgleichen, wenn sie bereit waren, eine 
neue Rolle einzunehmen. In Deutschland ist eine Veränderung in der Väter- und Männerrolle, hin zu einem 
tatsächlich gleichberechtigten Partner, überfällig. Männer, die dazu nicht bereit sind, werden keine 
Partnerin mehr finden. 
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Few men in Germany have been able to experience how it is to care for a 
baby 24 hours a day, seven days a week. I know from personal experience 
that caring for a baby not only creates deep father-child bonds but also 
builds respect for care work15 (Siems 2005)  
Von der Leyen has argued that father leave policies are instrumental in changing 
this traditional role pattern (‘Familienministerin Will Die Männer Umerziehen’ 2005) and 
that such policies are crucial in addressing the low fertility rates in Germany. While the 
idea of a father leave policy originated with the SPD, and despite the fact that neither 
party included the policy in its election manifesto, the policy ended up in the coalition 
agreement due to two factors: On the one hand, the close election results propelled the 
SPD into a bargaining position where it could ask for more than might have otherwise 
been possible during the coalition negotiations. On the other hand, Renate Schmidt found 
an ally in Ursula von der Leyen who fully supported the idea of Partnermonate, a father 
leave policy that would reserve a specific amount of time of parental leave for the 
exclusive use of fathers. Further, von der Leyen had the tacit support of the Chancellor 
who was open to modernizing family policies facilitating the inclusion of a father leave 
policy in the final coalition agreement. 
In the end, Renate Schmidt (together with the SPD negotiation leaders 
Müntefering, Schröder, and Platzeck) was able to push for the inclusion of social 
democratic minted family policies due to the unprecedented influence wielded by the 
SPD over the coalition negotiations. Accordingly, the coalition agreement not only 
                                                
15 Original text: Kaum Männer haben hierzulande bisher die Erfahrung machen können, wie es ist, 24 
Stunden am Tag, sieben Tage die Woche für ein Baby zu sorgen. Ich weiß aus eigener Erfahrung, daß dies 
nicht nur eine tiefe Bindung der Väter zu ihren Kindern schafft, sondern auch die Hochachtung für diese 
Arbeit fördert. Deshalb weiche ich an dieser Stelle von meinem Prinzip der Wahlfreiheit ab. 
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included a full commitment to the dual earner/carer model but also a father leave policy 
in addition to the establishment of an alliance for families (among political units, civil 
society and businesses) to foster the reconciliation of family and work. Yet it was left to 
Ursula von der Leyen – the new Minister for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women 
and Youth of the CDU – to shepherd the policy provision through the legislative process. 
As Renate Schmidt so aptly put it:  
“The Elterngeld always had two mothers – one who participated in its 
conception and one who participated at its birth” (Renate Schmidt as 
quoted in Ostermann 2006 and translated by the author). 
4.4.  The Policy Adoption Process 
The status as an equal coalition partner of the SPD and the support of Ursula von 
der Leyen thus explain the inclusion of a father leave policy into the coalition agreement. 
The following sections will illustrate why the policy was not dropped in the parental 
leave reform despite massive opposition from the conservative wing of the CDU/CSU. 
To understand the adoption of the father leave policy, we now need to sketch out the 
different stages of the policy process as well as the location of veto players and critical 
actors within the framework. Figure 2 shows the different stages of the policy making 
process in the area of family policies: 
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Figure 2: Policy Process for Family Policies 
 
The policy process consists of two distinct phases: the drafting phase and the 
legislative process. In the drafting phase, the responsible Minister – in the case of the 
father leave policy it is the Minister for Families, Seniors, Women, and Youth – develops 
the so called Referentenentwurf (ministerial draft). Once the first draft stands, the 
responsible spokespeople and responsible vice chairs in each coalition faction as well as 
the chairperson and vice-chairperson of the committee on Families, Seniors, Women, and 
Youth are asked to comment on it. The modified draft is then submitted to the office of 
the Chancellor for comment before the draft goes to the all other cabinet members to 
ensure an early coordination across the different ministers. Finally, the draft is sent to the 
state governments and business and other civil society associations for review.  
In the legislative phase, the draft is introduced to the cabinet and if accepted is 
introduced as a bill into the legislative process. The bill is first sent to the Bundesrat for 
comment (Art. 76 II GG) and then introduced by the government into the Bundestag 
including the comments of the Bundesrat to the bill as well a statement by the 
government justifying the need for the bill. After a first parliamentary hearing the bill is 
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sent to the responsible committee – the committee for Families, Seniors, Women, and 
Youth where members of civil society, organizations, and relevant experts are called to 
testify in favor or in opposition to the bill. The modified bill is then voted on and subject 
to two more parliamentary debates in the Bundestag. If accepted by the majority of 
parliament, the bill is send to the Bundesrat for a vote and in a last step, sent to the 
President of the Federal Republic for signature.  
That being so, the legislative process in Germany involves a myriad of actors who 
can all influence the outcome of each bill. Yet as I argue in Part I of the dissertation, not 
all actors are created equal. Some have a much greater influence on the fate of the policy 
than others. Specifically, the influence of actors varies by whether these individuals are 
located in the drafting phase or in the legislative process. Further, the level of influence 
depends on whether these actors are veto players or not. Veto players are political actors 
whose consent is necessary for the adoption of the policy (Tsebelis 1995). Institutional 
veto players are established by the constitution of a country. Applied to the case of 
Germany, there are potentially six institutional veto players that all need to consent to a 
bill before it becomes a law: the cabinet minister in charge of the policy area; the 
government cabinet; the Chancellor; the Bundestag; the Bundesrat; and the President.  
I argue that the cabinet itself is not a veto player in its own right but rather a 
deliberative government entity due to the Kanzlerprinzip (power of the Chancellor to 
determine policy guidelines) set forth in Article 65 of the German Constitution. This 
Article 65 holds that the Chancellor determines the general guidelines of the policy and 
that the cabinet cannot overrule the Chancellor. Thus, I apply the absorption rule to the 
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cabinet. The absorption rule holds that veto players who are located in the unanimity core 
of the other need not necessarily be analyzed as separate veto players (Tsebelis 2002).  
Likewise, while the Bundestag needs to approve the bill with a majority of its 
vote for the bill to become law (Art. 76 GG), I argue that the absorption rule can also be 
applied to the Bundestag. In parliamentary democracies, the government is part of the 
legislature and, in the case of a winning government coalition, controls the majority of 
parliament. Further, due to the fact that government coalitions in Germany are governed 
by the principle of discipline in parliamentary votes (Müller and Strom 2010), the 
government can rightfully expect that the Bundestag will not veto any bill proposals 
introduced by the government (Müller 2004). Thus, the Bundestag is not a relevant veto 
player.  
I am also applying the absorption rule to the Bundesrat, which is only a relevant 
veto player if the constitution requires the consent of the Bundesrat to the proposed bill 
and is only a potential veto player if the composition of the Bundesrat differs from the 
composition of the Bundestag. Because the governing coalition was a grand coalition, the 
majority in both chambers are identical and accordingly did not prove to be a hurdle for 
the passing of the bill (see Stüwe 2008).  
Finally, the President of Germany needs to sign any bill before it  is enacted (Art. 
82 GG) and is tasked with ensuring the constitutionality of the law. In reality, the 
signature of the President is only a formality. Since the founding of the German Federal 
Republic, the President has refused to sign a bill only eight times (‘Der Bundespräsident. 
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Amtliche Funktionen’ 2015). Thus, I argue that the President is not a relevant veto 
player. 
That leaves me with two relevant veto players: the responsible cabinet minister as 
the primary veto player and the Chancellor as the secondary veto player. Accordingly, 
Ursula von der Leyen is the primary veto player while Angela Merkel is a secondary veto 
player. The principle of minister discretion grants the right to develop the policy draft to 
the responsible cabinet minister (Laver and Shepsle 1996). As she is Minister for 
Families, Seniors, Women, and Youth, developing a father leave policy falls into the 
purview of Ursula von der Leyen and, accordingly, she becomes the primary veto player. 
The Chancellor is a veto player because of her power to determine policy guidelines and 
because her signature is necessary for a bill to be adopted.  
Beyond veto players, some actors were able to have a greater influence over the 
policy – both in the drafting stage and in the legislative process – than others even though 
they were not veto players per se. I will call these actors ‘expert advisors’ because their 
feedback and opinions were sought with regard to the policy draft and bill proposal. I 
have identified 36 expert advisors who could influence policy outcomes in this manner: 
1. Vice chairperson of each coalition faction: Nicolette Kressl (SPD) and Ilse 
Falk (CDU) 
2. Spokesperson for the faction working group on Families, Seniors, Women, 




3. Chairperson of the committee on Families, Seniors, Women, and Youth 
matters: Kerstin Griese (SPD) 
4. Members of the committee on Families, Seniors, Women, and Youth 
matters: 31 members 
In the drafting stage, faction vice chairs, the faction spokesperson on Families, 
Seniors, Women, and Youth matters, and the committee chair for Families, Seniors, 
Women, and Youth were consulted, provided their feedback, and requested changes to 
the policy draft. The Minister could incorporate these changes but was not required to do 
so (personal interviews). In the legislative process, members of the committee on 
Families, Seniors, Women, and Youth matters had the ability to modify the content of the 
bill before the final parliamentary debates. Thus, these expert advisors wielded important 
influence over the policy, but only to a limited extent.  
Further, not all of these expert advisors necessarily made use of their ability to 
influence the policy process. Thus, we need to determine whether these expert advisors 
chose to play an active role in the policy making process. I argue that only if these expert 
advisors spoke up during the policy process, can we assume that they attempted to 
influence the outcome of the policy. Of the 53 actors I identified (see Table 1 in 
Appendix A), only 13 can be classified as having made use of their positions as expert 
advisors. Four of them were in the drafting stage, while the rest were members of the 
committee on Families, Seniors, Women, and Youth matters and thus only active in the 
legislative process.  
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In Chapter 3, I argue that it is important to determine whether critical actors 
occupy veto player positions which allows these actors to control the legislative process 
and potentially even the drafting phase. I will also argue that critical actors can amplify 
their influence on the policy making process if they occupy positions as expert advisors. 
To recap, I consider an individual to be a critical actor if:  
1. The individual speaks up for feminist policies in public; and  
2. The individual speaks up during the legislative process or is identified as a 
critical actor in personal interviews.  
Based on this definition, I have identified five critical actors (in order of 
importance): Ursula von der Leyen (CDU), Christel Humme (SPD), Hans Bertram 
(academic expert), Nicolette Kressl (SPD), and Ilse Falk (CDU). 
4.5.  The Constellation of Veto Players, Critical Actors, and Opponents 
In the previous section, I identified both the relevant veto player positions (the 
Minister for Seniors, Families, Women, and Youth, and the Chancellor) and a total of 
five critical actors. I will now determine whether critical actors occupied veto player or 
expert advisor positions in the policy making process. Three critical actors, Christel 
Humme, Nicolette Kressl, and Ilse Falk, all held positions as expert advisors. This means 
that critical actors were in a unique position to influence the content of the policy during 
the drafting stage. Further, each critical actor was able to influence the legislative process 
due to their positions as either spokesperson for the party’s internal party working group 
for Families, Seniors, Women, and Youth Matters (Christel Humme) or as vice chairs for 
the factional group considering Families, Seniors, Women, and Youth Matters (Nicolette 
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Kressl, Ilse Falk). By occupying these positions, each critical actor was responsible for 
making the case for the merits of the father leave policy during parliamentary debates. 
This means that all three critical actors had several opportunities to influence the public 
debate around the policy in its favor (personal interviews). Finally, Ilse Falk and Christel 
Humme are members of the committee on Families, Seniors, Women, and Youth matters 
which means that they had the ability to influence the content of the policy during the 
drafting stage as well as during the legislative process. 
Another critical actor, Ursula von der Leyen, occupied the primary veto player 
position. As the Minister for Families, Seniors, Women, and Youth matters, Ursula von 
der Leyen was responsible for drafting and introducing the relevant bill into the 
legislative process. This means that she was able to propose a policy which closely 
corresponded with her beliefs for reform. As a result, the original policy draft included a 
partner month proposal that was designed as a father quota (based on a ‘10+2’ model) 
rather than a father incentive for the father leave policy. In the 10+2 model, parental 
leave is paid for 12 months but only if two months are taken by the father. Families 
where the father does not take advantage of the father leave policy will lose these two 
months and have a shortened ten-month period of paid parental leave. Thus, the original 
policy intended to put gentle pressure on fathers to take advantage of the partner months. 
Hans Bertram is the only civil society actor that I deem to be a critical actor. He is 
both a Professor Emeritus of micro sociology at the Humboldt University Berlin as well 
as a family policy expert who was the lead author of the seventh family report for the 
Minister for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth. In this report he argued 
 
119 
that the decline in the national birth rate is partially due to the continued support of the 
male breadwinner model, which no longer corresponds with the realities of families and 
the wishes of women and men. Bertram also finds that in order for women to have a 
second child, men need to step up and take over care responsibilities and that the state 
needs to create a framework that encourages men to take up parental leave. His report 
helped policy advocates and critical actors to make a solid case for the inclusion of 
partner months into the parental leave reform. For example, in the report he argues that 
the majority of young men in Germany want to take care of their children but traditional 
societal expectations and workplace cultures prevent them from doing so (Siebter 
Familienbericht Familie Zwischen Flexibilität Und Verlässlichkeit – Perspektiven Für 
Eine Lebenslaufbezogene Familienpolitik 2006).  
Angela Merkel is the secondary veto player. Because Angela Merkel is neither 
considered a critical actor nor an opponent of the policy, we need to ask whether she was 
supportive, neutral, or resistant of the father leave policy. I argue that Angela Merkel can 
be classified as a supportive veto player. For one, she recruited Ursula von der Leyen as 
the Minister for Families, Seniors, Women, and Youth in her shadow cabinet. She hoped 
that this relatively unknown state minister for Social Affairs from Lower Saxony, as a 
young working mother of seven, would bring some fresh air to the party. Thus, Merkel 
was very supportive of von der Leyen (Walter, Werwath, and Antonio 2011). Further, 
while Merkel only once publicly commented on the policy debate, she expressed her 
support for the policy (‘Umfrage: Union sinkt auf Jahrestief’ 2006). Several 
representatives of the CDU asserted in personal interviews that the Chancellor fully 
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supported the idea of a father leave policy. As a result, Angela Merkel was a supportive 
veto player.  
Support for the policy, however, was not ubiquitous. The father leave policy was 
mostly opposed by CSU men, especially Norbert Geis (CSU, MP), Markus Söder (CSU, 
general secretary), Peter Ramsauer (CSU, MP), and Alois Glück (CSU, president 
Bavarian parliament). The FDP and several prime ministers – particularly Dieter Althaus 
(CDU, Thuringia), Georg Milbradt (CDU, Saxony), and Jürgen Rüttgers (CDU, North 
Rhine Westfalia) were also opposed. 
Because there was strong opposition to the policy, an important question is 
whether opponents were in a position to influence veto players during the policy making 
process and as a result either stop or weaken the policy. In contrast to the five critical 
actors identified, the positions of policy opponents in the drafting and legislative process 
was not advantageous. Quite to the contrary, as opponents did not control any of the veto 
players or expert advisor positions in the drafting phase. However, two opponents – 
Anton Schaaf (SPD) and Miriam Gruß (FPD) – were members of the committee on 
Families, Seniors, Women, and Youth matters. Because Anton Schaaf was subject to the 
coalition discipline, he could not vote against the proposal, and as a member of the 
opposition party, Miriam Gruß did not possess sufficient influence to modify, let alone 
block the government proposal. Thus, the opponents were external to the legislative 
process and unable to stop policy adoption. I argue, however, that some of the opponents 
had enough intra-party clout to at least achieve modifications to the final policy. 
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To conclude then, critical actors occupied the most important veto player 
positions in the legislative process while also being able to influence the policy in the 
drafting phase and legislative process as expert advisors. Angela Merkel was a supportive 
veto player albeit not a critical actor. In contrast, opponents of the policy were not able to 
occupy positions of influence – neither as veto players nor expert advisors – in the 
drafting phase and legislative process. Their only hope was to influence the public 
discourse and to use their individual weight in the internal party process to affect changes 
to the policy.  
4.6.  Explaining the Policy Outcome 
While the policy proposal originated with the SPD under then Minister for Family 
Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth Renate Schmidt, the policy was drafted and 
introduced under the leadership of Ursula von der Leyen of the CDU. The fact that the 
CDU/CSU government did not go back on its coalition agreement to introduce the 
Elterngeld was mostly due to the personal commitment of Ursula von der Leyen and the 
unique constellation of critical actors and veto players.  
The policy debate around the father leave policy can be divided into two major 
phases: the drafting phase and the legislative phase. During the drafting phase, the 
discussion mainly centered on which form the father leave policy should take – whether 
the policy should be in the form of a father quota or in the form of a father bonus. During 




4.6.1.  The Drafting Phase 
Interestingly, the debate around the policy did not center so much on whether the 
policy would be part of the Elterngeld reform as what form the policy would take. The 
major discussion occurred during the drafting stage when two policy options were 
debated: the 10+2 model and the 12+2 model. In the 10+2 model, parents would only get 
12 months of paid parental leave if the father stayed home with the child for at least 2 
months. Here, families who preferred a more traditional division of labor would be 
disadvantaged. In the 12+2 model, all families would receive 12 months of paid parental 
leave but families where the father stays at home would receive a bonus of 2 additional 
months of paid parental leave. The two different models correspond to the father quota 
(10+2) and the father bonus (12+2). As discussed previously, the father bonus is a weaker 
commitment to gender equality because it provides only an incentive to families to share 
child rearing responsibilities. The father quota in contrast exerts mild pressure on families 
to commit to a more equitable division of labor in the home by shortening the paid 
benefits if the father does not step up.  
Unsurprisingly, the SPD preferred the 10+2 model (‘Familienzoff in der Union’ 
2006) as it represents the stronger commitment to gender equality (‘Umfrage: Union 
Sinkt auf Jahrestief’ 2006). In contrast, the conservative wing of the CDU and the CSU 
strongly opposed the idea of a father quota on two grounds. For one, a father quota would 
disadvantage the traditional nuclear family with a male breadwinner and a stay at home 
wife. Further, the concept of father leave policies overall threatens the centrality of the 
traditional family and the traditional family values that the CDU and specifically the CSU 
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typically promotes. Peter Ramsauer (CSU) publicly declared his opposition, and Prime 
Minister Milbradt (CDU, Saxony) said: ‘The important question is not who is doing the 
dishes but how to increase the birth rates16‘ (‘Union Streitet über die Vätermonate’ 2006)  
The question accordingly is how the critical actors were able to circumvent the 
opposing voices in this important drafting phase. I have argued in previous chapters that 
the location – or the situational power that critical actors possess – is crucial in 
determining the outcome of a feminist policy. Thus, we now need to consider more 
closely where the critical actors were located in the drafting phase. Figure 3 illustrates the 
constellation of critical actors and veto players in the drafting phase.  
Figure 3: Constellation of Political Actors in Drafting Phase17 
 
From this figure we can see that the critical actors were in an advantageous position to 
influence the policy content during the drafting phase. Ursula von der Leyen, specifically, 
is the most crucial critical actor who also occupies the primary veto player position. Very 
                                                
16 Original text: Es geht darum, dass mehr Kinder geboren werden, und nicht wer spült. 
17 Stars denote the locations of critical actors while the red circles denote veto players. 
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much to the consternation of her fellow party members. Von der Leyen did not waste her 
situational power when she outlined her policy proposal for partner months preferring the 
social democratic model of 10+2. Most importantly, von der Leyen was able to utilize the 
support of the Allianz für Familien (Coalition for Families) which her predecessor Renate 
Schmidt established (personal interview with civil servant in Ministry for Families, 
Seniors, Women, and Youth). The coalition consisted of important opinion leaders, most 
notably: Bishop Huber (Protestant Church), Hans Joachim Meyer (President, Central 
Committee of Catholics), Ludwig Georg Braun (President, German Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry), Michael Sommer (President, DGB), and Liz Mohn (Owner, 
Bertelsman Foundation). The coalition played an important role in mobilizing popular 
support for the policy. For example, Liz Mohn offered her foundation as a think tank and 
a platform to exchange ideas among political actors on the subject matter. Whenever 
Ursula von der Leyen issued a statement to the press, members of the coalition chimed 
into the media discourse in support of the policy. Further, von der Leyen organized a Tag 
für Familien (Day for Families) in Berlin where all opinion leaders met with Ursula von 
der Leyen and participated in a street festival to demonstrate their support for the policy. 
More surprisingly, President Horst Köhler also gave a speech at the Day for Families 
advocating for the inclusion of the partner month policy in the overall parental leave 
reform. This is rather unusual as the German President typically does not comment on the 
political debates of the day. Further, Ludwig Georg Braun, President of the German 
Chamber for Industry and Commerce, encouraged fathers to take advantage of the new 
policy and asked companies to facilitate the process for new fathers (Leyen 2008). 
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Finally, Ursula von der Leyen also established an Unternehmensnetzwerk (network of 
businesses) consisting of roughly 6,000 German companies which actively supported the 
partner month policy.  
Ursula von der Leyen departed from the traditional policy-making approach 
where a Minister first seeks the support of the majority of her party members. She not 
only ignored party opinion (generally opposed to the policy) but also did not try to win 
over her party members. Instead, she built popular support for the policy to create enough 
pressure publicly that opponents were no longer able to argue against the policy. By 
applying a populist approach, she was able to circumvent the conservative opposition 
within her own party. 
Von der Leyen also received support from the other critical actors. In general, all 
critical actors regularly spoke out in the media in favor for the policy proposal, publicly 
criticizing CDU/CSU men who mocked the policy proposal, and passionately arguing for 
the adoption of the policy during legislative debates or committee hearings. For example, 
Christel Humme, the SPD family expert and a member of the committee on Family 
Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth, emphasized that the new policy would 
support men to ask for parental leave while also making women less of a liability for 
employers because care responsibilities would now be distributed more evenly among 
men and women (‘Plenarprotokoll 16/40’ 2006). Nicolette Kressl was the deputy 
chairperson of the SPD faction at the time and publicly accused opponents from the 
CDU/CSU for favoring the model of the nuclear family, which no longer reflected 
German society (‘Merkel will Union für Elterngeld mit Vätermonaten Gewinnen’ 2006). 
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Ilse Falk consistently supported von der Leyen within the CDU/CSU faction, arguing that 
the new policy would give men the opportunity to experience domestic responsibilities, 
whether they needed a slight ‘shove’ or were actively seeking out this opportunity 
(‘Union Streitet über die Vätermonate’ 2006.) Further, because these critical actors were 
also expert advisors, they supported the draft language of the 10+2 model in the drafting 
phase. 
The conservative wing of the CDU/CSU inadvertently aided von der Leyen’s 
proposal. Peter Ramsauer (Faction chair, CSU) publicly referred to the planned partner 
month as a Wickelvolontariat (diaper internship), setting off a firestorm of criticism. His 
comment helped von der Leyen expose the traditional and outdated family values of the 
conservative CDU/CSU members, creating a backlash primarily by female citizens. As a 
result, Ramsauer and other prominent opponents of the policy such as Georg Milibadt 
(Prime Minister Saxony), Dieter Althaus (Prime Minister, Thuringia) or Jürgen Rüttgers 
(Prime Minister, North Rhine Westphalia) were discredited in the eyes of the public. 
Stopping the policy was no longer possible after the Wickelvolontariat comment 
(personal interviews). 
The only option for opponents was to weaken the proposed father leave policy. To 
do so, opponents needed to try to leverage their influence over the other veto player in the 
process, Angela Merkel. Her support was crucial to the success of the policy. Personal 
interviews reveal that Angela Merkel supported Ursula von der Leyen’s policy in general. 
However, I argue that Merkel did not favor one version of father leave policy over the 
other. Thus, policy opponents had a window of opportunity to sway the veto player in 
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their favor. Specifically, the conservative wing opposed the 10+2 model preferring the 
12+2 model instead. Peter Ramsauer – despite putting his foot in his mouth earlier – had 
considerable influence on the federal level as did Hans Michelbach (CSU chairperson, 
Mittelstandsunion) who also favored the 12+2 model (personal interviews). The 
Mittelstandsunion is a CDU/CSU internal group of representatives of small and medium 
sized businesses that still play a dominant role in the party internal decision making 
process. Thus, Michelbach and Ramsauer (who is also a member of the 
Mittelstandsunion) were able to leverage the group’s influence in the drafting phase with 
Angela Merkel. They signaled that in order to maintain the peace among the grand 
coalition, they were willing to go along with the coalition agreement (‘Vätermonate 
Werden Extra Bezahlt’ 2006). But in order to secure their support, Markus Söder (general 
secretary, CSU) insisted on the 12+2 model. As a result, the conservative wing of the 
CDU/CSU was able to guarantee the inclusion of a father bonus instead of a father quota. 
However, they were not successful in preventing the policy from being included in the 
parental leave reform. 
4.6.2.  The Legislative Process 
In the case of the father leave policy, the drafting phase was the crucial phase in 
the policy-making process. The legislative process itself (shown in Figure 4 below) 
became a forum where policy advocates and opponents were able to make known, justify, 
and explain their respective position. While opponents could no longer stop the policy as 
it would have meant breaking with the discipline in parliamentary votes, they could have 
further weakened the policy in the committee stage. 
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Figure 4: Legislative Process and Critical Actor Location18 
 
However, for several reasons, this was impossible. For one thing, two critical 
actors – Ilse Falk and Christel Humme – were ranking members of the committee 
responsible. In addition, seven committee members were vocal supporters of the partner 
month policy, among them Renate Schmidt (SPD), Gerda Hasselfelt (CSU), Johannes 
Singhammer (CSU), Caren Marks (SPD), Ingrid Fischbach (CDU), and Marlene 
Rupprecht (SPD). All of them had voiced their support publicly before. Further, the 
committee co-chair – Ekin Deligöz (Greens) – was also a fervent advocate of the policy. 
Thus, a further weakening of the policy was not possible in the committee. Finally, the 
Bundestag did not represent a barrier to policy adoption because members of parliament 
are subject not only to party but also coalition discipline. An analysis of parliamentary 
documents reveals that all parties except the FDP supported the policy, ensuring a 
parliamentary majority beyond just coalition discipline. As expected, the Bundestag 
voted for the passage of the bill along party lines: the coalition voted for the bill while the 
                                                
18 Stars denote the locations of critical actors. 
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opposition parties voted against it (‘Plenarprotokoll 16/55’ 2006), ensuring the successful 
adoption of the feminist policy. 
4.7.  Public Policy Discourse 
The legislative process showcased the public discourse around the arguments for 
and against the father leave policy. I will now turn to an analysis of the public discourse 
to better understand what kind of arguments were put forward. I argued in the previous 
chapter that socioeconomic, demographic, and cultural factors will form background 
conditions that allow critical actors to make cases for a feminist policy. I find that these 
types of arguments were certainly put forward. For example, the government justified the 
need for a father leave policy by stating: 
Many couples postpone having children, sometimes until it is too late. 
Married mothers are on average 30 years old when they have their first 
child. Many women today do not have children, and Germany has one of 
the lowest fertility rates in the world with 1.36 children per woman 
19(CDU/CSU and SPD 2006, 1).  
Representative Jürgen Kucharczyk (SPD) echoed this statement during the second 
and final reading of the legislative process: “It is valuable and necessary for our society 
that working mothers have children and are role models to children”20 (‘Plenarprotokoll 
16/55’ 2006, 5370). 
                                                
19 Original text: Viele Paare schieben auch vor diesem Hintergrund die Familiengründung auf, manchmal, 
bis es zu spät ist. Das durchschnittliche Lebensalter der Frauen bei der Geburt ihres ersten Kindes steigt 
beständig an und liegt bei verheirateten Müttern derzeit bei fast 30 Jahren. Die Kinderlosigkeit ist 
besonders stark ausgeprägt, und Deutschland hat mit 1,36 Kindern pro Frau eine der niedrigsten 
Geburtenrate der Welt. 
20 Original text: Für unsere Gesellschaft ist es wertvoll und unerlässlich, dass auch berufstätige 
Karrierefrauen Kinder bekommen und ihnen ein Vorbild sein können. 
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Ursula von der Leyen questioned whether working women would choose to have 
children if having children meant giving up a career. She urged others to create better 
opportunities to reconcile work and family life (‘Wer sich um Kinder kümmert, gilt als 
Weichei’ 2005).  
Another commonly used argument referred to countries that already adopted 
partner months to much success. Many used Sweden as an example of a successful case:  
“International experiences illustrate that the period designated to the 
exclusive use of the other parent (typically the father) is used by 80 per 
cent of fathers in Sweden”21 (‘Drucksache 16/769’ 2006, 2) 
As a testament to the success of the populist strategy employed by Ursula von der 
Leyen, many representatives referred to the broad support in the population for the 
policy. So argues Ingrid Fischbach (CDU) during the final parliamentary debate: 
If you consider the opinion polls (…) you can tell that 67 per cent of the 
surveyed men look favorably on partner months (…) 53 per cent of men 
between the ages of 18 and 45 want partner months because they want to 
care for their children.22 (‘Plenarprotokoll 16/55’ 2006, 5366) 
What was most surprising is that critical actors did not shy away from making a 
feminist case for the father leave policy. In fact, feminist claim-making – justifying the 
policy based on gender equality concerns – was by far the most used argument. I counted 
                                                
21 Original text: Internationale Erfahrungen zeigen, dass die Kernzeit der dem anderen Elternteil (in der 
Praxis überwiegend der Vater) vorbehaltenen Zeit z. B. in Schweden von 80 Prozent der Väter in Anspruch 
genommen wird. 
22 Original text: Man soll ja ehrlich miteinander umgehen. Wenn man sich die Auswertung von Umfragen 
einmal ansieht (…) dann stellt man fest, dass 67 Prozent aller befragten Männer diese Partnermonate 
begrüßen. (…) 53 Prozent der berufstätigen Männer zwischen 18 und 45 Jahren begrüßen diese 
Partnermonate, weil sie sich gerne um die Kinder kümmern wollen. 
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a total of 111 instances of feminist claim-making. Other arguments centered on six 
alternative themes: (1) arguments that emphasized the desire expressed by men in public 
opinion surveys to be more involved fathers and to stay at home for a period of time (16 
instances); (2) arguments that invoked the positive experiences by Scandinavia and 
especially Sweden which served as a role model for the engaged and involved father (13 
instances); (3) arguments that emphasized the need to allow for better reconciliation of 
work and family for both men and women (13 instances); (4) arguments that emphasized 
the ability of families to be able to choose among different family models (12 instances) 
– supporters of the policy used this line of reasoning to deflect any accusations by the 
opposition that the policy represents an undue interference in the private spheres; (5) 
arguments that emphasized the changing family structures and the rise of educated 
women who do not want to forgo a career for motherhood which required a new 
approach to family policy including holding men accountable for domestic work (11 
instances); and (6) arguments that emphasized the need for higher birth rates which could 
be achieved by modernizing the idea of a family and creating more equitable care roles in 
the domestic sphere (5 instances). Thus, feminist claim making by far dominated the 
public debate. 
The dominance of feminist claim-making is particularly surprising as these 
feminist claims were often made by conservative women, particularly Ursula von der 
Leyen, who used feminist claims to express their support throughout both the drafting 
and the legislative phases. These included claims about the need to create an equal 
division of labor in the home; benefits for children when both parents stay at home; the 
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need to force companies and businesses to accept that both sexes will eventually take 
time off to care for children which ultimately would lead to greater gender equality in the 
workplace; the need for men to step up domestically if they hope to find a partner in the 
future; supporting men who want to take care responsibilities; and social competencies 
that men are lacking but that they could learn through child rearing responsibilities.  
 With this [father bonus] we will have the back of fathers who want to take 
time off to care for their children. This will lead to a change in perceptions 
in the workplace (…) this is the purpose of it because in a modern society 
children will need their fathers as well as their mothers23 (Ursula von der 
Leyen, ‘Plenarprotokoll 16/40’ 2006, 3712) 
It also promotes the development – this is an additional gender equality 
aspect – to reduce workplace discrimination for women. Today, men as 
well as women are potential caretakers. This means an important goal of 
gender equality has been reached24. (Christel Humme, ‘Plenarprotokoll 
16/40’ 2006, 3738) 
During the committee hearing, Prof. Dr. Ute Gerhard (Protestant working group 
for family issues) further stated that: 
The planned introduction of partner months, which are not transferable to 
the mother, as well as the freedom of choice in the distribution of parental 
leave represents an important contribution to gender equality policies25 
(‘Protokoll 16/16’ 2006, 16) 
Likewise, Dr. Christine Fuchsloh (Women’s Bar Association) states during the 
committee hearing: 
                                                
23 Original text: Damit stärken wir auch den Vätern den Rücken, die sich Zeit für ihr eigenes Kind nehmen 
wollen. Das wird zu einem Umdenken in der Arbeitswelt führen. (…) Das ist auch gewollt; denn in einer 
modernen Gesellschaft werden Kinder ihre Väter im Alltag genauso brauchen wie ihre Mütter. 
24 Original text: Es fördert auch die Entwicklung – das ist ein weiterer Gleichstellungsgesichtspunkt –, dass 
Frauen bei Einstellungen weniger diskriminiert werden. 
25 Original text: Die vorgesehene Berücksichtigung von zwei Väter- oder Partnermonaten, die nicht 
übertragbar sind, sowie die Wahlfreiheit in der Verteilung und Gestaltung der Elternzeit sind ein wichtiger 
Beitrag zu einer geschlechtergerechten Gleichstellungspolitik. 
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We believe that the partner months are very reasonable and absolutely not 
unconstitutional (…). The constitution includes an obligation of the 
government to create de facto gender equality. The existing policies have 
cemented the traditional separation of gender roles in the labor market. 
Based on this assessment, we think it is constitutionally desirable to offer 
financial incentives to encourage parents to equally share in the care 
work26 (‘Protokoll 16/16’ 2006, 18) 
By the time the bill was introduced into the legislative process, the policy was 
broadly supported by the public. The climate for the policy was very favorable which 
undoubtedly helped the passage of the bill and influenced the views of the veto players 
and members of parliament overall. Key actors in the social policy realms such as the 
Catholic and Protestant Churches and the Confederation of German Trade Unions all 
supported the policy. During the legislative process, opposing voices were still heard but 
could not gain significant ground. Religious representatives such as Cardinal Sterzinsky 
of Berlin (‘Von der Leyen Verteidigt Vätermonate’ 2006) opposed the policy on grounds 
of state interference in private matters while Bishop Mixa of Augsburg argued that the 
policy would turn women into birthing machines (von Wahl 2008). Likewise, Cardinal 
Meisner of Cologne also voiced his opposition (von Wahl 2008). Because of a very 
favorable climate, opponents were not able to rally public opinion behind their cause. On 
the contrary, they exposed their traditional and conservative views of family life which 
neither corresponded with social reality nor with public opinion on the issue. In the end, 
                                                
26 Original text: Für ausdrücklich sinnvoll und in keiner Weise verfassungswidrig bedenklich, insofern 
haben wir eine ganz unterschiedliche Auffassung zu Herrn Professor Seiler, halten wir sowohl das Konzept 
als auch die Partnerschaftsmonate. Es gibt eine ausdrückliche verfassungsrechtliche Verpflichtung, wonach 
der Staat zur Aufgabe hat, auch auf die Herstellung der tatsächlichen Gleichberechtigung der Geschlechter 
hinzuwirken. Das bisherige Konzept hat dazu geführt, dass sich eine Geschlechterdifferenz am 
Arbeitsmarkt verfestigt hat. Unter diesem Gesichtspunkt ist es verfassungsrechtlich geradezu erwünscht, 




opponents to the policy were clearly outnumbered and all they had left to do was to voice 
their opposition to the policy without any real possibility of stopping it.  
Opponents used two primary arguments against the policy during the legislative 
process. First, opponents raised concerns about undue state interference in the private 
sphere. Such concerns are very much in line with the tenets of liberal conservatism. 
Markus Söder, for example, considered the policy an unacceptable interference by the 
government in the private sphere (‘Union Streitet über die Vätermonate’ 2006). Miriam 
Gruß (FDP) shared this concern, stating:  
I consider it to be principally wrong to force fathers to babysit their 
children and to care for the children. This won’t make fathers into better 
fathers. Parents should be free to decide who cares for the children and 
when they care for them27 (‘Plenarprotokol 16/40’ 2006, 3730) 
Second, opponents, including the FDP and certain legal professionals, questioned 
the constitutionality of the policy. Prof Dr. Christian Seiler, for example, stated during 
the committee hearing of the law that it is against the German constitution for the 
government to dictate one particular form of family over the other:  
Art. 6 GG protects the institution of marriage and family and as such 
includes a freedom of choice. It prohibits the state from intervening in the 
division of paid and unpaid labor within the family. Family initiatives 
must be based on the freedom of choice. The state must not prefer one 
form of family over the other28 (‘Protokoll 16/16’ 2006, 12) 
                                                
27 Original text: Noch ein Wort zu den Vätermonaten. Ich halte es grundsätzlich für falsch, Väter 
zwangsweise zu verpflichten, auf ihre Kinder aufzupassen und sich um die Kinder zu kümmern. Dadurch 
werden die Väter keine besseren Väter. Eltern sollen bitte in vollem Umfang frei entscheiden dürfen, wer 
sich wann und wie um die Kinder kümmert. 
28 Original text: An dieser Stelle ist daran zu erinnern, dass Artikel 6 GG, der Schutz von Ehe und Familie, 
ein Freiheitsrecht verbirgt. Es verbietet dem Staat unter anderem, unmittelbar oder mittelbar auf die 
innerfamiliäre Aufteilung von Familienarbeit und Erwerbstätigkeit Einfluss zu nehmen. Familienförderung 
muss daher auf Wahlfreiheit angelegt sein, zu verstehen im Sinne der Offenheit der Alternative. Dabei darf 
der Staat des Grundgesetzes kein Leitbild richtigen Familienlebens kennen. 
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4.8.  Discussion 
To recap, I argue that feminist policy success is most likely when critical actors 
occupy veto player positions or are in a position to influence the relevant veto player. I 
also argue that veto players and critical actors need to be identified on a case-by-case 
basis. Thus, in the area of family policies I distinguish first the Minister of Family 
Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth, as a primary veto player because of the 
Minister’s agenda setting powers. The second veto player is the Chancellor who acts as a 
veto player twice: first when approving the policy draft in the cabinet meeting so it can be 
introduced to parliament and later when signing the bill into law. I also identified expert 
advisors who are able to influence the content of the policy in the drafting phase of the 
policy process.  
Consistent with the claims I put forward in this dissertation, this case study shows 
that the adoption of father leave policy was successful because: 
1. Coalition constraints were permissive favoring the inclusion of the policy 
in the coalition agreement; and 
2. A critical actor controlled the most important veto player position while 
the secondary veto player was supportive of the policy.  
To the first claim, I have shown that the policy idea originated with the SPD and 
thus became part of the coalition negotiations. However, in an interesting twist, the policy 
was also supported by Ursula von der Leyen, the designated Minister for Families, 
Seniors, Women and Youth from the CDU, against the preferences of her own party. Due 
to the narrow election outcome, the CDU/CSU had no choice but to make significant 
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policy concessions to the SPD which included the father leave policy in the coalition 
agreement. This represented the first necessary but insufficient step towards successful 
policy adoption. 
To the second claim, I have argued that the veto player with the agenda setting 
power is the most important veto player as this actor has the opportunity to shape the 
policy draft. In the area of family policy, this agenda setting power belongs to the 
Minister of Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth, a position occupied by a 
critical actor in regards to the father leave policy: Ursula von der Leyen. Here we have an 
instance where the primary veto player is also a critical actor – a most ideal situation for 
the success of a feminist policy. As I have illustrated, von der Leyen made sure that the 
policy was included in the parental leave reform and passionately argued in favor of it 
across many media and political outlets. She was mentioned in all news articles about the 
policy, spoke at every reading of the policy and gave many interviews and speeches on 
the subject matter.  
I also have shown that Angela Merkel was a supportive veto player which 
facilitated the adoption of the policy. While Merkel rarely spoke out concerning the 
policy and the general topic, she was supportive of the policy and consistently backed 
Ursula von der Leyen against internal party criticism. However, Merkel caved to internal 
pressure by the conservative wing by accepting the modification of the proposed policy 
from a father quota to a father bonus. Thus, while the conservative wing was unable to 
stop the policy, it still had enough clout in the internal party decision making process to 
weaken the policy. Because Merkel was a supportive veto player who successfully 
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resolved the party internal conflict around the father leave policy, the cabinet approved 
the policy draft in June 2006 leading to its introduction into the Bundestag.  
I was also able to show that opponents of the policy did not occupy any veto 
player positions and were not able to leverage their political influence on veto players. 
First, as previously discussed, opponents recognized the need for the coalition agreement 
to continue – a realization that applied to both individual party members of the 
CDU/CSU as well as to the three prime ministers who opposed the policy. Second, the 
most vocal opponents were on the state level, particularly in Bavarian politics, and thus 
had limited influence on federal politics. Third, individual disgruntled members of 
parliament need to follow the party discipline if they do not want to endanger their 
internal party career path. Fourth, the composition of the committee for Family Affairs, 
Senior Citizens, Women and Youth, which reviewed the policy, was such that two critical 
actors (Christel Humme and Ilse Falk) were members of the committee. Fourth, the 
majority of committee members supported the policy and spoke out in its favor in the 
second reading of the bill. Finally, while the CSU was an outspoken opponent of the 
policy, the traditional wing of the CDU/CSU became marginalized in the overall party 
after Ramsauer’s ill-chosen words. As a result, they were not able to stop the policy. 
However, together with the three opposing prime ministers, the conservative wing was 
able to push for the adoption of the father bonus rather than the father quota as favored by 
the SPD and the critical actors.  
Thus, with this case study I have illustrated that contrary to claims made by 
previous studies, the adoption of the 2006 Elterngeld reform including the father leave 
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policy was not the result of conscious attempts by Angela Merkel to feminize the 
CDU/CSU but rather the result of the heavy influence of the SPD on coalition 
negotiations and later on as a fully equal coalition partner. The 2005 CDU/CSU party 
manifesto did not include any progressive family policies let alone a modification of the 
male breadwinner model or calls for care responsibilities for fathers. All these ideas – 
which were the hallmarks of the 2006 parental leave reform – originated with the SPD. 
However, the fact that the father leave policy was not dropped from the reform can be 
traced back to the influence of specific critical actors, first and foremost Ursula von der 
Leyen, and the positioning of critical actors within the veto player structure allowing 
them to command significant institutional resources in the policy making process. Thus, 
this policy is an example of how a conservative critical actor can exploit favorable 
political circumstances and policy constellations to push conservative parties to adopt 
feminist policies. In the end, all of these factors – a favorable policy environment, the 
influence that critical actors exerted on veto players, and the lack of influence which 
opponents could exert on the policy making process – aided the adoption of the policy 




Corporate Board Quotas: From Non-Issue to Trigger of 
Government Crisis 
In the previous chapter, I illustrated that permissive coalition constraints and a 
favorable constellation of critical actors, veto players, and opponents resulted in the 
adoption of a father leave policy in the 16th legislative period from 2005 to 2009. The 
subsequent legislative period from 2009 to 2013 (the 17th legislative period) saw further 
heated debate around another feminist policy: the corporate board quota. Contrary to the 
case of the father leave policy, however, the adoption of the corporate board quota 
ultimately failed because of non-permissive coalition constraints and because opponents 
rather than critical actors were in control of veto player positions.  
At the beginning of this 17th legislative period, corporate board quotas were a 
non-issue in German politics even though women made up only ten per cent of boards of 
directors and only three per cent of executive boards in 2011 (Schulz-Strelow and 
Falkenhausen 2015, 5). While there was an awareness that the representation of women 
on corporate boards was lacking, the issue did not play a major role in the 2009 election. 
The new government coalition of CDU/CSU and FDP continued to emphasize corporate 
governance codes, which rely on voluntary measures and soft targets (Gomez Anson 
2012, 18 – 42). In May 2010, the German Corporate Governance code was changed to 
include the goal of an adequate representation of women on boards (Weckes 2015). A 
 
140 
year later, the DAX 30 corporations declared that they would set their own voluntary 
targets for women on boards (Brösel and Bull 2012). Between 2009 and 2012, one bill 
was introduced via the Bundesrat by the government of North Rhine Westphalia. The 
Green and SPD factions each introduced a bill as well as a joint bill in the Bundestag. Yet 
all bills were defeated by the government majority which continued to insist on the 
benefits of voluntary measures and soft targets. 
This united front against corporate board quotas of the coalition government 
started to disintegrate in the beginning of January 2011, when newly appointed Minister 
of Labor and Social Affairs Ursula von der Leyen called for legal board quotas in an 
interview with Germany’s Manager Magazin (Rieckens 2011), even though the issue did 
not fall under the jurisdiction of her ministry: “Because of the snail-paced process in the 
past ten years, I no longer preclude a legal corporate board quota for women.”29  
With this interview, Ursula von der Leyen initiated a public debate about the need 
of corporate board quota laws in Germany and almost brought the Merkel government to 
a fall.  
This chapter is divided into two major parts. First, I will ask how corporate board 
quotas became part of the legislative agenda. I illustrate that corporate board quotas were 
put on the legislative agenda because of the relentless pressure by Ursula von der Leyen 
and constant lobbying by women’s organizations and the opposition parties. Second, I 
ask why the attempt to pass a corporate board quota law failed. Applying the framework 
                                                
29 Original text: Angesichts der nur mit der Lupe erkennbaren Fortschritte der vergangenen zehn 
Jahre schließe ich eine gesetzliche Regelung über einen Mindestanteil von Frauen in Führungspositionen 
von Unternehmen nicht mehr aus" 
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of veto players and critical actors, I show that critical actors did not control the important 
veto player positions and failed to sway veto players in their favor. Most importantly 
though, I argue that non-permissive coalition constraints enabled opponents to influence 
veto players to their advantage.  
5.1.  Corporate Board Quotas on Government and Legislative Agendas 
The 2009 election brought a return to the traditional coalition between the 
CDU/CSU and the Free Democratic Party (FDP). The CDU/CSU won the majority of the 
seats and was able to form a coalition government with FDP. The 2009 elections also 
brought the best post-war election outcome for the FDP when the party won 93 seats in 
the Bundestag; an increase of 32 seats since 2005 (‘Endgültiges Ergebnis der 
Bundestagswahl 2009’ 2015). Right after the election, Guido Westerwelle was confirmed 
as party faction chairman with 87 of 88 votes giving him a strong mandate for coalition 
negotiations (Weiland 2009). Further, the FDP won more seats than the CSU, putting the 
FDP in a stronger bargaining position than in previous coalition negotiations (Weiland 
and Wittrock 2009).  
Looking at the election manifestos of each coalition party, corporate board quotas 
did not play an important role. The CDU/CSU manifesto simply read: 
We will continue to push for compliance with the agreement between the 
federal government and the business community to promote the presence 
of women on corporate boards to achieve equal opportunities. We ask of 
companies in Germany to ensure a higher presence of women on corporate 
boards and executive boards. (CDU/CSU 2009, 28)30 
                                                
30 Original text: Wir werden die Vereinbarung der Bundesregierung mit der Wirtschaft zur 
Förderung der Chancengleichheit, die nachdrücklich die Förderung von Frauen in Führungspositionen als 
Ziel formuliert, fortschreiben und auf ihre Einhaltung und Umsetzung dringen. Wir fordern von 
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The FDP party manifesto is even more minimalistic than the CDU/CSU platform 
when it comes to the underrepresentation of women on corporate boards, not even 
considering such soft laws such as a corporate governance code: 
Women are still underrepresented in leadership positions both in the 
private market as well as in public life. To support success-driven and 
engaged women on their career path, we need to provide successful tools 
such as mentoring. (FDP 2009, 36)31 
Thus, both coalition partners entered coalition negotiations without a strong sense 
of urgency to address the lack of women in corporate leadership positions. This is 
reflected in the coalition agreement, which reads as follows in relation to women in 
business:  
We want to eliminate the remaining disadvantages for women in business, 
politics, and society. We want to stand for a culture of diversity and 
welcome diversity strategies. We want to particularly strengthen female 
entrepreneurs and business owners. We will create a framework for the 
equal participation of women and men across all life phases. The federal 
initiative for equal opportunities for women in business will be 
considered. (Wachstum. Bildung. Zusammenhalt. Koalitionsvertrag 
Zwischen CDU, CSU Und FDP 17. Legislaturperiode 2009, 73)32 
                                                                                                                                            
Unternehmen in Deutschland ein, eine höhere Repräsentanz von Frauen im Aufsichtsrat und auch im 
Vorstand zu gewährleisten. 
31 Original text: In Führungspositionen in der Privatwirtschaft und im öffentlichen Leben sind 
Frauen nach wie vor unterrepräsentiert. Um leistungsbereite und engagierte Frauen auf ihrem Berufsweg zu 
unterstützen, gilt es, erfolgreiche Instrumente wie das „Mentoring“ bereitzustellen. 
32 Original text: Wir wollen bestehende Benachteiligungen in Arbeitswelt, Politik und Gesellschaft 
beseitigen. Wir werden uns für eine Kultur der Vielfalt einsetzen und begrüßen daher „Diversity-
Strategien“. Insbesondere wollen wir auch Existenzgründerinnen und Selbständige in den Blick nehmen. 
Wir erarbeiten einen Rahmenplan zur gleichberechtigten Teilhabe von Frauen und Männern in allen Phasen 
des Lebensverlaufs. Die Bundesinitiative zur Gleichstellung von Frauen in der Wirtschaft wird einbezogen. 
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After a relatively general and modest commitment to support women in business, 
the coalition agreement continues to specify the plans of the coalition with regard to 
improving the numbers of women on corporate boards: 
The objectives of the federal equal opportunity law and the federal law for 
federal committee and board appointments will be pursued with vigor. We 
will investigate whether these laws need to be changed and improved. The 
percentage of women in leadership positions in the business realm and 
civil service must increase significantly. To do this, we will develop an 
incremental plan which will particularly address increasing the number of 
women on corporate boards. This plan will call for a binding reporting 
mechanism and transparent voluntary targets. (Wachstum. Bildung. 
Zusammenhalt. Koalitionsvertrag Zwischen CDU, CSU Und FDP 17. 
Legislaturperiode 2009, 74)33 
Thus, the coalition agreement did not include a commitment to a corporate board 
quota and even fell short of strengthening the corporate governance codes. Instead, the 
coalition agreement states that the government will develop a plan to call for report 
mechanisms and transparency when appointing women to boards.  
Unlike in the case of the father leave policy, the corporate board quota law did not 
originate from the coalition agreement when it entered the legislative agenda. That being 
so, we need to ask: how did the corporate board quota law become part of the legislative 
agenda? 
During the 17th legislative period, the need for a corporate board quota was 
frequently subject to parliamentary debates starting in 2010 when the Green faction 
                                                
33 Original text: Die Ziele des Bundesgleichstellungsgesetzes und des 
Bundesgremienbesetzungsgesetzes werden mit Nachdruck verfolgt. Wir werden prüfen, ob und inwieweit 
die Gesetze geändert und effektiver gestaltet werden müssen. Der Anteil von Frauen in Führungspositionen 
in der Wirtschaft und im öffentlichen Dienst soll maßgeblich erhöht werden. Dazu wird ein Stufenplan, 
insbesondere zur Erhöhung des Anteils von Frauen in Vorständen und Aufsichtsräten vorgelegt. Der 




introduced the first bill for the adoption of corporate board quotas. Because the Greens 
were part of the opposition party, the bill proposal was easily defeated in the Bundestag 
as was a similar proposal by the SPD in 2012. The same fate awaited a bill proposal in 
the Bundesrat introduced by the government of North Rhine Westphalia which was led 
by Prime Minister Hannelore Kraft (SPD) in coalition with the Greens. However, even 
though these policy initiatives all failed due to the opposition from the federal governing 
coalition between the CDU/CSU and the FDP, it had one important effect: it highlighted 
the lack of women on corporate boards in the public mind and framed it as a problem for 
gender equality and business success.  
Despite an increasingly vigorous public debate about the merits of corporate 
board quotas, little hope existed for the opposition parties to succeed with any of their 
corporate board quota proposals without the support of the government coalition. This all 
changed when Ursula von der Leyen emerged as a high-profile and conservative advocate 
for a corporate board quota in early January of 2011 when she publicly supported a 
corporate board quota in an interview with the Manager Magazin. She followed this up 
with an interview for a special issue on corporate board quotas by Der Spiegel at the end 
of January during which she explained why she supported a legal quota and proposed the 
specific details of such a quota law: 
First, I propose a gender neutral quota of 30 per cent. Neither men nor 
women should be underrepresented on boards. Second, it is important that 
the law includes sanctions. Otherwise the law has no real teeth. The 
French did the right thing: they have said that if corporations do not 
comply with the law their decisions remain valid; however, the election is 
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invalid and the board is not compensated for its time. This hurts corporate 
boards but not the companies.34 
While my interview partners all pinpoint her interview in the Der Spiegel as the 
start of the corporate board quota revolution in Germany, Ursula von der Leyen already 
supported quotas for boards as a Minister for Families, Seniors, Women, and Youth. She 
first spoke out on the issue of women on corporate boards in 2009, shortly before the 
federal election. At an event for the most prominent women’s organization lobbying for 
corporate board quotas (called FidAR, which stands for Frauen in die Aufsichtsräte, or 
women on corporate boards), von der Leyen had a press statement distributed presenting 
a gradual plan to increase the number of women on boards (personal interview). 
However, because Ursula von der Leyen switched from the Ministry for Families, 
Seniors, Women, and Youth to the Ministry for Labor and Consumer Affairs, she was no 
longer responsible for the subject matter. Thus, she found a new creative way to sidestep 
the principle of ministerial discretion by utilizing the media and public appearances to 
force the issue on to the legislative agenda (personal interviews). 
Ursula von der Leyen’s actions were remarkable for two reasons. First, the 
CDU/CSU as well as the FDP both agreed that a plan for voluntary measures was 
preferable over a legal quota. For example, staying true to liberal conservatism’s belief in 
market non-interference, Angela Merkel vehemently opposed the attempts by EU 
                                                
34 Original text: Erstens: Ich plädiere dafür, keine Quote allein für ein Geschlecht festzuschreiben, 
sondern einen 30-Prozent-Schlüssel, der für alle gilt. Weder Männer noch Frauen dürfen zu einem 
geringeren Anteil in Aufsichtsräten und Vorständen vertreten sein. Zweitens ist es wichtig, dass Sanktionen 
daran gekoppelt werden. Sonst ist es weiße Salbe. Die Franzosen haben mit dem ihnen eigenen Charme 
genau das Richtige getan: Sie sagen, wenn ein Aufsichtsrat die Quote nicht erfüllt, dann gelten zwar seine 
Beschlüsse, aber die Wahl ist ungültig, und es wird kein Geld für die Sitzungen bezahlt. Das tut den 
Aufsichtsräten, die sich abschotten, richtig weh, bestraft aber nicht das Unternehmen. 
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Commissioner Vivianne Reeding to pass a corporate quota on the European level in 
2012, which would have established a 40 per cent quota for women on corporate boards. 
Second, Kristina Schröder (CDU), who, as Family Minister, led the ministry responsible 
for developing of a legal board quota (the Ministry for Families, Seniors, Women, and 
Youth) was personally opposed to a legal quota. The Family Minister instead proposed an 
alternative flexible quota (Flexi-quota), which would have made businesses set their own 
quotas and report on their progress to meet the quota on a regular basis. However, this 
bill never made it beyond the drafting phase.  
Ursula von der Leyen as newly minted Minister for Labor and Consumer Affairs 
thus violated the principle of ministerial discretion which states that each minister has 
exclusive jurisdiction over his or her policy area (Müller 2004). Furthermore, von der 
Leyen also turned against the policy stance of her entire political party, including Angela 
Merkel’s position, signaling that she was willingly to break with the party line to push for 
her own ideological goals. This led to a situation in which the recurring debates in the 
Bundestag around the corporate board quota exposed a rift within the CDU government, 
not only between Ursula von der Leyen and Kristina Schröder, but also among the CDU 
representatives, many of whom supported a board quota in opposition to the CDU party 
leadership.  
Von der Leyen’s efforts were aided by several outspoken women’s organizations, 
which formed a policy advocacy coalition together with female members of parliament 
calling for the adoption of a legal corporate quota of 30 per cent shortly after Ursula von 
der Leyen’s interview with Der Spiegel. This advocacy coalition was composed of six 
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women’s organizations and several female members of parliament. The so-called 
Berliner Erklärung was unique because, for the first time in German history, it brought 
together women across all political parties into a bipartisan coalition. The Berliner 
Erklärung was supported by Ingrid Fischbach and Rita Pawelski (both CDU), Caren 
Marks and Dagmar Ziegler (both SPD), Monika Lazar (Greens), Sybille Laurischk 
(FPD), and Cornelia Möhring (Die Linke). Together, these representatives joined the 
heads of the six major women’s organizations in Germany – Renate Bargsten (European 
Women’s Management Development), Carlotta Köster-Brons (Verband Deutscher 
Unternehmerinnen, or Association of Female Entrepreneurs), Ramona Pisal (Deutsche 
Juristinnenverbund, the Women’s Bar Association), Henrike von Platen (BPW 
Germany), Brigitte Scherb (Deutscher LandFrauenverband e.V., the German Association 
of German rural women), and Monika Schulz-Strelow (FidAR). In July 2011, the 
coalition released a press statement calling on the public, prominent German figures, and 
other politicians to sign the coalition’s petition for corporate board quotas: 
We agree on the following points: First, we need a legal corporate board 
quota because voluntary measures have failed, and second, we will only 
be able to reach our goal if we unite our efforts. We need a strong social 
and political coalition. (‘Pressemitteilung Überfraktionelle “Initiative Der 
Frauen” Für Quote in Aufsichtsräten’ 2011)35 
Ursula von der Leyen was one of the prominent primary signatories 
(Erstunterzeichner) who signaled their support early on. Her interview and public support 
of a board quota turned Ursula von der Leyen into the public face of the quota law, and 
                                                
35 Original text: In den folgenden zentralen Punkten besteht Einigkeit: 1. Wir brauchen eine gesetzliche 
Quote für Frauen in Aufsichtsräten, weil freiwillige Selbstverpflichtungen keine Wirkung entfalten, wie die 
vergangenen Jahre gezeigt haben. 2. Nur mit vereinten Kräften können wir unser Ziel erreichen. Um unsere 
Sache zum Erfolg zu führen, brauchen wir eine starke gesellschaftliche und politische Allianz. 
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she also emboldened other women in the CDU to speak out in favor of a legal quota such 
as Maria Böhmer, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, and Rita Süssmuth (personal 
interviews). Maria Böhmer, chairperson of the CDU women group (Frauenunion) is 
quoted on the website of the Berliner Erklärung as saying: 
“The time for changes is here! Women mean success. Without women on 
the top, the economy won’t be able to compete. We demand a legal quota 
for women on corporate boards.” (‘Erstuntevzeichnerinnen’ 2015)36 
While the coalition was able to keep the issue in the public debate, there was little 
movement until September 2012. On September 21, 2012, the Bundesrat successfully 
passed a board quota bill that was introduced by the federal state of Hamburg with the 
consent of two federal states where the CDU was in a coalition government with the 
SPD: Saarland and Sachsen-Anhalt. Traditionally, state governments abstain from voting 
on bills where the state government coalition is made up of members of the opposition 
and government party in the Bundestag. Yet despite this unspoken rule, the Prime 
Minister of Saarland, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, a fervent supporter of a board quota 
and a primary signatory to the Berliner Erklärung, risked an open conflict with Angela 
Merkel when she announced her decision to vote in favor of the board quota with her 
state-level coalition partner SPD and against the will of the Merkel government (Müller 
                                                
36 Original text: Die Zeit ist reif für Veränderungen! Frauen sind ein Erfolgsfaktor. Ohne mehr Frauen an 
der Spitze, wird die Wirtschaft den Wettbewerb nicht bestehen. Wir fordern eine gesetzliche Regelung für 
eine Quote in Aufsichtsräten. 
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and Theile 2012). As a result, the bill made its way to the legislative process in the 
Bundestag. With this, the board quota officially became part of the legislative agenda. 
At the same time, the intense public debate around the issue of equal board 
representation for women, prompted Kristina Schröder, Minister for Families, Seniors, 
Women, and Youth, to draft her own policy proposal to address the lack of women on 
corporate boards. She proposed the flexi-quota as an alternative to the corporate quota 
law pushed for by Ursula von der Leyen. Schröder argued that the fundamental reason for 
the underrepresentation of women in corporate board is a dominant masculine working 
culture which punishes individuals for taking time away from work to care for their 
children (Schröder with Waldeck 2012). In her opinion, a corporate board quota would 
not fix this underlying problem but would force women to adapt to masculine working 
cultures that do not allow for a work-life balance. She argued that tackling the issue of 
reconciliation of work and family responsibilities would be more beneficial for women’s 
equality in leadership than mandating an artificial quota for women on boards. Her 
proposal calls on the leadership of each company to decide upon the appropriate 
percentage of women on their boards. These voluntary targets must be published and 
adhered to. Sanctions were planned if companies failed to fulfill their own targets. 
Companies where women already make up 30 per cent women on boards would not be 
subject to the law. She argued that this law would improve transparency, encourage 
market competition, and would motivate public discussion about the steps necessary to 
achieve equal opportunities for men and women. The idea received support from the 
CDU leadership and was presented as a compromise to resolve the growing rift among 
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quota opponents and advocates within the CDU. By drafting her own proposal, Kristina 
Schröder put the issue of a corporate board quota on the government agenda. 
Thus, by the end of 2012, two corporate board quotas proposals made it onto the 
legislative agenda. Because of intense pressure by both critical actors and the public, the 
government coalition could not simply ignore the issue or vote it down by enforcing 
coalition discipline. Instead, the coalition government was forced to deliberate whether 
they would support one or neither of the two proposals. To understand why both 
proposals ultimately failed to be adopted, we now need to turn to the constellation of 
critical actors, opponents, and veto players for each policy as well as the nature and 
influence of coalition constraints. 
5.2.  Identification of Critical Actors, Veto Players, and Opponents 
To be considered a parliamentary critical actor, a political actor needs to voice his 
or her support for the corporate board quota both in public debates as well as in the 
legislative process, for example by speaking up in favor of the bill during parliamentary 
debates. A civil society actor is considered to be an extra-parliamentary critical actor if 
the actor speaks up in the public debate through media appearances or interviews and 
engages with the government and members of parliament to aid the adoption of the 
policy. This can take several forms such as testifying in committees, petitioning the 
government, being a member of a lobbying group, or organizing open declarations of 
support whether this is in the form of public protest, or demonstrations. An individual is a 
parliamentary critical actor if the actor is identified as a critical actor in my interviews. I 
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have identified a total of 16 critical actors,37 all of whom supported the quota law as 
proposed by the state of Hamburg and passed by the Bundesrat (see Appendix A, Table 2 
for a full list of active participants in the policy debate): 
1. Barbara Höll, MBT Linke 
2. Christine Lüders, Federal Anti-Discrimination Commissioner 
(bureaucracy) 
3. Ekin Deligöz, Greens, Deputy Spokesperson (parliamentary group) 
4. Elisabeth Winkelmeier-Becker, CDU, member (Committee for Family 
Matters, Seniors, Women, and Youth) 
5. Eva Högl, SPD, representative 
6. Frank Walter Steinmeier, SPD, chairman parliamentary group (opposition 
leader) 
7. Ingrid Sehrbrock, vice-chairperson DGB (business) 
8. Katrin Göring-Eckardt, Greens, Vice President of the Bundestag 
9. Monika Lazar, Greens, spokesperson parliamentary group, member 
(Committee for Family Matters, Seniors, Women, and Youth) 
10. Monika Schulz-Strelow, President FidAR (civil society) 
11. Renate Künast, Greens, co-chair parliamentary group 
12. Rita Pawelski, CDU, representative (chairperson, CDU women’s group) 
13. Sigmar Gabriel, SPD, Party Chairman 
                                                
37 Critical actors in bold designate particularly vocal and active actors, based on the frequency of their 
contributions to the public debate  
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14. Ursula von der Leyen, CDU, Minister for Labor and Social Affairs 
15. Viviane Reeding, EU Commissioner (supranational) 
16. Yvonne Plotz, Die Linke, representative 
The number and range of critical actors hint at the broad coalition that had 
emerged within civil society and across party lines supporting the adoption of a corporate 
board quota law. In contrast to the successfully adopted father leave policy, we see a 
number of extra parliamentary critical actors both from women’s organizations and 
business as well as female members across all political parties except the FDP where only 
one woman was supportive of the proposal: Sybille Laurischk. Viviane Reeding, 
Commissioner of the European Union, also voiced her support in the national debate. 
Finally, as in the previous chapter on father leave policy, Ursula von der Leyen was the 
most important critical actor and the political face of the corporate board quota 
movement. However, due to the fact that she was no longer the responsible minister, she 
did not speak to the issue during parliamentary debates (personal interview). 
Of course, opponents to the bill were not silent on the matter either. The following 
individuals were the most vocal opponents: 
1. Nicole Bracht-Bendt, MBT FDP 
2. Kristina Schröder, SPD, Minister for Family Matters, Seniors, Women and 
Youth 
3. Marco Buschmann, MBT FDP 
4. Patrick Döring, MBT FDP (member, federal party leadership) 
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As argued in the previous chapter on father leave policies, there are two major 
veto players in the German policy process: the primary veto player is the Minster for 
Families, Seniors, Women, and Youth because she has exclusive jurisdiction over the 
issue area and thus all official government bills will be drafted by the Minister. Kristina 
Schröder, as the Minister for Families, Seniors, Women, and Youth took advantage of her 
position as primary veto player when she drafted her flexi-quota proposal (which I will 
discuss below). 
As discussed in the previous chapter, Angela Merkel is a secondary veto player 
because of her ability to set policy guidelines for the government and the inability of the 
cabinet to override her objections. Contrary to the case of father leave policies, Angela 
Merkel is not the only secondary veto player. Instead, there are two additional secondary 
veto players in the 17th legislative period: the individual political parties in the coalition 
government. While I have argued in chapter three that the coalition partner is not a veto 
player in itself - as each coalition partner essentially relinquishes its veto power once the 
coalition agreement has been approved -  I also argue that this is only true for policy 
initiatives agreed upon during the coalition negotiations and written into the coalition 
agreement. In contrast, policy proposals outside the scope of the coalition agreements 
must be negotiated ad hoc, and it is here where each coalition partner regains its veto 
power and thus becomes a veto player. For these instances, the coalition agreement 
contains a clause establishing the coalition committee (Koalitionsausschuss) which meets 
at the beginning of every week when the parliament is in session. This committee 
consists of the party leaders, the faction chairpersons, general secretaries, the 
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parliamentary secretary, the Chief of Staff of the German Chancellery, the federal 
minister for finance and one other FDP member (Wachstum. Bildung. Zusammenhalt. 
Koalitionsvertrag Zwischen CDU, CSU Und FDP. 17. Legislaturperiode 2009, 131). 
Accordingly, the CDU/CSU and the FDP need to consent to the policy for it to be 
adopted and are secondary veto players. 
5.3.  The Flexi-Quota Proposal 
Before we can understand why the adoption of the flexi quota failed, we need to 
determine the constellation of veto players, critical actors, and opponents in the policy 
making process. The policy process for the suggested flexi-quota is the same as it was for 
the father leave policy, and illustrated in Figure 5 below. The responsible Minister – the 
Minister for Families, Seniors, Women, and Youth is tasked with developing the 
ministerial draft which then is commented upon by several entities such as state 
governments, civil society and business association, and the responsible individuals for 
the issue area across party factions and the legislative committee for Families, Seniors, 
Women, and Youth. Once the final draft of the bill is complete, the bill is introduced into 
the cabinet and once approved by the cabinet, needs to go through three readings 
(parliamentary debates and votes) in the Bundestag. Once passed by the Bundestag, the 
Bundesrat is notified and the bill is signed into law by the German president. 
Contrary to the father leave policy under Ursula von der Leyen, the ministerial 
draft of the bill was never introduced into the cabinet. Thus, the bill failed in the drafting 
phase and never made it into the legislative process.  
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Figure 5: Policy Process for Corporate Board Quota Law 
 
Because the flexi-quota proposal did not emerge from the coalition agreement, the 
fate of the bill was decided in the coalition committee. For the bill to be approved, both 
the CDU/CSU and the FDP had to agree to the bill proposal. Thus, the policy stances of 
each party is of crucial importance here as well as the ability of critical actors to influence 
the policy position of each veto player. In terms of the policy preference of critical actors, 
all critical actors opposed the flexi quota proposal preferring a strong legal corporate 
board quota as suggested by the Bundesrat bill instead. However, none of the critical 
actors were in a position to influence the veto players. First, the majority of critical actors 
were extra-parliamentary critical actors and thus remained outside of the parties’ internal 
decision- making process: the representatives of the women’s organizations had little 
influence within either the CDU/CSU (or the FDP). Second, with the exception of three 
parliamentary critical actors – Elisabeth Winkelmeier-Becker, Rita Paweloski, and Ursula 
von der Leyen – all of the critical actors were members of the opposition party and thus 
remained outside the decision-making process of both the CDU/CSU and FDP. And third, 
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none of the three critical actors from within the CDU had the political clout to influence 
the policy outcome. As a result, critical actors remained external to the decision-making 
process and were unable to influence the policy decision. To understand then, why the 
adoption of the flexi-quota proposal failed, we need to determine whether the party 
overall – and the party leadership – supported either policy proposal. 
Looking at the CDU/CSU, Kristina Schröder had to face the opposition of the 
CDU women’s group as well as the women’s group of the CDU faction (Gruppe der 
Frauen) in the Bundestag which both opposed the flexi-quota, dismissing it as a useless 
tool, and preferred Ursula von der Leyen’s proposed quota law (Oestreich 2012). The 
support of the CDU women remained out of reach for Schröder for several reasons. First, 
Kristina Schröder was relatively new to politics and had insufficient political experience 
to know how to outmaneuver a skilled and popular politician such as Ursula von der 
Leyen. It was impossible for Kristina Schröder to step out of the shadow of the former 
Family Minister von der Leyen and compete with her on a policy issue that von der 
Leyen knew well (personal interviews). Second, as Minister of Labor, von der Leyen 
commanded a well-financed and powerful federal department, which allowed von der 
Leyen to continue to dominate the debate (personal interviews). Finally, women’s 
activists and many of the most important members of the advocacy coalition which the 
Berliner Erklärung established, reacted to Minister Schröder with full and open disdain. 
One female activist called her ‘a failure for all women’ while another called her 
appointment a step backwards for all women (personal interview). Thus, Kristina 
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Schröder could not fall back on the support of either women activists in civil society or 
the women in her own party. 
Luckily for Kristina Schröder, the women’s groups did not have much political 
clout within the party, particularly compared to the most powerful faction in the 
CDU/CSU: the Mittelstand - a group representing medium-sized business owners and 
interests (personal interviews). The Mittelstand agreed with Kristina Schröder that the 
flexi-quota was justifiable and commensurate with the problem as it would force 
companies to discuss the necessary steps to have more women on their boards. Echoing 
the hope of the family minister, the CDU group argued that the flexi-quota could aid in 
the transformation of the workplace culture into a more women-friendly environment 
(‘Merkel Und Seehofer Für Flexi-Lösung: FDP Komplett Gegen Frauenquote’ 2012). 
Further, Angela Merkel did support Schröder’s flexi-quota proposal, emphasizing that it 
was time for companies to set their own targets and fulfill them (‘CDU-Frauen: Merkel 
Stützt Schröder Bei Flexi-Quote’ 2012).  
The consent of the FDP, however, proved elusive for Schröder: the FDP strongly 
opposed any legal measures to address the underrepresentation of women on boards, 
arguing that the measures would violate liberal market principles. To this end, Birgit 
Homburger (FDP) stated in an interview: 
Quota regulations are and remain a substitute solution. I expect that 
businesses will make good on their promise and improve the career 
opportunities for women. This would also demonstrate a bold vision as 
female workers will be in high demand in the not so distant future. 
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(‘Merkel und Seehofer Für Flexi-Lösung: FDP Komplett Gegen 
Frauenquote’ 2012)38 
Thus, while Kristina Schröder could secure the support of two veto players – 
Angela Merkel and the CDU/CSU – her proposal ultimately failed due to the opposition 
of the third veto player, the FDP in the coalition committee. As a result, the proposal was 
never introduced into cabinet and died in the drafting phase of the legislative process.  
5.4.  The State Government Initiative in the Bundesrat 
The second major policy approach during the 17th legislative period originated 
with a state government initiative in the Bundesrat. The policy process for such an 
initiative is different than for bill proposals stemming from the governing coalition. In 
particular, the drafting phase for an initiative takes place at the level of the state 
government that plans to introduce the bill, and the legislative process starts with the 
introduction in the Bundesrat (see Figure 6 below). 
Figure 6: Policy Process of Corporate Board Quota Bill 
 
The bill was drafted by Jana Schiedeck who developed the bill in her function as 
Senator for Justice of the state government of Hamburg. I will first explain why the bill 
found support in the Bundesrat even though a prior attempt by the SPD in coalition with 
the Greens to pass a corporate board quota via the Bundesrat failed. Then, I will illustrate 
                                                
38 Original text: "Quoten-Reglementierungen sind und bleiben Ersatzlösungen. Ich erwarte, dass die 
Wirtschaft ihre Versprechen erfüllt und mehr Frauen eine berufliche Chance einräumt. Das würde auch von 
Weitblick zeugen, denn der Zeitpunkt ist nicht fern, dass weibliche Fachkräfte dringend gesucht werden", 
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which factors enabled the bill to proceed to the final parliamentary debate and vote. I will 
argue that it was the support of critical actors within the conservative party which ensured 
that the bill would receive full consideration in the Bundestag.   
The Bundesrat is the representative organ for the state governments in Germany 
and the upper chamber of the national parliament. Each state government has three to six 
votes depending on its population size. These votes cannot be split. The Bundesrat takes 
part in the deliberative process in the legislative branch, but its approval is only necessary 
to issues listed in the German Constitution. Further, according to Art. 70 GG, the 
Bundesrat has the right to legislate via initiatives from state governments. The Bundesrat 
becomes an important player when its majority differs from the majority in the 
Bundestag. However, the majority of the Bundestag and the Bundesrat was the same in 
the 17th legislative period. While the CDU/CSU and FDP coalition at the time did not 
control the majority of votes, the CDU/CSU party was in coalitions with opposition 
parties in several state governments. Political tradition dictates that state governments 
that are composed of both one party that is a government party on the federal level and 
another party that is an opposition party on the federal level must remain neutral in any 
contested votes in the Bundesrat. Thus, the government coalition had the necessary votes 
to defeat the proposal by North Rhine Westphalia in November 2011.  
On June 15, 2012, the state government of Hamburg (governed by the SPD), 
introduced a bill for corporate board quotas in the Bundesrat. The law proposed a 20 per 
cent quota for women on boards for all publicly traded companies in Germany starting in 
2018, which would increase to a 40 per cent quota by 2023. The bill was heavily opposed 
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by both the CDU/CSU and the FDP. Yet in an unexpected move, the state governments 
of Saarland and Saxony Anhalt announced their support of the bill, breaking with the 
neutrality rule and essentially guaranteeing the passage of the bill in the Bundesrat 
(‘Gleichstellung: Mehrheit Für Frauenquote Im Bundesrat Wahrscheinlich’ 2012). Both 
state governments are governed by a coalition of CDU and SPD and, according to the 
neutrality rule, should have abstained from the vote. Prime Minister Annegret Kramp-
Karrenbauer of the Saaland (CDU), however, was an ardent supporter of a quota law. She 
supported the Berliner Erklärung and was one of the first politicians to sign the 
coalition’s petition. Invoking her support of the Berliner Erklärung, she justified her 
decision to support the bill. She openly acknowledged that she was breaking with the 
party line and risked a conflict with the Chancellor over the issue of the corporate board 
quota, stating: 
“I fail to see why I should give up my position just because the position is 
promoted by a state government lead by the SPD.” (Holl 2012)39 
She emphasized that her position was consistent with her long-held beliefs on the 
subject, and in an interview with Die Welt, she admitted that she herself benefited from a 
woman quota when starting her political career:  
We need to demystify the woman quota. It is an instrument to create equal 
opportunities for women, nothing more and nothing less. It forces 
companies to look at their personal choices with fresh eyes. I am a quota 
woman – I freely admit that. This has never affected the quality of my 
work. We women should not let ourselves be divided by who is a quota 
                                                
39 Original text: „Ich sehe nicht ein, warum ich eine Position aufgeben soll, nur weil sie von einem SPD-
geführten Bundesland vertreten wird“ 
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woman and who is not. After all, there are countless quota men, who were 
elected according to regional considerations and proportional 
representation. But no one talks about that. Only if we talk about women, 
the quota becomes a taboo. (Siems 2012)40 
Thus, with the support of two CDU led state governments, the Bundesrat 
approved the bill on September 21, 2011, and the bill was introduced into the Bundestag 
on November 11, 2012.  
The passage of the bill out of the Bundesrat ensured that the bill entered the 
legislative agenda of the Bundestag. To explain the failure of this bill, we need to turn, 
once again, to the constellation of veto players, opponents, and critical actors. The 
legislative process of the Bundestag includes three veto players: Angela Merkel, the 
CDU/CSU, and the FDP. As mentioned earlier, the FDP can be considered to be a veto 
player in this particular instance because coalition partners regain their veto power in 
cases where the bill does not originate from the coalition agreement. Further, due to 
coalition discipline, the success of the bill depended on one of these two elements: 
suspension of the coalition discipline allowing members of parliament to vote as they see 
fit or support by the government coalition for the policy ensuring that the policy would be 
supported by a solid parliamentary majority. Figure 7 identifies the legislative process 
locating both critical actors and veto players in the process: 
                                                
40 Original text: Wir müssen die Frauenquote entmystifizieren. Es ist nicht mehr und nicht weniger als ein 
Instrument, das Frauen Chancen einräumt. Es zwingt die Unternehmen zu einem anderen Blick. Ich selbst 
bin eine Quotenfrau – dazu stehe ich. Dies hat der Qualität meiner Arbeit nie einen Abbruch getan. Wir 
Frauen dürfen uns nicht aufspalten lassen in Quoten-Frauen und Nicht-Quoten-Frauen. Schließlich gibt es 
zahllose Quoten-Männer, die nach Region und Proporz ausgewählt wurden. Doch niemand redet davon. 
Nur wenn es um Frauen geht, ist die Quote plötzlich tabu. 
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Figure 7: Constellation of Veto Players, Critical Actors, and Opponents41  
 
Because the majority of critical actors were extra-parliamentary critical actors or 
members of the opposition party, they did not control any veto player positions. Their 
only option was to increase the pressure on these veto players to sway their opinion. This 
is exactly what these extra- parliamentary critical actors did. The Berliner Erklärung was 
the most important tool these actors used. As an advocacy coalition, the Berliner 
Erklärung carried significant political weight: the coalition unified a total of nine 
organizations with a combined membership base of over 500,000 individuals.42 Further, 
corporate board quotas were publicly supported by several big companies, most 
importantly Telekom AG, Fa. A Ritter, and Axel Springer AG, as well as by labor unions 
and professional groups such as the DGB (Confederation of German Trade Unions) and 
the women’s bar association. The advocacy coalition sent out a letter to all members of 
parliament calling for their support of the bill, specifically arguing: 
With the broad support of the public, the Bundesrat, and Europe, we task 
the members of the Bundestag to adopt an effective law regulating the 
appointment of women on boards. The initiative by the Bundesrat is such 
                                                
41 Stars denote critical actors while the red circle denotes a veto player. 
42 Business und Professional Women, (BPW Germany): 1800 members (Germany) 30.000 members 
in 100 countries; Deutscher Ingenieurinnenbund e.V., (DIB): 400 members; Deutscher Juristinnenbund 
e.V., (DJB): 2500 members; Deutscher LandFrauenverband e.V. (DLV): 500 000 members; European 
Women´s Managment Development International Network (EWMD): 550 members (Germany), 900 
members (Europe); Frauen in die Aufsichtsräte e.V. (FidAR): 375 members;; Nürnberger Resolution: 5000 
supporters; ProQuote Medien e.V.: 150 members, 4500 supporters;; ProQuote Medizin: 2000 members; 
Verband Deutscher Unternehmerinnen (VdU): 1800 members 
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a proposal (…) It is time for the discussion to end. It is time for action. 
The Berliner Erklärung shows: there is a broad base of support in society 
for a corporate board quota. Now it is your turn to pass this proposal. 
Support the Bundesrat and the EU commission proposal and vote for bill 
17/11270! (Berliner Erklärung 2015)43 
FidAR, the most active women’s organization, and its president Monika Schulz-
Strelow strategically used the Berliner Erklärung and its advocacy coalition to lobby for 
the adoption of corporate board quotas. Monika Schulz-Strelow testified during 
committee hearings, and her organization publishes the Women on Board Index which 
represents an up-to-date data collection on the status of women on boards in Germany. 
The Public Women on Board Index similarly tracks the number of women on public 
boards. Together, these reports provided supportive members of parliament with the 
necessary data and facts to demonstrate the urgency of the problem and to support the 
arguments by members (personal interviews). FidAR and the women’s bar association 
also frequently contacted members of parliament and cabinet members calling for their 
support for corporate board quotas (personal interviews). The other organizations such as 
BPW or Pro-Quote Medien/Medizin or the Landfrauenverein all approached female 
representatives at events, sent informational material to representatives, issued press 
                                                
43 Original text: Wir begreifen die breite Unterstützung aus der Gesellschaft, dem Bundesrat und aus 
Europa als Auftrag an die Mitglieder des Deutschen Bundestages, eine wirksame gesetzliche Regelung zur 
geschlechtergerechten Besetzung von Aufsichtsräten zu verabschieden. Mit dem Gesetzentwurf des 
Bundesrates liegt hierfür eine geeignete Grundlage vor. Der Beschluss des Bundesrates sieht ein 
zweistufiges Quotenmodell mit langen Übergangsfristen vor: Ab dem Jahr 2018 müssen Aufsichtsräte eine 
20  per cent -Mindestquote erfüllen, ab dem Jahr 2023 müssen es 40  percent sein. Dieser Gesetzentwurf 
wurde Ende Oktober unter der Drucksachennummer 17/11270 in den Deutschen Bundestag eingebracht 
und am 16. Januar 2013 in einer Anhörung im Rechtsausschuss des Bundestages mit zwei weiteren ähnlich 
lautenden Anträgen zur Einführung einer Frauenquote in Unternehmen diskutiert. Jetzt sollten die 
Diskussionen ein Ende haben. Es ist Zeit für Entscheidungen. Die Berliner Erklärung hat gezeigt: Es gibt 
ein breites Bündnis in der Gesellschaft für eine Quote in den Aufsichtsräten. Jetzt sind Sie aufgefordert, 
dieses Bündnis auch in den Bundestag hineinzutragen. Greifen Sie die Initiativen von Bundesrat und EU-
Kommission auf und stimmen Sie für den Gesetzentwurf 17/11270! 
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statements together, organized public demonstrations outside the Bundestag when the bill 
was debated and attended the parliamentary debates in person in the public gallery to 
show their presence (personal interviews). 
Most importantly, Ursula von der Leyen supported the work of the advocacy 
coalition. Not only did she start the conversation about board quotas and encouraged 
other conservative women to step forward in support of board quotas but she ensured 
from the beginning that the issue gained traction in the public mind (personal interviews). 
To this end, she gave the keynote speech at an event for Pro-Quote Medien, a member of 
the Berliner Erklärung that lobbies for quotes in media companies, as well as at the third 
FidAR forum. Von der Leyen knew that by showing up at an event for Pro-Quote 
Median she would generate the necessary support in the media for her idea (personal 
interview). Once the Berliner Erklärung built the necessary momentum, von der Leyen 
moved to the background (personal interviews) and ceded the spotlight to these women’s 
organizations.  
Parliamentary critical actors utilized their allotted time in the parliament debates 
to speak out in favor of the bill. For example, Renate Künast (Greens) argued 
passionately for the quota by stating: 
If you do not dare to adopt a quota for corporate boards for publicly listed 
companies, these things will not be possible for you: you will not achieve 
diversity in leadership positions, which you need to compete 
internationally, you won’t be able to keep women in the workplace, and 
you will not be able to get skilled personnel from other countries. This is 
the whole truth. (‘Plenarprotokoll 17/171’ 2012, 20175 )44  
                                                
44 Original text: wenn Sie sich nicht trauen, endlich eine Quote für Aufsichtsräte und Vorstände der DAX-
Unternehmen einzuführen, wird Ihnen eines nicht gelingen: Sie werden weder die Vielfalt in den 
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In general, the arguments of board quota supporters specifically centered on three 
main points. First, the arguments pointed to the lack of progress despite the existence of 
voluntary measures. As suggested by the following statement, companies have taken too 
long to increase their numbers of women on boards, and all voluntary attempts have 
failed because not much has changed since voluntary measures have been in place. This 
type of argument was brought forward a total of 176 times: 
Another delay tactic is the insistence on voluntary measures. Many 
governments have tried this. The results are known: less than 1per cent of 
executive boards of the biggest 100 companies are female. In total, women 
make up a maximum of 10 per cent of boards of directors. The chancellor 
and Minister Schröder still insist on voluntary measures for business. Let’s 
just say this: in comparison, belief in Santa Claus is a more serious project 
(Katja Kipping, Die Linke, ‘Plenarprotokoll 17/90’ 2011, 10102).45 
Second, a significant number of arguments consisted of feminist arguments, 
which were voiced a total of 166 times during parliamentary debates, exemplified by the 
statement below. They included appeals for legal quotas to achieve gender equality in 
business, appeals for the need to address the glass ceiling for women in business, and 
appeals for changes in society and the workplace that women in leadership positions can 
bring about for all. 
                                                                                                                                            
Führungsetagen bekommen, die Sie gerade für den Wettbewerb mit dem Ausland brauchen, noch werden 
Sie Frauen hier binden können, noch bekommen Sie Fachkräfte aus dem Ausland. Das ist die ganze 
Wahrheit! 
45 Original text: Eine weitere Verzögerungstaktik besteht darin, auf die Freiwilligkeit der Wirtschaft zu 
setzen. Das haben schon mehrere Regierungen hintereinander versucht. Das Ergebnis ist bekannt: Weniger 
als 1 Prozent der Vorstände in den 100 größten deutschen Unternehmen sind weiblich. Insgesamt, so sagt 
man, besetzen Frauen maximal 10 Prozent der Posten in Aufsichtsgremien. Die Bundeskanzlerin und 
Ministerin Schröder wollen trotzdem weiterhin auf die Freiwilligkeit der Wirtschaft setzen. Ich sage es 
einmal so: Im Vergleich dazu ist der Glaube an den Weihnachtsmann ein geradezu seriöses Projekt. 
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The need for action is immense. Germany does not compare well in the 
European context. We are not an exporting nation, when it comes to 
gender equality. In contrast, we are a developing nation; today in 
Germany, the often cited glass ceiling is still bullet proof. (Christel 
Humme, SPD ‘Plenarprotokoll 17/90’ 2011, 10114)46 
Third, many arguments addressed business matters, as described below. 
According to these arguments, having more women in a business improves the bottom 
line, improves decision-making outcomes, or avoids the loss of valuable talent (total 
mentions: 106). 
Internationally respected scientists have shown that the competitive 
advantage of countries is linked to its promotion of women. If you ignore 
well-qualified and educated women and keep them at the middle 
management level, you obstruct your own chances on the global market. 
(Doris Barnett, SPD ‘Plenarprotokoll 17/171’ 2012, 20178)47 
Other arguments which played a prominent role in the debate pointed to Norway 
and other countries with legal board quotas for women and the positive results that came 
out of having board quotas. These arguments were also used by opponents of the board 
quota who pointed to evidence in Norway that the change was only symbolic and that 
companies actually endured losses or changed their legal status to avoid quota 
compliance.  
In contrast to the case of father leave policy addressed in Chapter 4, none of the 
critical actors in the CDU/CSU occupied veto player positions. Nevertheless, they tried to 
                                                
46 Original text: Der Handlungsdruck ist natürlich immens. Wir stehen im europäischen Vergleich nicht 
besonders gut da. Wir sind keineswegs ein Exportland, wenn es um Gleichstellung geht. Im Gegenteil: Wir 
sind hier ein Entwicklungsland; bei uns ist die auch heute viel zitierte gläserne Decke immer noch aus 
Panzerglas. 
47 Original text: International renommierte Wissenschaftler weisen darauf hin, dass die 
Wettbewerbsfähigkeit eines Landes gerade auch mit der Frauenförderung zu tun hat. Wer heutzutage die 
gut ausgebildeten, talentierten Frauen auf das Abstellgleis Mittelmanagement schiebt, der verbaut sich 
seine eigenen Chancen im globalen Wettbewerb. 
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influence the CDU/CSU and Angela Merkel. The CDU women’s group supported the bill 
and tried to win support of fellow party members, but with little success (personal 
interview). Beyond that, conservative women were also in constant contact with women 
from the opposing parties, exchanging ideas and information (personal interviews). Two 
CDU members particularly used the power of the pulpit to encourage their fellow 
conservative women to openly support and lobby for corporate board quotas: Elisabeth 
Winkelmeier-Becker and Rita Pawelski.  
I will quote Art. 3 II GG once again: Men and women shall have equal 
rights. The state shall promote the actual adoption of equal rights for 
women and men and take steps to eliminate disadvantages that now exist. 
We do not ask for more but nothing less than the adoption of this 
constitutional clause (Rita Pawelski, ‘Plenarprotokoll 17/94’ 2011, 
10766)48  
The closed shops won’t open up without binding rules on the horizon. 
They exclude qualified women; but also men who do not fit the traditional 
image. The Manager Magazin just illustrated how hardened these 
structures are. When reading this account, you notice that this has nothing 
to do with the selection of the best but all to do with male friendships, 
hunting experiences, etc. And we know from Volkswagen49 what else can 
be done to improve group cohesiveness. (Elisabeth Winkelmeier-Becker,’ 
Plenarprotkoll 17/90’ 2011, 10112)50  
                                                
48 Original text: Ich zitiere noch einmal Art. 3 Abs. 2 des Grundgesetzes: Männer und Frauen sind 
gleichberechtigt. Der Staat fördert die tatsächliche Durchsetzung der Gleichberechtigung von Frauen und 
Männern und wirkt auf die Beseitigung bestehender Nachteile hin. Wir wollen nicht mehr, aber auch nicht 
weniger, als dass das Grundgesetz endlich anerkannt und umgesetzt wird. 
49 The representative refers to an incident where the full board of Volkswagen traveled to Brazil and visited 
a brothel on company expense (see Müller 2007). 
50 Original text: Ohne verbindliche Regelungen am Horizont werden sich die Closed Shops nicht öffnen. 
Sie schließen qualifizierte Frauen aus; sie schließen aber auch gute Männer aus, die nicht ins Schema 
passen. Wie fest da die Strukturen gefügt sind, das hat uns das manager magazin gerade noch einmal 
beschrieben. Wenn man das liest, dann stellt man fest, dass das nichts mit Bestenauslese zu tun hat, sondern 
dass es dabei um Dinge wie Männerfreundschaften, Bergtouren, Jagderebnisse und dergleichen geht. Von 
VW wissen wir ja, was noch so infrage kommt, um die Gruppendynamik zu stärken. 
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While none of the critical actors held a veto player position, one critical actor – 
Elisabeth Winkelmeier-Becker – was a member of the committee on Justice and 
Consumer Affairs, the responsible committee to review the bill and to decide whether to 
recommend acceptance, rejections, or tabling of the bill to the Bundestag. On the 
committee, four other CDU/CSU members supported the proposed bill. Two of them, 
Jan-Marco Luczak und Marco Wanderwitz also signed the Berliner Erklärung. Thus, 
these individuals were in a position to influence the outcome of the legislative process, a 
power they utilized in a rather creative manner. After the first parliamentary debate, the 
bill was assigned to the committee of Justice and Consumer Affairs as the leading 
committee. The government coalition had the majority of votes in the committee and 
could have moved to dismiss the bill which would have tabled the proposal indefinitely 
(Lohse and Wehner 2013). However, neither the CDU/CSU nor the FDP ever proposed a 
motion to dismiss the bill. Instead, the bill proceeded to the vote, the crucial step to 
require the Bundestag to debate the bill and vote on it. The committee chairperson was 
Siegfried Kauder who supported the quota law. He is also the brother of Volker Kauder, 
an outspoken opponent of the quota and chairperson of the CDU faction. Before the 
quota debate, Siegried Kauder was already at odds with the CDU over different policy 
issues and as a result had already announced his retirement (personal interviews). 
Siegfried Kauder, Elisabeth Winkelmeier-Becker, and Marco Wanderwitz all officially 
voted to reject the bill demonstrating support for the official party line even though all 
three members of the CDU supported a legal board quota for women. This clever 
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interpretation of parliamentary rules ensured a final vote on the bill in parliament and 
caused uproar in the press which called the CDU politicians out on their strategy. 
Similar to the position of critical actors, the policy opponents identified earlier did 
not control any veto player positions. However, these opponents were able to leverage 
their influence more easily because their political parties both opposed the bill. In 
general, opponents emphasized two main arguments. The first argument proffered that 
legal quotas are the wrong tool to address the underrepresentation of women. Instead, 
according to the opponents, politics should focus on a greater reconciliation of work and 
family life, where the true obstacles for women lie. Opponents also pointed out that there 
are simply not enough qualified women and that a legal quota would ignore important 
differences among businesses which would require a more nuanced approach that would 
be impossible under a quota law (mentioned 69 times during parliamentary debates). The 
second argument was that legal quotas represent an undue interference in the free market 
as well as private businesses (mentioned a total of 61 times).  
One veto player, the FDP, and particularly the FDP leadership, most notably 
Guido Westerwelle as party leader and Rainer Brüderle as party faction chairperson, 
vehemently opposed the Bundesrat proposal. As a liberal party, the FDP leadership and 
the members of the party opposed board quotas because the policy was seen as violating 
free market principles. When the FDP sent out a position paper about the corporate board 
quota to all its parliamentary members, the FDP did not receive any pushback from 
women in the party (personal interviews). Because the German Governance Code already 
included a guideline to consider the diversity of the board when making board 
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appointments, the FDP believed that no further action was necessary (personal 
interviews). One exception was Sybille Laurischk who was the only party member to 
support the bill. Ultimately, she was unable to sway any other FDP members in its favor 
(personal interviews). This is not surprising as the FDP strongly opposes any form of 
quota: in the same year, a proposal to introduce an internal quota for party positions 
failed (personal interviews). Thus, bill opponents did not have to work hard to ensure the 
opposition of the FDP.  
Beyond support of the bill by the FDP, critical actors also needed to secure the 
support of Angela Merkel as well as the CDU/CSU overall, and specifically the consent 
of Gerda Hasselfeldt and Volker Kauder who were the party faction chairpersons of the 
CSU and CDU, respectively. While opponents only needed to ensure the continued 
opposition to the bill, critical actors need to achieve a much more difficult task: changing 
the minds of these veto players. One opponent, Kristina Schröder, was able to leverage 
the opposition of the CDU Mittelstand to her advantage. The CDU Mittelstand is the 
biggest internal party interest group with 145 of 237 parliamentary members belonging to 
the group. Its chairperson, Christian von Stetten stated in the Sueddeutschen Zeitung: 
Women need to be better represented in leadership positions, but the 
internal party group would not support an unwarranted interference into 
the property rights of companies, as intended by the quota law. (‘Merkel 
Und Seehofer Für Flexi-Lösung: FDP Komplett Gegen Frauenquote’ 
2012)51 
                                                
51 Original text: Frauen „sollen in den Führungsetagen stärker vertreten sein, aber einen ungerechtfertigten 
Eingriff in die Eigentumsrechte der Unternehmenseigentümer, wie es eine starre Frauenquote vorsieht, 
wird es mit uns nicht geben.“ 
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Further, the strong showing of the FDP also meant that the conservative/business 
wing of the CDU/CSU regained its influence and was able to leverage the FDP’s 
preference for liberal market policies including its opposition to the board quota law 
against the bill (Weiland and Wittrock 2009). Likewise, opponents could count on 
Angela Merkel to be a sympathetic veto player. The Chancellor herself opposed the quota 
tool as Minister for women in 1991 calling it ‘degrading and slanderous’ (Müller and 
Theile 2012). Again, the external position of critical actors to the internal decision 
making process of the CDU/CSU as well as the limited influence of parliamentary critical 
actors within the CDU/CSU explains why critical actors were unable to sway another 
veto player in their favor. 
The strongest leverage that opponents of the quota had was the coalition 
agreement. The coalition agreement did not include a plan for a quota law and explicitly 
emphasized voluntary measures. Thus, the FDP, as a coalition partner, could threaten to 
exit the coalition if the CDU/CSU changed its position on the subject matter. This would 
have led to a profound government crisis shortly before the next federal election 
scheduled for September 2013. Thus, the FDP and opponents of the corporate board 
quota law had a powerful tool in their disposal to stop the bill and to ensure that the 
CDU/CSU leadership would guarantee party discipline in the final vote. Merkel herself 
saw the coalition constraints as real and inevitable: when discussing the bill proposal, she 
was quoted as saying that she did not disapprove of the bill but it will be impossible to 
pass the bill with the FPD in the government coalition (Müller and Theile 2012). Thus, 
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the FDP vetoed the bill and made it impossible for the coalition government to allow its 
passage (personal interviews).  
Because none of the critical actors occupied a veto player position and because 
the FDP threatened with the exit of the coalition, critical actors needed to come up with 
creative ways to overcome veto player opposition. Critical actors with the support of 
other advocates of the quota law, tried to outmaneuver veto players with two strategies: 
first, they demanded that the government suspend coalition discipline and consider a vote 
on the bill as a vote of consciences, and second, they threatened to vote with the 
opposition party for the bill. 
In April 2013, Renate Künast (chairperson of the Green faction), with 
considerable support by women across all parties, demanded the vote on the bill to be a 
vote of conscience. This would absolve all members of the Bundestag from party 
discipline and allow them to vote according to their own personal beliefs (Bauchmüller 
and Roßmann 2012). In the past, votes of conscience have occurred on issues such as 
abortion or euthanasia. Elke Ferner (SPD) called on the leadership of the CDU/CSU and 
FDP: 
I call on the faction leadership of the CDU and FDP – there probably are 
some reasonable members in your midst – to suspend party discipline, as 
we have done before in other areas, and allow us to design a solution from 
the middle of the parliament which will improve the equality between men 
and women! (‘Plenarprotokoll 17/147’ 2011, 17609 )52 
                                                
52 Original text: Ich appelliere daher an die Fraktionsführungen von Union und FDP – in Ihrer Fraktion gibt 
es ja wahrscheinlich auch die eine oder andere vernünftige Kollegin: Heben Sie den Fraktionszwang auf 
wie wir es auch bei anderen Gelegenheiten schon gemacht haben, und lassen Sie uns aus der Mitte des 
Parlaments eine Regelung erarbeiten, mit der wir den Einstieg in die Verbesserung der Gleichstellung 
zwischen Männern und Frauen hinbekommen! 
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Conservative women joined the calls for a vote of conscience. Rita Pawelski said 
in an interview with the Fokus that she will lobby for the suspension of the party 
discipline so that women could vote according to their ‘women-equality conscience’ 
(AFP and ADP 212). Likewise, the Berliner Erklärung called on the party leadership to 
allow a vote of conscience as well (Berliner Erklärung 2015). However, the party 
leadership was not receptive to the idea: Volker Kauder (CDU faction chairperson) and 
Patrick Döring (FDP, general secretary) staunchly opposed a vote of conscience and 
called on Chancellor Merkel to lay down the law. Despite all the momentum in 
parliament and in the public for corporate board quotas, the CDU/CSU party leadership 
refused to suspend party discipline.  
In a final move, the women of the CDU/CSU announced their intentions to vote 
with the opposition parties in favor of the bill, a move that ultimately would have ended 
the coalition government and would have led to a government crisis (“Geheimoperation 
Quote” 2013). The bill only needed 21 votes from the government coalition to pass 
(“Geheimoperation Quote” 2013). This maneuver was orchestrated by the women’s 
organizations behind the Berliner Erklärung which reached out to individual members to 
secure a “yes” vote from female members of the CDU and CSU who supported the bill 
(personal interviews). Ursula von der Leyen and FidAR started to make calls to see who 
would be willing to vote with the opposition and for the quota law (personal interviews). 
With increased pressure by Ursula von der Leyen and the Berliner Erklärung, more and 
more conservative women came out in favor of the bill and were openly considering a 
break with coalition discipline to vote with the opposition. For example, speaking against 
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the party line in parliamentary debates, six members53 of the CDU/CSU passionately 
argued for corporate board quotas. 
When news of this plan broke, women in the other parties encouraged their 
conservative female colleagues to break with the party discipline in the name of female 
solidarity: 
This is why I call upon all my female colleagues across all factions: let us 
do this together. Let us not wait any longer. The time for appeals is over. 
Let us make a giant step towards the realization of gender equality 62 
years after the passing of the Grundgesetz. The secret is in the mix. It will 
be beneficial to all of us if both men and women are appointed to 
corporate boards. (Eva Högl, SPD, ‘Plenarprotokoll 17/94’ 2011, 10764)54 
I believe it is time for women to take up responsibility together in 
parliament. Women in parliament have achieved a lot, from laws against 
domestic violence to the protection of embryos (Embryonenschutzgesetz) 
and the patient provision law. We succeeded in shedding a different light 
on these matters. (Ekin Deligöz, Greens ‘Plenarprotokoll 17/147’ 2011, 
17606)55 
In a last minute deal, Angela Merkel reached a compromise with Ursula von der 
Leyen: she bought party loyalty from the female party members by promising that the 
2013 campaign party platform would include a commitment to a legal board quota for 
2020 (Roßmann 2014). Personal interviews with parliamentarians and women’s rights 
                                                
53 Dorothee Bär, Elisabeth Winkelmeier-Becker, Hans Michelbach, Jan-Marco Luczak, Nadine Schön, Rita 
Pawelski 
54 Original text: Deswegen appelliere ich noch einmal an alle Kolleginnen in allen Fraktionen: Lassen Sie 
uns gemeinsam einen Anlauf nehmen. Lassen Sie uns nicht länger warten. Die Zeit der Appelle ist vorbei. 
Lassen Sie uns bitte 62 Jahre nach Inkrafttreten des Grundgesetzes endlich einen großen Schritt in Richtung 
Verwirklichung der Gleichberechtigung von Männern und Frauen machen. Die Mischung macht es. Es tut 
uns allen gut, wenn Vorstände und Aufsichtsräte mit Männern und Frauen besetzt werden. 
55 Original text: Ich denke, es wäre wieder einmal an der Zeit, dass Frauen gemeinsam Verantwortung im 
Parlament übernehmen. Frauen haben in diesem Parlament vieles bewegt, angefangen bei dem 
Gewaltschutzgesetz bis hin zum Embryonenschutzgesetz und zur Patientenverfügung. Wir haben es immer 
geschafft, einen anderen Blick auf die Dinge zu werfen.  
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activists referred to von der Leyen’s actions openly as an attempted extortion, and in the 
aftermath of the failed rebellion, several members of the CDU demand the resignation of 
Ursula von der Leyen (“Steinback fordert von der Leyens Rücktritt” 2013). Yet Angela 
Merkel not only gave von der Leyen her vote of confidence but also appointed her as 
Minister of Defense after the 2013 election. The compromise ensured that the 
conservative women voted with the government coalition and the adoption of the board 
quota failed. However, the conservative women achieved the adoption of the policy in the 
party platform which would significantly shape the coalition agreement of the following 
legislative period.  
In the end, two moves forced corporate board quotas onto the legislative agenda 
in May 2012 where it remained throughout the 17th legislative period: First, the approval 
of the opposition bill in the Bundesrat with the support of two CDU led state 
governments, and second, the willingness of some conservative women to break with 
party discipline, most notably Ursula von der Leyen. 
5.5.  Discussion 
This case study has illustrated that critical actors have a difficult time making 
inroads with a policy proposal if the subject matter is not part of the coalition agreement. 
More importantly though, the case study has shown that critical actors cannot influence 
policy outcomes when they do not occupy veto player positions. At the same time, when 
opponents can influence veto players or occupy veto player positions themselves, critical 
actors will not be able to push for the adoption of their preferred policy. I argued 
previously that in cases where critical actors are external to veto players, i.e., do not 
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occupy veto player positions, their ability to enact their preferred policy outcome depends 
on their access and influence on veto players. Ursula von der Leyen was the most 
important critical actor, and because she was a member of the cabinet she occupied an 
elevated position within the CDU/CSU. Thus, she was in a better position than any other 
critical actor to influence veto players. Yet her main disadvantage was that she no longer 
led the ministry responsible for the development of a corporate board quota proposal. 
Thus, her only option was to influence the responsible Minister for Families, Seniors, 
Women, and Youth to buy into her suggestion. However, Kristina Schröder was an 
outspoken opponent of the policy and refused to propose a corporate board quota law. 
Instead, she put forward an alternative flexi-quota which Ursula von der Leyen 
considered to be insufficient. Von der Leyen decided to pass over the minister and 
instead applied the populist strategy she is known for and which often has worked to her 
advantage. 
Rather than trying to win the party over for her policy proposals, von der Leyen 
created a public majority, i.e., she established popular support in society both in the 
general public as well as among important public figures and so forced the hand of the 
party leadership which did not want to go against popular demands. Her approach was 
informed by her outsider status in the CDU: she is not the typical CDU politician. She did 
not climb the internally party ladder, and she was never a member of the CDU Youth 
(Dausend and Niejahr 2015). Instead, she was directly recruited to the cabinet of 
Christian Wulff in the state of Lower Saxony when she was first elected to the state 
legislature in 2003. The same year, Angela Merkel tapped her for her shadow cabinet as 
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Minister for Families, Seniors, Women, and Youth. Thus, she does not have a broad base 
of support in the CDU, and she apparently does not care much about party majorities 
either – she is often called a soloist in politics (Dausend and Niejahr 2015). She has no 
confidants, no majority support, and few allies. Instead she developed a populist strategy 
where she charges forward with policy ideas that are often controversial and even 
opposed by the CDU. She did this successfully with the father leave policies mostly 
because the SPD was very supportive of the proposal and because Angela Merkel backed 
her. Thus, when von der Leyen proposed a corporate board quota, she trusted that the 
same populist approach would work.  
When a report on the status of women on corporate boards showed little progress 
and an actual decline for women on boards in 2011, von der Leyen sensed a window of 
opportunity. She called a meeting with the CEOs of the biggest companies to discuss the 
dismal progress to achieve gender balanced corporate boards. When the CEOs only came 
up with excuses she abruptly left the meeting (personal interviews) and shortly thereafter 
gave her path-breaking interviews with the Manager Magazin and Der Spiegel. These 
interviews in January 2011 mark the start of her populist campaign to win a public 
majority for corporate board quota, which she planned to turn into a party majority 
afterwards. However, von der Leyen miscalculated the influence opponents had in the 
policy making process by virtue of occupying veto player positions as well as the impact 
of coalition constraints in the 17th legislative period. In the previous legislative period, 
her strategy was successful because she could rely on a supportive coalition partner that 
wanted to see the policy adopted. In the 17th legislative period, this was no longer the 
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case. The SPD returned to the opposition, and the FDP became a member of the 
governing coalition. In contrast to the SPD, the FDP strongly opposed any form of 
quotas. As a result, despite popular support for the corporate board quota and a strong 
advocacy coalition, Ursula von der Leyen could not overcome the opposition by a major 
veto player: the FDP. Ursula von der Leyen might also have bet on the support of another 
veto player – Angela Merkel – with whom she has a close and good relationship. While it 
is unclear whether Angela Merkel personally supported a corporate board policy 
(personal interviews), she was in a position that did not allow her to change the CDU 
position on the subject matter without risking the end of the government coalition. 
Because Merkel is known to be a realpolitiker who wished to keep the government 
coalition in tact she did not let herself be swayed by von der Leyen (personal interviews). 
Thus, coalition constraints help to explain the negative policy outcome in 2013. 
The question is why Ursula von der Leyen was eventually able to convince 
Angela Merkel and the party leadership to adopt corporate board quotas in the election 
manifesto for the upcoming election. The answer lies in the relationship between Angela 
Merkel and Ursula von der Leyen. Merkel recognized early on that in order to modernize 
the CDU, she needed to appoint fresh and young faces to her cabinet (Dausend and 
Niejahr 2015). This is why she made Ursula von der Leyen the Minister for Family in her 
shadow cabinet; Merkel realized that a working mother of seven would bring a breath of 
fresh air into the party. The Chancellor knew that the CDU needed modern family and 
work policies but did not dare to speak publicly on these matters while Ursula von der 
Leyen had no problem doing so (Dettmer, Müller, and Pfister 2013). Accordingly, von 
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der Leyen could typically rely on the support and protection of Merkel (Walter, Werwath, 
and Antonio 2011). Further, von der Leyen is extremely popular with the electorate, 
draws huge crowds when she campaigns for the CDU, and has lured new voters to the 
CDU (personal interviews). This all meant that the CDU needed to tolerate her, and it 
gave her the freedom to push for a quota law against the party stance in the first place 
(personal interviews). Civil servants remarked in personal interviews that Merkel also 
respected von der Leyen’s convictions and her drive to achieve these convictions. That is 
why Merkel tolerated and supported many policy initiatives from von der Leyen 
(Dausend and Niejahr 2015, 119). Thus, Merkel had little choice or desire to remove von 
der Leyen from her cabinet. 
In the end, the failure of the corporate board quota bill can mainly be attributed to 
two conditions: (a) the fact that critical actors neither occupied veto player positions nor 
were able to influence veto players in their favor; and, most importantly, (b) non-
permissive coalition constraints. Because the coalition agreement did not include a policy 
proposal for a corporate board quota, both coalition partners – CDU/CSU and FDP – 
became veto players. Here, the policy preference of each veto player becomes important. 
Sympathetic or supportive veto players will aid in the passage of feminist policies, as I 
have illustrated in the previous chapter on father leave policy, while opposing veto 
players will bring the policy process to a halt. Both the FDP and the CDU/CSU opposed 
the policy. The influence of the FDP as well as the opposing faction within the 
CDU/CSU (Mittelstand) were also bolstered by the strong electoral showing of the FDP. 
Thus, both veto players refused to consent to the policy. In contrast, Angela Merkel was 
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sympathetic to the demands of the quota advocates but was unable to force the FDP into 
accepting the bill even if she had wanted to without risking the breakup of the coalition 
government. Further, Merkel was not in a position to challenge the opposition of the 
Mittelstand within her own party. Because the FDP and the CDU/CSU opposed the bill, 
the bill ultimately failed. 
Yet, the failure of the corporate board quota bill was not in vain. It did lead to the 
adoption of the policy in the CDU/CSU election manifesto for 2013 which ensured that 
all parties except for the FDP started the 2013 election campaign with a commitment to 
corporate board quotas. In the next chapter, I will show that inclusion of the corporate 
board quota in the election manifesto was instrumental in putting the policy on the 




Return of the Grand Coalition and Return of Feminist Policies 
The 17th legislative period was one of the most interesting and exciting legislative 
periods when considering the fate of feminist policies. While Ursula von der Leyen and 
the Berliner Erklärung failed in a very spectacular and public manner, they still achieved 
something important: the inclusion of a corporate board quota in the CDU/CSU election 
manifesto. This ensured that all political parties except the FDP were formally committed 
to addressing the lack of women on boards via a legally binding corporate board quota. 
Further, the advocacy coalition was not deterred by its failure. Quite to the contrary, it 
continued to make sure that the issue stayed relevant throughout the 2013 election 
campaign. To this end, ten56 women’s organizations put together an election campaign 
event entitled Spitzenfrauen fragen Spitzenkandidaten (top women leaders ask top 
political candidates) to question each party candidate on his or her stance towards the 
corporate board quota. The SPD candidate for Chancellor, Peter Steinbrück, asserted that 
his party wanted to introduce a 40 per cent quota by 2017. Ursula von der Leyen also 
participated in place of Chancellor Merkel. Heinrich Kolb, representing the FDP 
leadership, continued to insist on the party’s opposition to a quota because it would 
interfere with the freedom of the markets and business owners. Representatives from the 
                                                
56 FidAR, Landfrauenverband, Pro-Quote Medien, Pro-Quote Medizin, BPW, Deutscher 
Juristinnenverbund, Deutscher Ingenieurinnenverbund, Erfolgsfaktor Frau, and EWMD 
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Greens and Die Linke continued to stress their support for the quota (‘Spitzenfrauen 
fragen Spitzenkandidaten’ 2015).  
This chapter will demonstrate how the 18th legislative period (from 2013 to 2017) 
became the turning point for the fate of the corporate board quota law in Germany. Not 
only was the law successfully adopted in the spring of 2015, but it also was adopted 
much earlier than envisioned by the CDU/CSU. I will argue that this success is due to 
two factors: first, coalition constraints were permissive as the CDU/CSU returned to a 
coalition partner supportive of the quota (SPD); and second, critical actors occupied veto 
player positions. I will proceed as follows: the first part of the chapter discusses the 
coalition negotiations and how corporate board quotas became part of the government 
agenda. In the second part, I will focus on the policy process and discuss the constellation 
of critical actors, opponents, and veto players that allowed for a successful policy 
outcome. Finally, I will take some time to compare the failed attempts in greater detail 
with the successful attempt, demonstratingwhat we can learn from both cases. 
6.1.  General Elections and Coalition Negotiations 
The 2013 election results came as a shock to many, especially to the FDP which 
failed to clear the five per cent threshold and, for the first time in its postwar history, was 
no longer represented in the Bundestag. This left the CDU/CSU without its traditional 
coalition partner. After conversations with the Greens broke down, the CDU/CSU was 
left with a grand coalition as the only viable option as three-member coalitions and 
minority governments are not typical in the German political context. Yet the SPD was 
very hesitant to enter into another grand coalition with the CDU because the CDU 
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contributed to the SPD’s weak showing in the 2009 election. The CDU claimed all the 
social policy successes leaving the SPD with little room to criticize the CDU on its social 
policy record ("Sondierung Mit SPD: Merkel Nimmt Genossen in Die Pflicht" 2013). In 
the end, the SPD voted to start coalition negotiations with the CDU/CSU. 
The coalition negotiations were conducted among 77 members – 28 from the 
CDU, 31 from the SPD, and 18 from the CSU (Mahlzahn 2013). In contrast to 2005, 
when only four seats separated the CDU from the SPD, the CDU/CSU in 2013 received 
62 more seats than the SPD (Der Bundeswahlleiter 2014; Alexander and Sturm 2013). As 
a result, the SPD was no longer an equal coalition partner but relegated to the status of a 
junior partner (Weiland 2013). The issue of corporate board quotas was negotiated in the 
Committee for Family, Women, and Gender Equality by Annette Widmann-Mauz (CDU) 
and Minister for Social Affairs in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern Manuela Schwesig (SPD) 
(Zeit Online 2013). Manuela Schwesig was an early supporter of the corporate board 
quota and was one of the primary signatories for the Berliner Erklärung. She spoke out in 
favor of the bill in the 17th legislative period and called upon Ursula von der Leyen to 
show that she was serious about promoting the corporate board quota in the CDU/CSU 
(‘Von Der Leyen Und EU-Kommission Für Frauenquote’ 2011). In contrast, Annette 
Widmann-Mauz did not take part in the corporate board quota debate. However, she was 
supportive of the quota as one can tell from her comments and activities in the 18th 
legislative period.  
The SPD proposed an incremental legal quota, which would prescribe a 40 per 
cent corporate board quota for women by 2021: 
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To tear down the glass ceiling for women, we need a legal framework. 
This is why we propose a 40 per cent gender quota for executive boards 
and boards of directors of publicly listed companies. We also believe that 
a balanced leadership will improve the work culture across all levels. (Das 
Wir entscheidet 2013, 51)57 
The SPD manifesto continued to draw attention to the lack of women in 
leadership position in the public sector and pledged to modify the respective laws so that 
the public sector would lead by example. Finally, the SPD also called for a federal 
equality law which would introduce binding regulations for the promotion of women on 
all levels where women are underrepresented in companies.  
In contrast, despite adopting the corporate board quota in its party platform, the 
CDU emphasized the use of the flex-quota and proposed a fixed board quota to start only 
in 2020: 
We want women to achieve leadership positions – in middle management 
as well as on executive boards and board of directors. This is why we want 
to propose a law that increases the percentage of women on executive 
boards and boards of directors (…) Utilizing an obligatory flex-quota, we 
will demand from publicly listed companies or companies with employee 
representation that they set a binding quota for women on corporate 
boards and boards of directors. These need to be made public and cannot 
be adjusted downwards afterwards. At the same time, we will propose a 
law that will introduce a legal board quota of 30 per cent in 2020 for 
women on boards of directors for publicly listed companies and those with 
employee representation. (Gemeinsam Erfolgreich für Deutschalnd 2013, 
40)58 
                                                
57  Original text: Auch um die gläserne Decke für Frauen einzureißen, braucht es einen gesetzlichen 
Rahmen. Wir werden deshalb eine 40-Prozent-Geschlechterquote für Aufsichtsräte und Vorstände 
börsennotierter und mitbestimmter Unternehmen verbindlich festlegen, auch weil eine ausgewogenere 
Führungsstruktur die Unternehmenskultur auf allen Ebenen verbessern kann. 
58  Original text: Wir wollen, dass mehr Frauen in Führungsverantwortung kommen – in mittleren und 
höheren Führungspositionen ebenso wie in Vorständen und Aufsichtsräten. Deshalb wollen wir die 
Erhöhung des Anteils von Frauen in Vorständen und Aufsichtsräten von Unternehmen gesetzlich regeln. 
(…) Mit einer verpflichtenden „Flexi-Quote“ werden wir von den börsennotierten oder 
mitbestimmungspflichtigen Unternehmen fordern, eine verbindliche Frauenquote für Vorstand und 
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The CDU manifesto also emphasized the need for the public sector to lead by 
example. In contrast to the SPD program, however, the CDU/CSU still appeared to prefer 
the flex-quota over a quota law and postponed the adoption of a board quota until 2020. 
Further, the manifesto demanded a legal quota only for boards of directors but not for 
executive boards. 
The CDU could not oppose the inclusion of the corporate board quota in the 
coalition agreement because Ursula von der Leyen and her allies made sure that it was 
part of the party’s platform. The party could not turn around during the coalition 
negotiations and change its stance as negotiations are based on the election manifesto of 
each party (personal interviews; Dausend and Niehjar 2015, 150/151). Thus, the coalition 
negotiations mainly centered on the details of a corporate board quota law. The 
CDU/CSU preferred a weak corporate board quota while the SPD insisted on a 
comprehensive and powerful law. The CDU/CSU tried several delay tactics by 
postponing a discussion about the issues several times (personal interviews). These delay 
tactics did not work as there was broad pressure from internal and external actors to 
ensure the inclusion of a corporate board quota in the coalition agreement. Elke Ferner, 
chairwoman for the Arbeitskreis der Sozialdemokratischen Frauen (working group of 
SPD women) was a vocal supporter of corporate board quotas during the coalition 
                                                                                                                                            
Aufsichtsrat festzulegen. Diese soll öffentlich ausgewiesen und darf nicht nachträglich nach unten 
berichtigt werden. Zugleich werden wir gesetzlich regeln, dass ab dem Jahr 2020 eine feste Quote von 30 




negotiations. The women of the SPD flexed their muscles in order to get the corporate 
board quota included in the coalition agreement, as Elke Ferner stated: 
The corporate board quota and ending care money were central issues 
during the campaign, and without including these in the coalition, the 
women of the SPD cannot accept that coalition (…) Gender equality 
policies were prominently named in the resolution of the party convention. 
Thus the Union needs to send us a signal (…). It will not be sufficient to 
announce policies for two legislative periods down the road, as it did with 
the board quotas. We need to act now, and cannot wait forever.59 (VME 
2013) 
A member of the SPD also highlighted in the interview that the SPD made the 
inclusion of a legal corporate board quota a condition for a grand coalition: 
It was clear that the introduction of a corporate board quota law 
represented a vital point for the SPD without which the coalition would 
not have occurred. Before the start of the coalition negotiations, an 
unscheduled party convention already set the parameters for a coalition 
with the respective coalition partner. In it, we also demanded a corporate 
board quota. The members of the SPD needed to consent to the coalition 
agreement in the end and without the inclusion of the big points that were 
demanded during the party convention, a majority for a grand coalition 
would not have been possible.60 
Manuela Schwesig also received support from FidAR during coalition 
negotiations to justify and develop the proposal by providing her with the most current 
numbers and figures for both publicly traded companies as well as for women in 
                                                
59 Original text: Die Frauenquote und die Abschaffung des Betreuungsgelds sind Themen, die für uns im 
Wahlkampf eine zentrale Rolle gespielt haben und ohne die aus Sicht der SPD-Frauen kein 
Koalitionsvertrag zustande kommen kann (…) Die Gleichstellungspolitik haben wir explizit in dem 
Beschluss unseres Parteikonvents erwähnt. Da wird von der Union ein Signal kommen müssen  
60 Original text: Es war daher klar, dass die Einführung der Frauenquote für die SPD einen wesentlichen 
Punkt darstellte, ohne den eine Koalition nicht zustande gekommen wäre. Im Vorfeld der 
Koalitionsverhandlungen hatte bereits ein außerordentlicher Parteikonvent der SPD die Maßgaben für eine 
Koalition mit dem Koalitionspartner festgelegt. Darin enthalten war auch die Forderung nach einer 
Frauenquote. Die Mitglieder der SPD mussten dem ausgehandelten Koalitionsvertrag am Ende zustimmen 
und ohne eine Umsetzung aller geforderten Punkte aus dem Konventsbeschluss hätte es wohlmöglich keine 
Mehrheit für eine „große Koalititon“ gegeben. 
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leadership positions in the public sector (personal interviews). Further, as one 
representative of a women’s organization mentioned in an interview, taking a page out of 
von der Leyen’s playbook, Schwesig asked the women’s organizations to keep up the 
pressure for corporate board quotes in the media as well in the public because the 
CDU/CSU kept delaying a discussion about the topic and often it was not even clear 
whether the issue would be part of the day’s agenda. 
The CDU/CSU continued to oppose a fixed quota for women on executive boards 
but was willing to compromise on a quota for women on the boards of directors in 
exchange for other important policy topics such as a consent to toll roads (personal 
interviews, ‘Schwarz-Rot Einigt Sich Auf Frauenquote Ab 2016’ 2013). In the end, both 
parties worked out a compromise which the leadership of each party could justify to their 
respective political base: 
We want to increase the number of women in leadership positions in 
Germany. To this end, we will introduce a bill in the 18th legislative period 
which establishes a gender quota for boards of directors and executive 
boards of companies. A 30 per cent gender quota will be effective for 
executive boards of publicly listed companies with employee 
representation that will be newly appointed in 2016. In cases of non-
compliance, chairs will remain empty. (Deutschlands Zukunft Gestalten 
2013, 72)61 
Thus, the SPD succeeded in pushing for a legal quota in 2016 rather than in 2020. 
At the same time, the SPD had to accept a lower gender quota of 30 per cent rather than 
                                                
61 Original text: Frauen in Führungspositionen: Wir wollen den Anteil weiblicher Führungskräfte in 
Deutschland erhöhen. Deshalb werden wir zu Beginn der 18. Wahlperiode des Deutschen Bundestages 
Geschlechterquoten in Vorständen und Aufsichtsräten in Unternehmen gesetzlich einführen. Aufsichtsräte 
von voll mitbestimmungspflichtigen und börsennotierten Unternehmen, die ab dem Jahr 2016 neu besetzt 
werden, sollen eine Geschlechterquote von mindestens 30 Prozent aufweisen. Wir werden eine Regelung 
erarbeiten, dass bei Nicht- erreichen dieser Quote die für das unterrepräsentierte Geschlecht vorgesehenen 
Stühle frei bleiben. 
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40 per cent as originally proposed by the party. The CDU was also able to limit the quota 
to companies with appointments in 2016 rather than all companies. The coalition 
agreement read as follows: 
We will legally obligate publicly listed companies with employee 
representation to introduce a binding target for increasing the percentage 
of women on executive boards, boards of directors, and in upper 
management positions, and to report on  progress towards the respective 
targets in a transparent fashion. The first targets need to be reported within 
the 18th legislative period and cannot be adjusted downward afterwards. 
(Deutschlands Zukunft Gestalten 2013, 72)62 
The CDU/CSU successfully pushed the flex-quota through which allows 
companies to set their own targets. The coalition agreement also included the regulation 
of women in leadership positions in the public sector. Specifically, the coalition 
agreement stated that the coalition government would increase the percentage of women 
on public boards as well as modify the federal equality law (Bundesgleichstellungsgesetz) 
and the federal law for the appointment of federal committees 
(Bundesgremienbesetzungsgesetz).  
Finally, Manuela Schwesig, the principal negotiator for the SPD on this issue, 
became Minister for Seniors, Family, Women, and Youth and was tasked with drafting a 
bill and introducing the bill into the decision-making process. 
                                                
62 Original text: Wir werden börsennotierte oder mitbestimmungspflichtige Unternehmen gesetzlich 
verpflichten, ab 2015 verbindliche Zielgrößen für die Erhöhung des Frauenanteils im Aufsichtsrat, 
Vorstand und in den obersten Management-Ebenen festzulegen und zu veröffentlichen und hierüber 
transparent zu berichten. Die ersten Zielgrößen müssen innerhalb der 18. Wahlperiode des Deutschen 
Bundestages erreicht werden und dürfen nicht nachträglich nach unten berichtigt werden. 
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6.2.  The Constellation of Critical Actors and Veto Players 
To understand the adoption of the corporate board quota, we need to sketch out 
the different stages of the policy process as well as the location of veto players and 
critical actors within the policy process. Figure 8 shows the different stages of the policy 
making process. These stages are the same as for the father leave policy discussed in 
chapter four. 
Figure 8: Policy Process for Corporate Board Quota 
 
In order to understand why the corporate board quota bill was successful, we need 
to identify the critical actors. To be considered a parliamentary critical actor, a political 
actor needs to speak up in favor of the corporate board quota both in the public as well as 
in the legislative process. A civil society actor is considered to be an extra-parliamentary 
critical actor if the actor speaks up in several media outlets and engages in some form of 
political activism to influence the outcome of the policy process by either testifying in 
committees, petitioning the government, being a member of a lobbying group, or 
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organizing open declarations of support whether this is in the form of public protest, or 
demonstrations. I also consider an individual a critical actor if the actor is identified as a 
critical actor in my interviews. 
 
I have identified a total of 11 critical actors (in order of importance): 
1. Manuela Schwesig (SPD): Minister for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, 
Women, and Youth 
2. Heiko Maas (SPD): Minister for Justice and Consumer Protection 
3. Renate Künast (Greens): chairwoman, Greens parliamentary group 
4. Ekin Deligöz (Greens): member of parliament 
5. Monika Schulz-Strelow: President, FidAR (women’s lobbying group for 
board quotas) 
6. Ramona Pisal: President, women’s bar association 
7. Henrike von Platen: President, BPW (Business and Professional Women 
Association) 
8. Katrin Göring-Eckhardt (Greens): member of parliament 
9. Ulle Schauws (Greens): member, committee for Family Affairs, Senior 
Citizens, Women and Youth;  
10. Cornelia Möhring (Die Linke): member, committee for Family Affairs, 
Senior Citizens, Women and Youth 
11. Dagmar Ziegler (SPD): member of parliament 
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In contrast to the previous case studies, the critical actors in the 18th legislative 
period stem predominantly from the SPD. This is due to three factors. For one, Ursula 
von der Leyen was appointed Minister of Defense, the first woman to hold this position. 
As such, she was far removed from domestic issues. Ursula von der Leyen also felt that 
her presence and advocacy for the issue were no longer required because the Berliner 
Erklärung was still influential and involved, and the Minister for Family, Seniors, 
Women, and Youth was now in the hands of an early quota advocate Manuela Schwesig 
(personal interviews). However, von der Leyen remained true to her own feminist 
convictions and recently called for a leadership quota for women in the German military 
in an interview with Der Spiegel in January 2015 (Hoffmann and Repinski 2015). 
Further, many of the most vocal conservative advocates for the corporate board quota law 
either left the Bundestag or switched to different positions within the party. For example, 
Elisabeth Winkelmeier-Becker switched from the Committee for Families, Seniors, 
Women, And Youth to the Committee for Justice and Consumer Affairs and thus was no 
longer as closely involved in the matter. Rita Pawelski left the Bundestag for private 
reasons. Dorothee Bär (CSU) became general secretary in the transportation department 
which was headed by a vocal quota opponent, essentially silencing her (Bullion 2014). 
Finally, after causing much ruckus in the past legislative period, many conservative 
women withdrew into the background knowing that the policy was now part of the 
coalition agreement and in the hands of active quota supporters which no longer 
necessitated serious and sustained action to ensure the success of the bill (personal 
interviews). According to one member of the coalition, party discipline also played an 
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important role in ensuring a less active participation of conservative women in the 18th 
legislative period. 
Critical actors in civil society specifically have been a powerful force behind the 
corporate board quota, utilizing the Berliner Erklärung63, which called upon the German 
government and parliament to adopt corporate board quotas that address gender 
inequalities in business. A total of 17,412 people had signed the declaration, six64 of the 
critical actors were authors of the declaration and three65 of the critical actors were 
primary supporters (Berliner Erklärung 2015). The authors (Initiatoren) and primary 
supporters (Erstunterzeichner) continued to keep pressure on the conservative 
government by publishing open letters, creating petitions, and organizing media events 
during the 18th legislative period. For example, Monika Schulz-Strelow, the president of 
FidAR also testified in front of the committee for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, 
Women, and Youth while being a driving force behind the Berliner Erklärung. She made 
sure to keep constant pressure on the conservative governments during the 18th legislative 
period and lobbied members of parliament extensively. 
Further, parliamentary critical actors such as Deligöz, Möhring, Göring-Eckhardt, 
Lay, Schauws, Zieglar and Künast spoke out in favor for the policy proposal in the 
media, publicly criticized members of the CDU/CSU who lobbied against the policy 
proposal, and passionately argued for the adoption of the policy during legislative debates 
                                                
63 http://www.berlinererklaerung.de/ 
64 Ramona Pisal; Monika Schulz-Strelow; Henrike von Platen; Ekin Deligöz; Cornelia Möhring; Dagmar 
Ziegler 
65 Original supporters: Katrin Göring-Eckhardt, Renate Künast, Manuela Schwesig 
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or committee hearings. Critical actors also took to Twitter to express their support for the 
policy, most prominently Heiko Maas who sent 32 tweets in support of the corporate 
board quota followed by Manuela Schwesig who tweeted 22 times. Civil society actors, 
for example the organization Pro-Quote and Henrike von Platen, also utilized Twitter to 
express their support for the quota,66 as shown in the excerpts below. 
Figure 9: Tweet by Henrike von Platen 
 
Figure 10: Tweet by Pro-Quote 
 
After having determined the critical actors, I will now identify the relevant veto 
players. The primary veto player was Manuela Schwesig who as newly-minted Minister 
for Families, Seniors, Women, and Youth was responsible for drafting the policy 
proposal. She drafted the proposal in cooperation with newly appointed Minister for 
Justice and Consumer Affairs, Heiko Maas (SPD). Based on the principle of ministerial 
description, the minister responsible can develop a policy proposal that reflects the 
preferences of her own party (Müller 2004). Thus, Schwesig and Haas developed a draft 
                                                
66 Tweet by Henrike von Platen: I am sure that not one single board position [reserved for women] will 
remain empty; Tweet by Pro Quote: weak quota or strong signal – we collected the media’s responses to 
the board quota 
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that was the most effective bill possible with the backing of their own party. However, I 
will later show that the bill was significantly modified during the drafting phase by 
opponents from the CDU/CSU. The secondary veto player is Angela Merkel as she 
remains the Chancellor. The Bundesrat is another potential secondary veto player, but 
due to the existence of a grand coalition, it was neutralized as the majority conditions are 
the same as in the Bundestag. Thus, we only had two veto players: 
1. Primary veto player with agenda setting power: Manuela Schwesig with 
Heiko Maas 
2. Secondary veto player: Angela Merkel 
However, as I illustrated in chapter three, beyond veto players, some actors are in 
positions to influence the bill draft as expert advisors. These are:  
1. Vice chairperson of each coalition faction: Carola Reiman (SPD), Nadine 
Schön (CDU) 
2. Spokesperson for the faction working group on Families, Seniors, Women, 
and Youth matters: Sönke Rix (SPD), Markus Weinberg (CDU) 
3. Chairperson of the Committee on Families, Seniors, Women, and Youth 
matters: Paul Lehrieder (CSU) 
4. Members of the Committee on Families, Seniors, Women, and Youth 
matters: 36 members 
In contrast to the case of the father leave policy, only two of the expert advisors in 
connection with the board quota were critical actors – Cornelia Möhring (Die Linke) and 
Ulle Schauws (Greens). Further, both critical actors were from the opposition parties and 
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were only regular members of the committee on Families, Seniors, Women, and Youth, 
meaning that they had no influence in the drafting phase of the bill and limited influence 
in the legislative process itself as they did not have the numbers to modify the bill in the 
committee. 
Thus, the constellation of critical actors, veto players, and export advisors is as 
shown in Figure 9. 
Figure 11: Constellation of Veto Players and Critical Actors67 
 
Similar to the case of father leave policy, critical actors in the case of the board 
quota occupied the primary veto player positions. However, in contrast to the 16th 
legislative period, critical actors from the governing coalition this time did not occupy 
expert advisor positions, which had an effect on their ability to prevent modifications to 
the draft, as I will illustrate below. Angela Merkel again was a supportive veto player as 
she supported the adoption of the corporate board quota (Buillion 2014).  
                                                
67 Red circles denote the locations of veto players while stars denote the locations of critical actors. 
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Several civil society actors were extra-parliamentary critical actors. While they 
remained outside of the political process, they nevertheless were able to influence veto 
players – most notably Schwesig and Maas. Five of the authors and original supporters of 
the Berliner Erklärung were members of parliament in addition to Manuela Schwesig (an 
original supporter) who is now the Minister for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women 
and Youth. By having these important actors as well as primary veto players publicly 
declare their support for a quota, extra-parliamentary critical actors were able to leverage 
the public commitment to board quotas by Schwesig and other parliamentarians to 
pressure these actors to uphold their commitment. Thus, extra-parliamentary critical 
actors were successful in extending their reach into the highest ranks of government as 
well as parliament overall. Having members of parliament sign the declaration made it 
very difficult for these actors to not support the quota unless they wanted to risk 
appearing insincere. 
Finally, we need to locate the opponents in this constellation between critical 
actors and veto players. It is not surprising that the most vocal opponents stem from the 
CDU/CSU. As in the 17th legislative period, Gerda Hasselfeldt (CSU), Volker Kauder 
(CDU), Kristina Schröder (CDU) were the most outspoken opponents of the policy. 
Volker Kauder, particularly, opposed the ministerial draft while Gerda Hasselfeldt hoped 
to postpone the adoption of the board quota arguing that the quota would have an adverse 
effect on the economic recovery (WBR and DPA 2014). Kristina Schröder (CDU) was no 
longer a cabinet member but instead returned to her position as a regular member of 
parliament. This turn of events demonstrates perfectly the power Ursula von der Leyen 
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had within the government and the positive relationship she maintained with the 
Chancellor. Kristina Schröder turned out to be the big loser of the corporate quota debate 
in the past legislative period despite the fact that she supported the party line in contrast 
to von der Leyen who openly rebelled against it. Kristina Schröder kept emphasizing the 
preference for voluntary quotas in line with liberal conservative principles from the back 
bench (ANR 2014). Thus, in contrast to the previous legislative period, opponents in the 
18th legislative period did not control any veto player positions and were not able to fall 
back on a coalition partner supportive of their position. Nevertheless, opponents 
successfully pushed for significant changes to the bill during the drafting phase and in 
committee deliberations during the legislative process, which significantly weakened the 
original bill. I will now turn to explaining the outcome of the policy process drawing on 
the constellation of critical actors and opponents vis-à-vis veto players. 
6.3. Explaining the Policy Outcome 
Drafting Phase. Manuela Schwesig and Heiko Maas planned to introduce a bill 
draft early in the legislative period. By March 2014, they were only able to present broad 
guidelines due to strong opposition from business interests outside and within the 
CDU/CSU (Caspari 2005). The guidelines suggested the following elements be included 
in the final bill: 
1. Publicly listed companies with over 2,000 employees would need to 




2. The quota would apply to the company side as well as the union side of 
boards of directors (both sides typically appoint directors to a board). 
3. If a company were to fail to comply with the quota, the seat of the 
applicable director would be required to remain empty. 
4. Publicly listed companies with under 2,000 employees or companies with 
boards that are co-governed by union representatives would be subject to 
the flex-quota: these companies would need to establish their own targets 
for women on executive boards, boards of directors, and in middle and 
upper management starting in 2015. 
Thus, the legally binding quota of 30 per cent would be only narrowly applied as 
it would target boards of directors but not executive boards even though the number of 
women on executive boards is much lower at four per cent compared to eleven per cent 
for boards of directors (Caspari 2005). As a result, the quota would pertain to 
approximately 110 companies which would need to appoint 176 women by 2016. In 
contrast, the flex-quota applied to roughly 3,500 companies.  
In addition to quotas for private businesses, the Schwesig and Maas also wanted 
to change the federal equality law (Bundesgleichstellungsgesetz) which applies to the 
public sector: 
1. All public committees would set their own targets. 
2. In executive committees that are appointed by the federal government, a 
quota of 50 per cent would apply to such committees. 
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Both Schwesig and Maas were between a rock and a hard place: many quota 
supporters criticized the suggested guidelines as being too lenient as they only applied to 
a handful of companies, and many quota advocates preferred a quota of 40 per cent 
(‘Grüne fordern Frauenquote von 40 Present’ 2014). In contrast, leading business 
managers and representatives of business and employer organizations criticized the 
guidelines as too harsh and unfulfillable. Further, the majority of CDU/CSU members 
still did not support a quota for corporate boards and wanted to see only a flex-quota in 
the bill proposal. Nadine Schön and Karin Maags (both CDU), for example, praised 
particularly the part addressing the flex-quota and emphasized that the CDU/CSU would 
ensure during the policy process that the bill would remain realistic.  
It took Schwesig and Maas until September 2014 to present their bill draft for 
comments to the relevant entities such as state governments, other cabinet members, and 
business associations. It is during the drafting phase where the majority and most 
significant changes took place. The bill drew heavy criticism from the CSU, Volker 
Kauder (chairperson, parliamentary group CDU), and business groups: first, opponents 
worried that the bill would create a bureaucratic burden both for companies and the civil 
service; second, opponents were concerned that the quota would sacrifice quality over 
quantity; and third, opponents argued that the quota would obstruct the already fragile 
economic recovery (Buillion 2014).  
Speaking for the CSU, Gerda Hasselfeldt openly questioned whether it made 
sense to adopt everything in the coalition agreement immediately, as the corporate board 
quota would represent a burden to business (‘Merkel beharrt auf Frauenquote’ 2014). She 
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continued that, due to a recent economic downturn, the adoption of a corporate board 
quota would interfere too much with the freedom of action of companies and as such 
should be postponed (‘CSU Landeschefin will Frauenquote später einführen’ 2014). 
Michael Grosse-Böhmer (CDU) echoed her concerns by emphasizing that the bill would 
represent an undue burden for companies. Hasselfeldt also insisted that the bill draft went 
beyond the details included in the coalition agreement and announced that she also had 
concerns as to whether the bill would violate EU law (‘CSU attackiert Schwesigs 
Frauenquote’ 2014). In particular, the CSU claimed that the quota would violate property 
rights of business owners. Horst Seehofer (CSU prime minister, Bavaria) announced that 
the quota could eventually become a reality, but without bureaucracy, documentation, 
and a control mechanism (Bouillon 2014). Volker Kauder (CDU) warned of an 
increasingly bureaucratic burden for companies (Buillion 2014). 
Minister Schwesig and other SPD members reacted with anger to these 
comments: ‘It is unconscionable to call women an economic burden.’ said Minister 
Schwesig while SPD general secretary Yasmin Fahimi warned the CSU/CDU to leave the 
coalition agreement alone (‘CSU Landeschefin will Frauenquote später einführen’ 2014). 
Heiko Mass reminded the public that Germany is a laggard when it comes to the 
representation of women on boards and that companies would benefit from greater 
diversity (Roßmann 2014). 
In the private sector, employee and business organizations as well as several 
business managers were openly against the bill. For example, the Deutscher 
Gewerkschaftsbund (Confederation of German Trade Unions) lobbied for a flexible quota 
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that reflects the presence of women in companies, arguing that in male-dominated 
industries, the quota of 30 per cent would be impossible to fulfill (‘DGB für Frauenquote 
light in Männerbetrieben’ 2014). Rainer Kirchdörfer, a business manager, argued that the 
government cannot legally interfere with employment decisions (‘CSU will jetztige Form 
der Frauenquote verhindern’ 2014). 
The opposition to the board quota successfully delayed the bill draft in the 
drafting phase for several months. When progress towards the corporate board quota bill 
stalled in the fall of 2014 and attempts by Manuela Schwesig to get the proposal 
approved in the cabinet were postponed several times, quota advocates utilized the 
Berliner Erklärung to publish another open letter to the Chancellor and the federal 
government which read: 
In your coalition agreement, you committed yourself to increasing the 
percentage of women on corporate boards by introducing a corporate 
board quota bill in the 18th legislative period. After years of discussion, 
this bill would represent an important step towards greater gender 
equality, enabled by the support of women and men across all political 
parties and all social groups. Already in March of this year, Minister 
Manuela Schwesig and Minister Heiko Maas have developed a bill for 
more women on boards. With it, your colleagues are adopting the coalition 
agreement. This draft is a great first step towards more women in 
leadership positions although some of us would like to see a greater 
commitment. Despite this, we are still waiting in vain for the cabinet to 
put the bill on its agenda. Instead, we are confronted constantly with new 
delay tactics. This must end now! Now is the time to fulfill the coalition 
agreement and pave the way to parliamentary debates and the adoption of 
corporate board quotas. (Berliner Erklärung 2015)  
Angela Merkel, as a sympathetic veto player, played a crucial role in resolving the 
conflict around the bill draft. Merkel was aware of the coalition agreement that cemented 
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the adoption of a corporate board quota. After months of discussions, she finally put her 
foot down:  
“It is decided, the quota law will be passed, said Merkel. The arguments in 
favor and in opposition to the quota are well-known. Any further 
discussion is pointless.” (“Merkel beharrt auf Frauenquote” 2014)68 
With Angela Merkel’s insistence, the quota opponents in the CSU/CDU had to 
relent and accept the passage of the bill in the cabinet. While Gerda Hasselfeldt and 
Volker Kauder occupied important positions (both were, and continue to be, chairpersons 
of their respective parliamentary groups), they could not override the support of Angela 
Merkel (“Merkel beharrt auf Frauenquote in Firmen” 2014). Their role in essence was to 
ensure that their respective parliamentary groups voted according to party line – not to 
question the government agenda. Further, after Volker Kauder called Minister Schwesig 
‘whiny’ when pushing for passage of the bill in the cabinet, the backlash was hefty and 
swift, not only from the media or his colleagues but also Angela Merkel who publicly 
apologized for his comment (“Merkel entschuldigt sich für Kauder-Äußerung” 2014). 
Especially women reacted angrily and publicly to this sexist comment both in social 
media as well as in parliamentary debates. Karin Göring-Eckhardt (Greens), a primary 
signatory to the Berliner Erklärung, tweeted from a parliamentary debate (see the excerpt 
below) that all women should get their Kleenex ready as Volker Kauder was the next 
person scheduled to speak. 
                                                
68 Original text: „Es ist beschlossen, das Gesetz für die Quote kommt“, sagte Merkel. Die Argumente des 
Für und Wider seien bekannt: „Noch länger darüber zu diskutieren, wäre müßig." 
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Figure 12: Tweet by Kathrin Göring-Eckhardt 
 
Caren Lay mentioned Volker Kauder’s transgression specifically in a 
parliamentary debate later on: 
We have debated loudly and publicly over the corporate board quota for 
over a year now. We negotiated hard, and we have a total of six bill drafts. 
Business representatives warn of intolerable burdens for the German 
economy and Mr. Kauder, the faction chairperson of the CDU/CSU, also 
made his name as the super macho of the German parliament when he 
berated Mrs. Schwesig as whiny. And that even when he – I cannot see 
him at the moment – was strong competition [for that title] 
(Plenarprotokoll 18/83 2015, 7916)69 
With this off-the-cuff comment, Kauder maneuvered himself into a position 
where he no longer was able to influence the policy outcome. In contrast, the CSU under 
Gerda Hasselfeldt simply did not have enough seats (56 seats compared to 193 for the 
SPD and 255 for the CDU (Der Bundeswahlleiter 2014) in parliament to push their 
                                                
69 Original text: Über ein Jahr wird nun schon lauthals und öffentlich über die Frauenquote für die 
Privatwirtschaft diskutiert. Es wurde zäh verhandelt, und es gab sage und schreibe sechs verschiedene 
Referentenentwürfe. Die Wirtschaftsvertreter warnten vor unzumutbaren Belastungen für die deutsche 
Wirtschaft, und Herr Kauder, der Fraktionschef der CDU/CSU-Fraktion, machte sich auch noch einen 
Namen als Obermacho des Deutschen Bundestages, als er Frau Schwesig als weinerlich beschimpfte; dabei 
hatte Herr Kauder – ich sehe ihn gerade nicht – wirklich harte Konkurrenz. 
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opposition further. Thus, opponents were unable to convince any of the veto players to 
postpone the bill further. 
While quota opponents were not able to stop the bill from being introduced into 
the legislative process, Schwesig had to modify the bill draft a total five times before it 
was passed by the cabinet on December 11, 2014 (‘CSU attackiert Schwesigs 
Frauenquote’ 2014). The final draft included the following three elements. First, the 
corporate board quota of 30 per cent applied only to publicly listed companies with over 
2,000 employees by 2016, and it included the sanctions of an empty chair in cases of non-
compliance. Second, the flex-quota was also kept for medium-sized companies. No 
sanctions were planned for companies that miss their own targets, but such companies are 
not allowed to set a target that is lower than their existing percentage of women on 
boards. Finally, public companies would need to consider the gender composition of 
boards for new appointments.  
However, important changes were also made to the draft bill. First, the 
requirement in the original version of the bill for an increase in gender equality 
ombudsmen across all federal departments was removed (Müller 2014). Second, the 
original version of the bill called for the appointment of an additional member to the 
corporate board that was underrepresented. The final bill draft no longer included this 
requirement (Müller 2014). Third, the public report mechanism for the public sector on 
its advancement towards gender balance on its committees was removed as well (Müller 
2014). While Manuela Schwesig called these modifications minor, the opposition parties 
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(The Greens and the Left Party) expressed their frustration, calling the final version of the 
bill draft a cheap compromise and a severe weakening of the original bill (Müller 2014).  
Legislative Phase. After a tumultuous and contentious drafting phase, the 
government sent the bill to the Bundesrat on December 29, 2014 for comment, and then 
introduced the bill into parliament in January 2015. With the support of the chancellor, 
and modifications already made to the proposal, the passage of the bill should have been 
straight forward. However, the bill was changed one more time after committee 
deliberations: the mandate to introduce affirmative action for men in women-dominated 
professions was declared unconstitutional and scratched from the final version of the bill. 
The bill also called for a 50 per cent quota for all executive committees appointed by the 
federal government which was also removed (‘Koalition bessert bei Frauenquote nach’ 
2015). 
Despite a further weakening of the bill during the legislative process, extra-
parliamentary critical actors took to social media to continue lobbying in favor of the bill 
and to make sure the bill would remain relevant. For example, Ramona Pisal (president, 
women’s bar association) tweeted a “thank you” to Renate Künast (Greens) for her 
speech in favor of the quota in parliament while Henrike von Platen (president, BPW) 
called attention to the committee deliberation and the participation of another women’s 
organization, FidAR, which testified as experts70: 
 
                                                
70 Tweet from Henrike von Platen: Hearing of the corporate board quota in the Bundestag on February 23. 
Pay attention to the list of experts, which includes FidAR, and participate! Tweet from Ramona Pisal: 




Figure 13: Tweet by Henrike von Platen 
 
Figure 14: Tweet by Ramona Pisal 
 
In the 18th legislative period, the discourse around the corporate board quota 
differed slightly from the discourse in the 17th legislative period. While in the 17th 
legislative period, quota advocates continuously referred to the failure of voluntary 
quotas (total of 155 instances), this line of reasoning played only a subordinate role in the 
18th legislative period (total of 43 instances). The same is true for references to other 
countries as role models (67 instances in the 17th legislative period compared to 13 
instances in the 18th legislative period), while references to the European advancement 
for board quotas played no role in the most recent debate. Likewise, the argument that 
greater gender equality on boards would lead to a comparative advantage over other 
countries was not as prominent in the 18th legislative period as it was in the 17th 
legislative period (15 instances in the 17th legislative period compared to 3 instances in 
the 18th legislative period). Finally, legal arguments about the constitutional requirement 
for the state to affect gender equality in a proactive manner also played an important role 
 
207 
in both legislative periods (48 instances in the 17th legislative period and 40 instances in 
the 18th legislative period). 
Utility driven arguments and feminist arguments played an important role in the 
18th legislative period (as they did in the 17th legislative period). Utility driven arguments 
are arguments that emphasize the economic benefits of balanced representation on 
boards. These arguments refer to positive effects of quotas on the bottom line (42 
instances), stress the improvements of decision-making on diverse boards as a result of 
quotas (18 instances) or draw attention to future economic challenges that women can 
help alleviate thanks to quotas, such as anticipated skilled labor shortage (12 instances) 
and the loss of talent for companies when highly skilled women drop out of the 
workforce due to discrimination (12 instances). An example of a utility driven argument 
is the following statement by Manuela Schwesig in one of the parliamentary debates: 
Companies with diverse leadership teams are more successful. A Swiss 
bank calculated that the stock prices of companies with women on boards 
have improved by 26 per cent between 2005 and 2011. To put it 
differently, I will cite a member of the CSU who justifies her support for 
quotas on the website of the Berliner Erklärung with ‘sometimes you need 
to force people to be happy.’ (‘Plenarprotokoll 18/83’ 2015, 7915)71 
The following statement by Elisabeth Winkelmeier-Becker during the 
parliamentary debate represents another utility driven argument: 
This is not just about gender equality. It also recognizes that the economy 
will benefit from women in leadership positions. It is to the benefit of the 
economy if diverse life experiences are brought to bear, if everyone does 
                                                
71 Original text: Unternehmen mit gemischten Führungsteams sind erfolgreicher. Eine Schweizer Bank hat 
errechnet, dass sich die Aktienkurse von Unternehmen mit Frauen im Aufsichtsrat zwischen 2005 und 2011 
um 26 Prozent besser entwickelt haben. Anders gesagt – hier zitiere ich gerne eine Abgeordnete der CSU, 
die ihre Zustimmung zur Quote anlässlich der Berliner Erklärung so begründet hat: „Manchmal muss man 
die Leute zu ihrem Glück zwingen.“ 
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not have the same background, the same opinion, and the same thought 
patterns. (‘Plenarprotokoll 18/83’ 2015, 7922)72 
Feminist arguments were put forward most frequently in the debate (a total of 182 
instances). I coded arguments to be feminist when they (1) directly referenced gender 
equality, (2) drew attention to the glass ceiling, (3) emphasized the need to change 
workplace cultures to become more women-friendly, (4) called upon solidarity among 
women, (5) stressed the symbolic effects of having a woman in a prominent leadership 
position, (6) criticized the injustices in the business world, or (7) argued that women need 
to make up a critical mass on boards to affect change. Manuela Schwesig speaks to 
several of the above arguments when she stated: 
The law will introduce a cultural change in the workplace. If no gender 
equality exists at the top of companies or public sector, who believes that 
there will be gender equality within the rest of the company or 
administration? Once more women are present in leadership positions, 
equal opportunities across the company and administration become more 
natural. (‘Plenarprotokoll 18/83’ 2015, 7916)73 
Heiko Maas spoke to feminist and utility arguments in the parliamentary debate 
before the final vote: 
This is the best educated generation of women that ever existed. More 
women than men graduate from college. Whoever ignores this potential 
not only endangers gender equality but also growth and prosperity. It is 
                                                
72 Original text: Es geht hier nicht nur um Gleichberechtigung, sondern es geht auch darum, dass die 
Wirtschaft von mehr Frauen in Führungspositionen profitiert. Es ist ein Vorteil für die Wirtschaft selbst, 
wenn unterschiedliche Lebenserfahrungen eingebracht werden, wenn nicht alle den gleichen Hintergrund, 
die gleiche Meinung und die gleiche Denke haben. 
73 Original text: Darüber hinaus wird dieses Gesetz einen Kulturwandel in der Arbeitswelt einleiten. Wenn 
es an der Spitze eines Unternehmens oder an der Spitze der öffentlichen Verwaltung keine 
Gleichberechtigung gibt, wer glaubt dann, dass es im Rest des Unternehmens oder der Verwaltung 
Gleichberechtigung gibt? Sobald es aber mehr Frauen in Führungspositionen gibt, werden gleiche Chancen 
in Unternehmen und Verwaltungen selbstverständlicher. 
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the latter that the quota will contribute to, something that is said too little. 
(‘Plenarprotokoll 18/92’ 2015, 8754)74 
A new argument was the idea of a trickle-down effect of corporate board quotas 
in the debates during the 18th legislative period (17 instances total). Advocates 
emphasized that quotas on the top levels of a corporation would eventually lead to 
positive changes for women in lower levels of a corporation as well. For example, in an 
interview with a local newspaper, Manuela Schwesig argued that having women on 
boards would open the door to all other areas as well (Schwesig 2014). In a press 
statement by the Ministry for Families, Seniors, Women, and Youth, Schwesig reiterated 
that: 
Women represent a plus for the economy. The quota will break up 
structures and improve workplace cultures. Having more women in 
leadership positions will make more women follow. It will result in more 
women across all management levels. (Schwesig 2015)75 
In contrast, opponents of the bill hardly spoke out against the bill during the 18th 
legislative period; they only spoke up 18 times compared to 208 times in the 17th 
legislative period. This demonstrates that the opposition had grudgingly accepted the 
passage of the bill when the legislative phase started. The most commonly used argument 
called the quota an economic and bureaucratic burden (25 times) or emphasized violation 
of liberal conservative principle of limited state intervention and property rights (11 
                                                
74 Original text: Wir haben die bestausgebildete Generation von Frauen, die es je gegeben hat. Wir haben 
mehr Hochschulabsolventinnen als Hochschulabsolventen. Wer dieses Potenzial ungenutzt lässt, der 
gefährdet nicht nur die Gleichberechtigung, sondern letztlich auch Wohlstand und Wachstum. Auch dazu 
leistet die Quote einen Beitrag. Das wird viel zu selten gesagt. 
75 Original text: Frauen sind ein Gewinn für die Wirtschaft. Die Quote wird Strukturen aufbrechen und die 
Unternehmenskultur verbessern. Mehr Frauen in Führungspositionen werden andere Frauen nachziehen. Es 
wird mehr Frauen auf allen Hierarchieebenen geben. 
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times). This contrasts starkly with the 17th legislative period where opponents called 
attention to limited state intervention a total of 61 times and argued that a fixed quota 
cannot be applied to all companies equally as some companies have a harder time finding 
qualified women (24 times).  
At the final debate of the bill, the public gallery was packed with former members 
of parliament who supported the bill in previous legislative periods such as Rita Pawelski 
and representatives of all the major women’s organizations. Manuela Schwesig and 
Heiko Maas called the passage of the bill a historic day for women and gender equality, 
and the SPD invited everyone for cake and champagne after the debate76.  
Figure 15: Tweets by Manuela Schwesig  
 
Figure 16: Tweet by Heiko Maas 
 
The Frauenquote became law on May 1, 2015. The final draft of the bill had four 
main components: it established a 30 per cent quota for all publicly listed companies with 
employee representation on their boards – if they do not comply with the quota, board 
seats will remain empty; companies that are either publicly listed or have employee 
                                                
76 Manuela Schwesig Tweet: An important day ends! Many thanks to all the supporters. Have a wonderful 
weekend! #thequotaiscoming; Tweet by Heiko Maas: The women quota has been adopted. Good Day. 
Thank you to all who helped. Congratulations to Manuela Schwesig 
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representation on their boards must introduce a quota at their discretion but the quota 
must be fulfilled by 2017; state companies will adhere to a 30 per cent quota starting in 
2016 to be increased to 50 per cent by 2018; and finally, civil services must set a quota 
for women at their own discretion and make these objectives publicly available (BMJV 
2015). 
While supporters in the SPD and CDU/CSU celebrated the passage of the bill, the 
opposition parties abstained from the vote calling the bill a ‘quota light’ or a ‘tiny quota’ 
emphasizing that the bill simply did not go far enough (‘Die Frauenquote ist beschlossen’ 
2015). The Greens preferred a quota of 40 per cent while Die Linke demanded a 50 per 
cent quota (‘Bundestag stimmt über Frauenquote ab’ 2015). Caren Lay (Die Linke) for 
example tweeted her disappointment about the final bill by blaming the old boys’ 
network in the CDU for a quota that only applies to 180 women77.  
Figure 17: Tweet by Caren Lay 
 
In the CDU/CSU, some were still unhappy about the quota: In an interview, a 
member of the CDU claimed that 75 per cent of the party is still against a legal corporate 
board quota arguing that only the CDU women and maybe members of the working 
group on family affairs were in favor of the final bill. Likewise, Kristina Schröder 
                                                
77 Tweet by Caren Lay: the mini quota is not a cause for celebration. A fixed quota for only 180 women. 
Guilty: men networks in the CDU and business 
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published a statement on her personal website decrying the adoption of the policy. She 
also insisted on including a written statement to the plenary protocol of the final 
parliamentary debate when the quota was adopted. The statement read: 
I object to the introduction of a legal and fixed corporate board quota. On 
the one hand, it represents a severe intervention in the freedom to conduct 
business. On the other hand, (…) underrepresentation does not necessarily 
equal discrimination. More importantly though, the corporate board quota 
makes individuals prisoners of their gender. It dares to decrease the 
opportunities of individuals via a state interference, because other 
members of one’s own gender enjoyed actual or alleged advantages. This 
collective logic of the corporate board quota leads to an individually based 
injustice and therefore is not compatible either with my idea of man or 
with my idea of the state. (‘Plenarprotokoll 18/92’ 2015, 8813).78 
6.4.  Discussion 
To summarize, this case study confirms that feminist policy outcomes will be 
successful under conservative governments when coalition constraints are permissive and 
critical actors occupy veto player positions. This case study also shows that the policy 
preferences of secondary veto players matter: while Angela Merkel, a secondary veto 
player, opposed a legal quota in the previous legislative period, she changed her position 
in the 18th legislative period and actively intervened to allow the bill draft to be passed by 
the cabinet. This change of mind also demonstrates the importance of coalition 
constraints. Angela Merkel never publicly expressed her support for the quota on 
                                                
78 Original text: Ich lehne die Einführung einer gesetzlichen starren Frauenquote ab. Zum einen stellt sie 
einen empfindlichen Eingriff in die unternehmerische Freiheit dar. Zum anderen gilt, was gegen die 
kurzzeitig geplante sogenannte „Männerquote“ vorgebracht wurde, auch in Hinblick auf Frauen in 
Führungspositionen: Aus einer Unterrepräsentanz lässt sich nicht zwangsläufig auf eine Diskriminierung 
schließen. Vor allem aber nimmt die Frauenquote Menschen in Haftung für ihr Geschlecht. Sie maßt sich 
an, durch einen staatlichen Eingriff die Chancen eines Individuums zu vermindern, weil andere Angehörige 
seines Geschlechts tatsächlich oder vermeintlich Vorteile genossen haben. Diese kollektivistische Logik 
der Frauenquote führt zu individueller Ungerechtigkeit und ist daher weder mit meinem Menschenbild 
noch mit meinem Staatsverständnis vereinbar. 
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ideological grounds. Rather, she emphasized the fact that the policy was included in the 
coalition agreement and as such would be adopted. This is one of many examples of 
Merkel as a reasonable and strategic political actor. Finally, this case study underscores 
the importance of coalition agreements: the great majority of my interview partners 
stressed that the board quota became law because it was part of the coalition agreement 
and thus could not be prevented. In many ways, coalition constraints circumscribe the 
actions of veto players in the policy making process. 
At the same time, quota opponents such as Hasselfeldt and Kauder occupied 
important positions within the CDU/CSU faction. Many opponents had the opportunity to 
influence the bill language during the drafting phase: Horst Seehofer – prime minister of 
Bavaria – was consulted as were business and labor organizations. Collectively, quota 
opponents took advantage of their feedback position in the drafting phase to modify the 
proposal. This illustrates that opponents can weaken – if not block – a policy proposal 
they oppose, if they occupy strategic points of influence in the policy process. However, 
they could not change the essential elements of the bill (such as the fixed quota of 30 per 
cent), and they were not able to include exceptions for male-dominated companies in the 
final bill language. Thus, their power to modify was limited but not non-existent.  
The case of corporate board quotas gives us a great opportunity to compare a 
failed attempt with a successful attempt to learn more about the factors and conditions 
that contribute to the success of a feminist policy under a conservative government. 
Although each case followed a slightly different policy process – the failed attempt as an 
opposition bill introduced via the Bundesrat versus the second attempt in the form of a 
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government bill – the two cases nevertheless allow us to compare the impact of veto 
players, critical actors, and coalition constraints on the respective policy outcomes.  
I argue that a conducive constellation of critical actors and veto players is not 
enough but that coalition constraints must be permissive as well. This claim is partially 
borne out when considering the case of corporate board quotas. There is reason to believe 
that Angela Merkel would have been on board with passing a corporate board quota law 
in the 17th legislative period after continued pressure within the party and by the public. 
She once mentioned that she changed her mind on the need of quotas because she learned 
that it accelerated the progress for women (Roll 2013). However, the presence of a 
coalition partner that vehemently opposed any form of quota prevented a bipartisan 
solution to the problem. A member of the coalition argued that Angela Merkel’s silence 
on the topic was indicative of her personal support of a quota. But in light of the FDP’s 
opposition, she was in an impossible situation because her consent to a quota would have 
meant the end of her own government. Thus, the failure of the corporate board quota in 
the 17th legislative period was due to restrictive coalition constraints and the fact that both 
coalition parties – which both opposed a quota solution – were veto players. 
The 18th legislative period saw a return to the grand coalition with the SPD which 
carefully leveraged the board quota momentum inside the parties and outside of 
parliament that had built over the course of the previous two years. The SPD made the 
inclusion of a corporate board quota in the coalition agreement the condition for the 
grand coalition and succeeded partially because conservative women, most notably 
Ursula von der Leyen, blackmailed the party leadership to include a commitment to the 
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policy in its election manifesto before the election (personal interviews). Before we can 
conclude that the coalition constraints imposed by the SPD led to the successful adoption 
of the corporate board quota law, let us consider whether the board quota would have 
become law without the SPD in the coalition. The SPD was not the only party supportive 
of the policy. Both the Greens and Die Linke called for a legal quota in their election 
manifestos. Further, the CDU/CSU did enter preliminary coalition talks with the Greens 
after the 2013 election. The question now is whether the Greens could have pushed for 
the inclusion of the policy in the coalition agreement. The great majority of my interview 
subjects argued that neither the Greens nor Die Linke would have had the necessary 
weight and number of parliamentary seats to push for the policy. First, both partners 
would have been definite junior coalition partners with little say in the government as the 
CDU/CSU almost won the majority of seats in 2013. Further, support for a corporate 
board quota was far from unanimous within the CDU/CSU, making it likely that the 
opponents could have prevented either the inclusion of the policy in the coalition 
agreement or successfully stalled the introduction of the quota into the policy process. 
Thus both the policy stance as the relative weight of the coalition partner matters for 
policy adoption.  
The quota case studies in the 17th and 18th legislative periods demonstrate the 
importance of the coalition agreement and the election manifesto as a foundation for 
coalition negotiations in regards to the outcome of policies. Several interview subjects 
stressed that the first step for any policy proposal to become part of the coalition 
negotiations is to ensure that the policy proposal is present in at least one of the 
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negotiating political parties’ election manifestos. The election manifesto sets the 
framework of coalition negotiations and determines the subjects that are up for debate. As 
a second step, the policy proposal needs to be included in the coalition agreement as a 
legislative priority to become part of the legislative agenda. Thus both the election 
manifesto and the coalition agreement are crucial to policy adoption.  
In the absence of policy adoption in the coalition negotiations, policy adoption 
becomes very unlikely when the policy is put on the legislative agenda by the opposition. 
In these cases, support or opposition for policy adoption must be negotiated ad hoc giving 
each coalition partner a veto power.  
In the 17th legislative period, both coalition parties agreed that they did not want a 
legal quota and even a voluntary quota was opposed by the FDP which preferred soft 
targets and diversity initiatives. Even though the coalition agreement had little to say on 
the matter of the corporate board quota, each veto player referred to the constraining 
effects of the agreement to justify why an adoption of said policy was not feasible. A 
member of the FDP said in the interview that consent to the bill was impossible because 
the corporate board quota was not part of the coalition agreement. It is simply not 
conceivable to adopt a policy that does not have a foundation in the coalition agreement. 
Members of the FDP continued to call this scenario an ‘impossible deviation’. A member 
of the CDU also highlighted that the FDP rightfully pointed out that the corporate board 
quota was not part of the coalition agreement and thus could not become supported by the 
government coalition.  
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In contrast to the corporate board quota in the 17th legislative period, the corporate 
board quota in the 18th legislative period was part of the election manifesto of all political 
parties except the FDP in the 2015 election, guaranteeing that it would be part of any 
coalition negotiations once the election results revealed that the FDP failed the five per 
cent hurdle to parliament. The important role that the coalition agreement played is 
highlighted by a multitude of comments defending the adoption of the corporate board 
quota with reference to the binding effects of the coalition agreement. Christina Jantz 
(SPD) for example justified the introduction of the bill by referring to ‘the adoption of the 
goals set forth in the coalition agreement’ (‘Plenarprotokoll 18/83’ 2015). Oswin Veith 
(CDU) made the same argument when he stated in the parliamentary debate that the CDU 
would fulfill the coalition agreement. An interesting question to consider is whether the 
CDU/CSU would have passed a quota law in a majority party government scenario. One 
conservative Member of Parliament argued that the CDU/CSU would have adopted the 
policy on its own but probably one legislative period later and the CDU/CSU would have 
adopted the policy in a much more weakened form that would have limited the 
applicability of the quota to the least number of companies possible (personal 
interviews). 
To summarize, the case studies in the German context show that coalition 
constraints indeed matter. But rather than just mattering for legislative agenda setting, 
coalition constraints also determine the chances for successful policy adoption in each 
legislative period. Policies that have been agreed upon in the coalition agreement are 
almost guaranteed adoption once they have been introduced by the responsible minister. 
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However, the nature of coalition constraints is not sufficient to explain policy 
outcomes. Beyond coalition constraints, I also argue that the constellation of veto players 
and critical actors matters for the policy outcome. For a positive policy outcome, critical 
actors need to occupy veto player positions. The successful adoption of the corporate 
board quota shows that the passage of the bill was facilitated by critical actors who were 
also primary veto players; the same is true in the case of the father leave policy. Yet we 
do not know whether the type of veto player matters: is it important that critical actors 
occupy the primary veto player position, or could they also affect the outcome positively 
if they only control secondary veto player positions? Because primary veto players have 
the agenda setting power, it seems that the importance lies with primary veto players. 
After all, secondary veto players have no policy to consent to if the policy is never 
developed in the first place. Thus, it seems more important for critical actors to occupy 
primary veto player positions than secondary veto positions. At the same time, it matters 
who the secondary veto players are. If these are critical actors as well, we can expect 
smooth sailing for the feminist policy. However, the secondary veto player can also be 
supportive (i.e., open to the policy proposal but not a policy advocate in his or her own 
right), opposed, or neutral (i.e., not having a formed opinion on the policy matter yet). 
Angela Merkel was either a supportive or opposing veto player. In the case of the 2015 
corporate board quota, Angela Merkel was a supportive veto player facilitating the 
passage of the policy. In contrast, she was an opposing veto player in the 17th legislative 
period, ultimately preventing the passage of the bill.  
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The failed attempt in the 17th legislative period also demonstrates that it is almost 
impossible to lobby opposing secondary veto players to change their minds. This is 
particularly true for critical actors who remain external to the policy process, particularly 
extra-parliamentary critical actors. The Berliner Erklärung successfully built up public 
and political pressure in favor of the policy as well as coordinated the contact among 
critical actors across all political parties. Yet the critical actors were not able to sway the 
governing coalition to support the opposition’s bill. The parliamentary critical actors 
within the CDU/CSU fared only slightly better. While they were unable to sway Angela 
Merkel, let alone the coalition partner FPD, they were able through clever political 
maneuvering to ensure the adoption of the policy in the election manifesto of the 
CDU/CSU, an important prerequisite for it to become part of the legislative agenda in the 
following legislative period. The failed attempt has also shown that leveraging 
socioeconomic challenges or public opinion is not helpful for convincing veto players of 
the merits of a policy, particularly when the policy is not part of the coalition agreement.  
Another important aspect of the constellation between veto players and critical 
actors is the position of policy opponents. I assume that if opponents are in control of 
veto player positions, a successful policy outcome is not possible. This is borne out by 
the failed attempt. In the 17th legislative period, opponents occupied all veto player 
positions. Kristina Schröder occupied the primary veto player position. As a result, a 
policy draft as envisioned by the critical actors and more specifically Ursula von der 
Leyen, was never introduced as a government bill. This prompted critical actors to 
circumvent the primary veto player by initiating a bill through the Bundesrat. However, 
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this attempt also proved to be futile as each secondary veto player – Angela Merkel, the 
CDU/CSU, and the FDP – opposed policy adoption. However, the case also shows that 
critical actors have opportunities to try to circumvent veto players. In a scenario with a 
neutral or supportive veto player (instead of an opposing veto player), the out-
maneuvering of the primary veto player might have succeeded. 
In contrast, opponents did not occupy any veto player positions during the 18th 
legislative period. Thus, opponents had to find ways to influence veto players in their 
favor. While opponents were not able to stop the bill from becoming law due to the 
provisions in the coalition agreement, the opponents nevertheless succeeded in 
weakening the final draft of the bill and were able to stall the policy process. This was 
possible because many of the opponents occupied expert advisor positions and, as such, 
were consulted in the drafting phase of the policy process. Further, these opponents were 
also members of a powerful internal faction within the conservative parties rather than 
external to the policy process and thus could leverage the influence of internal party 
groups such as those representing business interests to modify the bill draft. 
6.5.  Conclusion 
Comparing both the failed and successful cases of corporate board quota shows 
that two elements help explain feminist policy outcomes: coalition constraints and the 
position of critical actors vis-à-vis veto players. Yet neither element is sufficient by itself 
to explain feminist policy outcomes under the conservative government in Germany. 
First, coalition constraints particularly matter in determining the inclusion of feminist 
policies on the policy agenda (legislative agenda setting). In instances where coalition 
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constraints are permissive, i.e., the coalition partner supportive of the policy has 
sufficient electoral strength to include the feminist policy in the coalition agreement, the 
adoption of the feminist policy is facilitated (as was the case in the 16th and 18th 
legislative period). It also seems that coalition constraints not only matter for legislative 
agenda setting but also for policy adoption in that the content of coalition agreements 
circumscribes the ability of veto players to consent to a policy proposal. 
However, permissive coalition constraints are only a necessary but insufficient 
step. Secondly, the constellation of critical actors, veto players, and opponents matter for 
feminist policy adoption. Feminist policy adoption is particularly likely in instances 
where critical actors occupy primary veto player positions which allows them to 
introduce a bill draft in the policy process. Once introduced, the policy preferences of 
secondary veto players matter. When secondary players are supportive, policy adoption is 
likely. However, a supportive veto player is not enough to ward off attempts by 
opponents to weaken the bill, especially if opposition comes from powerful internal party 
factions. If that is the case, a weakening of the final bill language is likely. Opponents 
will be able to stop a policy if they occupy veto player positions. In the case of 
opponents, however, it does not matter whether they are primary or secondary veto 
players because both positions suffice to stop a policy. Of course, if they control both 
veto player positions, the demise of the policy proposal is almost guaranteed. 
In cases where the feminist policy has entered the legislative agenda despite not 
being part of the coalition agreement (as occurred in the 17th legislative period), the 
constellation of critical actors, veto players, and opponents becomes crucial. Here, the 
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coalition partners each become secondary veto players and their policy preference will 
decide whether the feminist policy will be adopted. Coalition constraints still matter but 
in a slightly different manner: rather than determining whether the feminist policy will be 
put on the legislative agenda, i.e., included in the coalition agreement, coalition 
constraints are leveraged by each coalition partner to influence the likelihood of adoption. 
In the German context, veto players utilize coalition constraints – the absence of the 
feminist policy in the coalition agreement – to justify their policy position and to ensure 
that the coalition partner followed the existing coalition agreements. If the coalition 
agreement is in contradiction to the opposed feminist policy (as was the case in the 17th 
legislative period), it is unlikely that the feminist policy will win the support of the 
coalition government.  
The case studies in the German context have illustrated that both permissive 
coalition constraints and an advantageous constellation of veto players, critical actors, 
and opponents matter for successful feminist adoption. Because the case studies are 
limited to only one country and one government under one specific political leader, the 
ability to generalize these findings is limited. Thus, the next chapters will extend the 
arguments made previously to four others cases in the United Kingdom and Japan to 




Expanding the Argument 
In the previous chapters, I have shown that strong coalition constraints in 
combination with an advantageous constellation of veto players, critical actors, and 
opponents prompted two conservative governments in Germany to adopt feminist 
policies. However, because of the inherent limited ability to generalize findings from 
within case-studies, this chapter will consider four additional cases in two other 
countries: Japan and the United Kingdom. Similar to Germany, the conservative 
governments in Japan considered and adopted both a father leave policy (under Prime 
Minister Taro in 2009) and a corporate board quota (under Prime Minister Abe in 2015). 
In contrast to Germany, the British government under the leadership of Prime Minister 
Cameron adopted neither a father quota nor a corporate board quota despite the push by 
several political actors and civil society organizations to consider quota policies during 
the legislative period of 2010-2015. Thus, looking at these countries more closely will 
allow me to better understand the extent to which my framework applies beyond the 
cases in Germany.  
Studying Japan allows me to test these causal mechanisms under a new set of 
circumstances. Contrary to Germany and the United Kingdom, both feminist policies 
were advocated for by the conservative party in power, and each policy was adopted 
under a different prime minister. Thus, I can test whether both conditions operate across 
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different governments and whether original support by the conservative party makes for 
smooth policy adoption. In the United Kingdom, the father leave policy was not included 
in the shared parental leave law while the government opted for a voluntary approach to 
women’s underrepresentation on corporate boards. It is worthwhile to study failed cases 
because this study allows me to ensure that the explanatory variables identified in 
successful cases indeed are absent in negative instances. Expanding the argument to four 
additional cases in the United Kingdom and Japan is also valuable because these 
countries not only share a consideration of these two policies under conservative 
governments, but they are also characterized by fairly similar socioeconomic conditions, 
political characteristics, and cultural attitudes (as discussed in chapter 3). This variance in 
macro patterns however is desirable because it allows me to judge the importance of 
these conditions on policy outcomes. While I agree with the argument that 
socioeconomic macro-patterns never cause a public policy to be adopted (see Seeleib 
Kaiser and Toivonen 2011), I nevertheless assume that these macro variables have an 
impact on the ability of critical actors to put the policies on the legislative agenda and 
influence the strengths of the final policies that are adopted.  
As in the German context, both the Liberal Democratic Party in Japan and the 
Conservative Party in the United Kingdom are not feminized. This allows me to hold the 
level of feminization constant. In regards to the Liberal Democratic Party, while Prime 
Minister Abe has embraced a gender equality rhetoric and has made womenomics a key 
part of his economic recovery program, the commitment to gender equality is less than 
skin deep. Policy reforms such as better child care or the ability to hire immigrant 
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workers as nannies are motivated by demands for female labor and to stabilize the 
economic and labor market (Lambert 2008). Electoral considerations such as winning 
over the women’s vote or addressing existing gender inequalities in Japanese society are 
not part of the policy considerations (Dalton 2015). This can explain why the 
government’s policies (such as the law addressing women’s underrepresentation on 
corporate boards) are sub-optimal and weak in their effectiveness. Further, the issue of 
womenomics played little to no part in the 2014 election campaign, and the LDP 
nominated a mere 169 female candidates out of a total of 1,093 candidates ((McCurry 
2014). Similarly, in the 2013 election to the upper house, the LDP only nominated nine 
women out of a total of 79 candidates (Reynolds and Hirokawa 2013). Thus, feminization 
has neither occurred in terms of the descriptive nor the substantive representation of 
women. 
One reason for the lack of feminization is that the LDP has never experienced a 
significant challenge from the Left (Wiliarty and Gaunder 2014). The center-left 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) is the LDP’s main rival. Contrary to the Labour Party in 
the United Kingdom or the Social Democratic Party in Germany, however, the DPJ’s 
commitment to gender equality in terms of the numerical representation of women is 
dismal. In the last election, women made up only 15 per cent of candidates compared to 
12 per cent for the LDP (Gaunder 2016). More importantly, there has never been a real 
threat that the women’s vote would make a difference in the electoral fortunes of the LDP 
(Wiliarty and Gaunder 2014). In contrast to Germany and the United Kingdom, the DPJ 
has won an election only once, in 2009. Thus, the key mechanism that prompts the 
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feminization of conservative parties – electoral competition for the votes of women – is 
missing in the Japanese context. 
I also argue that, similar to the conservative parties in Germany and Japan, the 
Conservative Party in the United Kingdom has not been feminized. As in Germany, the 
gender gap traditionally favored the Conservative Party; however, in 1997 and 2001 the 
gender gap reversed and contributed to the success of the Labour Party (Annesley and 
Gains 2014). Yet contrary to the Christian Democratic Union and the Liberal Democratic 
Party, David Cameron considered the feminization of the Conservative Party an 
important part of his modernization strategy when he was elected party leader in 2005 
(Bryson and Heppel 2010). Cameron vowed to elect more women by utilizing an A List 
of priority candidates (50 per cent of whom were women) from which local parties 
should select their short list candidates (Campbell, Childs, and Lovenduski 2006). He 
also promised flexible working hours and shared parental leave policies. Yet, Cameron’s 
feminization strategies proved to be inconsistent and cursory: while Cameron’s rhetoric 
proclaimed support of women-friendly and socially progressive policies, he was hesitant 
to adopt any specific policy recommendations (Bochel 2011). Further, when the 
Conservative Party returned to power in 2010, Cameron largely dismantled the gender 
equality machinery in the government structure, the proposed spending cuts 
disproportionally affected women, and the Conservative Party supported anonymity for 
rapists and special tax benefits for marriage (Bryson 2012; Annesley and Gains 2014). 
Thus, like its conservative counterparts in Germany and Japan, the Conservative Party in 
the United Kingdom cannot be considered a feminized political party. 
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To recap, I have argued that feminist policy adoption under conservative 
governments occurs in two stages. First, the policy needs to be put on the legislative 
agenda by the coalition government. Second, the policy needs to be adopted, i.e., the 
government bill needs to successfully pass into law. I have also argued that for each step, 
two different sets of conditions are necessary. For legislative agenda setting, coalition 
constraints are crucial – successful legislative agenda setting is likely only if coalition 
constraints are permissive and only if at least one coalition partner supports the policy. 
For policy adoption, the constellation of veto players, opponents, and critical actors needs 
to be such that critical actors control veto player positions while opponents remain 
outside the policy making process. I have shown that these condition hold true in the 
German cases. In this chapter, I will expand the argument to the British and Japanese 
context to see whether they hold explanatory value beyond the German context. 
This chapter is split into three sections. First, I will extend the argument to the 
United Kingdom and its consideration of both father leave and corporate board quota 
policies. Second, I will turn to the adoption of both feminist policies to test whether my 
argument holds in the Japanese context. In the third section, I will assess the ability of the 
explanatory framework to apply to cases beyond the German context. 
7.1.  Feminist Policy Adoption under the British Cameron government 
Legislative agenda setting can occur in two instances: during coalition 
negotiations and during the legislative period. In both instances, I have shown in previous 
chapters that coalition constraints influence whether a policy will be put on the legislative 
agenda – this is particularly true if one coalition partner is opposed to the policy. During 
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coalition negotiations, successful legislative agenda setting is most likely when the 
supportive coalition partner can leverage the necessity of the coalition and its electoral 
strength to convince the other coalition partner to include the policy in the coalition 
agreement. Further, when the policy enters the legislative agenda after the conclusion of 
the coalition negotiations, the coalition agreement circumscribes greatly whether 
successful legislative agenda setting is possible. In the case of Great Britain, legislative 
agenda setting for corporate board quotas occurred during coalition negotiations while 
the father leave policy entered the legislative agenda after coalition negotiations had 
concluded. Despite the different timing for both policies, they failed to be included in the 
final bill language (father leave policy was excluded from the shared parental leave law) 
or were rejected by the government in favor of a voluntary approach (corporate board 
quota). 
7.1.1.  Coalition Constraints in the British Context 
The 2010 election in the United Kingdom resulted in a hung parliament for the 
first time since 1974 where no party won enough seats to form a single majority 
government (BBC 2010). The Conservative Party under the leadership of Prime Minister 
Cameron emerged as the strongest party, winning 306 seats of 650, 18 seats short of a 
parliamentary majority (House of Commons Library 2011). In contrast to Germany, 
coalition governments in the United Kingdom are very rare – the last coalition 
government occurred in 1931 and lasted until 1940. As a result, no official rules exist on 
how coalition negotiations need to proceed and how government coalitions are formed. 
The British Constitutions contains only one simple guideline with regard to coalition 
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governance: the constitution grants the sitting prime minister the first attempt in forming 
a government (‘A Hung Parliament: Key Issues for the 2010 Parliament’ 2010). Further, 
the civil service, sensing a possible hung parliament, in 2009 prepared guidelines for 
coalition formation stating that the current prime minister will stay in office until the 
coalition has been formed (Yong 2012). 
However, sitting Prime Minister Gordon Brown’s Labour Party won 48 fewer 
seats than the Conservative Party. Further complicating things was the fact that Labour 
was not able to form a majority government even in coalition with the Liberal 
Democratic Party (LibDems) – the third biggest party in the House of Commons having 
won 57 seats. Nicholas Clegg, the leader of the Liberal Democratic Party, called for 
David Cameron to form a government because the Conservative Party, though short of a 
majority, emerged as the victorious party from the 2010 election (BBC 2010). The 
Liberal Democratic Party negotiated with both the Conservative Party and the Labour 
Party immediately following the election. In the end, the Conservative Party and the 
Liberal Democratic Party agreed to form a coalition government (Curtis 2010; BBC 
2010). 
During the coalition negotiations, David Cameron made it clear that he expected 
the majority of the Conservative election manifesto to be accepted (Curtis 2010). This 
was a reasonable expectation because the Conservative Party was the dominant party in 
the coalition government having won 250 more seats than the Liberal Democratic Party. 
The coalition agreement was negotiated between Danny Alexander (Liberal Democrats) 
and Oliver Letwin (Conservative Party) who both drafted the election manifesto for their 
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respective parties (Yong 2012). They were supported by a variety of civil servants and 
key staff members of each party. Contrary to Germany, the coalition negotiations were 
less institutionalized and fewer individuals were involved. 
The final cabinet composition as well as the coalition agreement reflected the 
predominance of the Conservative Party in the coalition government. In terms of cabinet 
posts, the Liberal Democratic Party received five out of 24 cabinet positions (Allen et al 
2010). Nicholas Clegg, the leader of the Liberal Democratic Party, became Deputy Prime 
Minister. In addition, members of the junior coalition partner were appointed to Chief 
Secretary to the Treasury (David Laws), Secretary of State for Scotland (Danny 
Alexander), Secretary of State for Business (Vince Cable), Secretary of State for Energy 
and Climate Change (Chris Huhne). In terms of the policy agenda, the Liberal 
Democratic Party was able to push through many of their election pledges (Yong 2012). 
In terms of policy areas, the Conservative Party dominated the issues of economic 
policies and national security while the Liberal Democratic Party was able to put their 
mark on the issues of employment, welfare, education, pension, and social care (Quinn, 
Bara, and Bartle 2011). The final coalition agreement is only 36 pages long and contains 
31 sections with 400 policy pledges in total (Yong 2012, 37). The coalition agreement 
included neither a commitment to the father quota proposal nor a corporate board quota 
proposal. However, it did address the issue of corporate board diversity stating: “We will 
look to promote gender equality on the boards of listed companies.” (‘The Coalition: Our 
Programme for Government’ 2010, 18) 
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The statement remains vague and only commits the coalition partners to a 
consideration of the topic rather than the introduction of a policy that would address the 
issue. It was Vince Cable, then Secretary of State for Business, Innovation, and Skills, 
who put the underrepresentation of women on corporate boards on the government 
agenda by initiating a government inquiry spearheaded by Lord Davies to deliberate 
whether a voluntary approach or a legal board quota approach was most suitable to 
address the lack of women on corporate boards. The resulting first Lord Davies report 
published in 2011 concluded that a voluntary approach would be preferable. In contrast, 
the issue of father leave policy was not part of the coalition agreement. However, 
Nicholas Clegg, the deputy prime minister and party leader of the Liberal Democratic 
Party, proposed the inclusion of the policy when a shared parental leave law was debated. 
After an initial public consultation on the merits of a father leave policy, the policy 
proposal was rejected by government and was not included in the proposed shared 
parental leave law adopted in 2013. 
Accordingly, the adoption of these policies was not determined during coalition 
negotiations but rather through a formal process established among the coalition parties 
to determine the content of the government agenda. The British case is particularly 
important to understand whether coalition constraints can explain the failure of policy 
adoption or whether other explanations, such as macro-patterns, might contribute to 
failed policy adoption. 
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7.1.2.  Father Leave Policy in the United Kingdom 
In 2012, the coalition government started its Modern Workplace Consultation 
under the Department for Business, Innovation, and Skills. The consultation lasted twelve 
weeks and included meetings with key stakeholders – for example, businesses and 
women’s organizations – to understand the best way to move forward. Following the 
coalition agreement, the consultation was the first step to overhaul the parental leave 
system in the United Kingdom and to introduce a shared parental leave law. According 
the coalition agreement, 
[the coalition government] will encourage shared parenting from the 
earliest stages of pregnancy – including the promotion of a system of 
flexible parental leave (The Coalition: Our Programme for Government 
2010, 20)  
Nicholas Clegg introduced the idea of a father leave policy into the shared 
parental leave law when he proposed that one month of the shared parental leave should 
be reserved for fathers on a use it or lose it basis. With his proposal, Clegg wanted the 
United Kingdom to follow the example of Scandinavia where fathers play an 
instrumental part in their children’s upbringing (Peev 2013). In a speech, he called the 
two weeks of paternity leave currently available to British fathers outdated and in need of 
reform: 
These rules patronize women and marginalise men. They’re based on a 
view of life in which mothers stay at home and fathers are the only 
breadwinners. That’s an Edwardian system that has no place in 21st 
Century Britain (Clegg 2011) 
He continued to draw attention to the benefits of having fathers play a greater part 
in their children’s lives: 
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Children suffer, too often missing out on time with their fathers. Time that 
is desperately important to their development. We know that where fathers 
are involved in their children’s lives they develop better friendships, they 
learn to empathise, they have higher self esteem, and they achieve better at 
school. And men suffer too. More and more fathers want to play a hands-
on role with their young children. But too many feel that they can’t. That 
culture must change. Government won’t be able to change it alone. But we 
can do our bit by modernising the opportunities for parents who work 
(Clegg 2011) 
While his proposal was not based on the coalition agreement, the Modern 
Workplace Consultation included the idea of a father quota in its extensive public 
consultation for the new Children and Families Bill which included the new parental 
leave law. In general, the consultation agreed with Clegg’s arguments that children 
benefit from an early involvement of fathers in their upbringing. Further, 57 per cent of 
respondents agreed that a specific part of parental leave should be reserved for fathers 
(‘Modern Workplaces – Government Responses to Flexible Parental Leave’ 2012, 20). 
Nevertheless, the government decided to not include a father quota in the new shared 
parental leave law citing two main reasons: opposition to adopting any red tape measures 
for businesses, and financial costs associated with the father leave policy. 
The consultation paper argues that introducing a father leave policy would 
complicate the system which needs to be ‘as simple as possible to balance the needs of 
the economy’ (‘Shared Parental Leave and Pay Administration Consultation – Impact 
Assessment’ 2013, 14). This is echoed by several businesses and business organizations. 
For example, the Trade Union Congress opposed the proposal stating ‘New parents 
should be able to decide for themselves who looks after their baby in the first year, rather 
than having the decision dictated by government regulation’ (‘Nick Clegg outlines plans 
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for new parental leave rules’ 2011). Likewise, the British Chambers of Commerce saw 
the proposal as a burden to business which could damper business’ willingness to hire 
new people. More importantly, the consultation paper concluded ‘we have decided not to 
extend paternity leave and pay until the economy has properly recovered and 
Government finances can afford the extension’ (‘Modern Workplaces – Government 
Responses to Flexible Parental Leave’ 2012, 20). Extending the leave to include a father 
quota would have cost between 33.8 million pounds for two additional weeks to 60 
million pounds for addition four weeks (‘Shared Parental Leave and Pay Administration 
Consultation – Impact Assessment’ 2013, 14). The coalition government operated under 
strict guidelines – set forth in the coalition agreement – not only to maintain current 
levels of government spending but also to tackle the deficit. During coalition 
negotiations, the Conservative Party’s push to curtail public spending and reduce the 
deficit was successful and is highlighted throughout the coalition agreement. To 
emphasize the centrality of deficit reduction to the coalition government, the last page of 
the document reads: 
“The deficit reduction programme takes precedence over any of the other 
measures in this agreement” (The Coalition. Our programme for 
government 2010, 35) 
As a former government member put it: the coalition agreement was like the 
bible, and because shared parental leave law was included in the coalition agreement, it 
was tackled. This, however, was not the case for the father quota. Instead, the father 
quota contradicted two central elements in the coalition agreement: no additional red tape 
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for British businesses and the imperative to reduce the deficit and curtail spending. As a 
result, the Secretary for Business Regulations was strongly opposed to the proposal 
(personal interview) while the strong influence of the purse was noticeable in the top 
decision-making body of the coalition government, the “Quad.” The Quad consisted of 
the prime minister, the deputy prime minister, the chief secretary of the treasury, and the 
chancellor and was where all major policy decisions were made (personal interviews). 
Here, the majority of decisions were made based on spending considerations with deficit 
reduction the founding principle of the government with George Osborne (Chancellor of 
Exchequer) and Danny Alexander (Chief Secretary to the Treasury) having the greatest 
influence in imposing austerity and fiscal restraints on all policy decisions (Allen 2012). 
Thus, the government maintained that while the benefits of a father quota – such as 
greater involvement of fathers and equalizing the care burden among parents – were 
desirable goals, the basic principles of deficit reduction and limiting business regulations, 
agreed upon in the coalition agreement, took precedence over creating a more equitable 
care relationship and thus led to the failure of the proposed father quota. 
7.1.3.  Corporate Board Quota in the United Kingdom 
In the United Kingdom, a public debate around corporate board diversity emerged 
around 2010 prompted by several domestic and international developments. Two years 
earlier, Norway became the first country to adopt a corporate board quota while several 
European countries debated whether to follow Norway’s footstep. Then in 2010, a new 
report on women’s progress on UK boards showed that progress in the United Kingdom 
had been rather slow, with the percentage of women on boards raising merely from seven 
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to twelve per cent in the past decade (Sealy 2013, 23). The report prompted a sense of 
frustration both in the media and on part of the government. At the same time, the 
European Union was considering introducing a European-wide corporate board quota, 
also forcing the issue on the political agenda. While the coalition agreement contained a 
promise to investigate how to increase the number of women on boards, it was mostly 
due to the personal efforts by newly appointed Business Secretary Vince Cable that the 
issue of board diversity became a central government concern (personal interviews). 
Even in opposition, Cable had been committed to the issue of diversity, arguing 
that tapping into the female talent pool would not only be good for business but would 
also be the right thing to do; he set his own example, as several of his most trusted 
advisors were women (personal interview). He might also have been more open to the 
issue because, as a long-term member of parliament for the Liberal Democratic Party, he 
belonged to the social democratic wing of the party, which is open and supportive of 
government regulations and state interference into the market (personal interviews). 
Cable was able to win over the support of David Cameron for the issue of board diversity 
because Cameron saw the topic as an opportunity to present the Conservative Party in a 
more modern and progressive light (personal interviews). Further, corporate board 
diversity was easily presented as a business issue that would help address an ailing 
economy and be good for business, playing right into the hands of a pro-business 
government. 
In cooperation with Theresa May, the conservative government minister for 
equality, Cable appointed Lord Davies to head a steering commission tasked with 
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determining the best way to remedy the lack of gender diversity on British corporate 
boards (personal interviews). After a lengthy public consultation process, Lord Davies 
published his first report and recommendations on how to increase the number of women 
on corporate boards in Great Britain. Most importantly, he advised against the use of 
legal corporate board quotas. Instead, Lord Davies recommended that FTSE 350 
companies should achieve 25 per cent of women on their boards by 2015 with quoted 
companies being required to disclose the percentage of women on their boards annually. 
In addition, the steering committee would meet every six months to monitor progress and 
publish an annual progress report to assess whether companies are on track to reach the 
25 per cent goal by 2015. To signal that the issue was taken seriously, both Lord Davies 
and Vince Cable, as well as David Cameron, made it clear that corporate board quotas are 
not off the table unless business shows significant progress. 
The key question becomes whether coalition constraints played any role in 
preventing the policy adoption of a legal corporate board quota. I argue that coalition 
constraints were again important for the policy outcome; a strong lobby for a business-led 
approach to corporate board diversity tapped into the coalition’s commitment to avoid 
additional regulations for business and helped to forestall the adoption of a corporate 
board quota. 
One of the major concerns was that introducing a legal corporate board quota 
would increase red tape for businesses in an environment where the government and 
business community already saw themselves as burdened by too much bureaucracy 
(personal interview). This view was strengthened by the fact that the coalition 
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government was founded on the basic principle that government should not increase 
regulations on businesses and that government should remove any unnecessary red tape 
for business (personal interviews). Thus, introducing a legal quota would also have 
violated the foundations of the coalition agreement. Overall, the support for corporate 
board quotas was minimal: the Fawcett Society, Women on Boards UK, and the Trade 
Union Congress were the only organizations that preferred legal quotas over a voluntary 
approach. The great majority of business stakeholders and civil organizations – such as 
the 30 Percent Club or An Inspirational Journey – strongly lobbied for a voluntary 
approach. A study initiated by the Department of Business, Innovation, and Skills found 
that 80 per cent of respondents opposed a corporate board quota, a view supported by 
principal stakeholders, such as shareholders, company owners, chairmen, or headhunters 
who were consulted during Lord Davies’ initial report (personal interview). When the 
issue was discussed in the Quad, Cameron and Clegg were clearly opposed to legal 
quotas as were most female members of the cabinet (personal interviews). As a result, 
Lord Davies opted for a business-led approach. 
The business-led approach to corporate board diversity framed the lack of women 
on corporate boards as a business issue: as one government member put it, increasing the 
number of women on boards was about rejuvenating the British economy and not about 
achieving gender equality. As Maria Miller, Minister for Women and Equalities put it: 
“This is not about political correctness, it’s about good business sense. 
Businesses must act now to harness women’s full potential and to help 
maximise Britain’s economic growth.” (Watts 2013) 
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Similarly, Vince Cable stated: 
This is not about equality, this is about good governance and good 
business. The international evidence supports this – diverse boards are 
better boards benefiting from fresh perspectives, opinions and new ideas 
which ultimately serve the company's long-term interests’ (BBC UK 
Politics 2013). 
The sentiment that corporate board diversity is not about gender equality was 
echoed throughout interviews with government officials and members of the business 
community. Some even considered a corporate board quota as a discriminatory measure 
and in violation of the Equality Act which holds that non-discrimination is at the heart of 
employment relationships (personal interviews). Likewise, a member of a liberal think 
tank stressed that business is not supposed to provide equal representation but services to 
consumers and value to shareholders. Accordingly, the issue of fair or balanced 
representation on corporate boards is misplaced from an equality perspective. The main 
reason that all stakeholders interviewed stated a preference for a voluntary approach is 
that they saw the need for profound and sustained changes in business practices. Quotas 
in the minds of these stakeholders were a superficial fix that would not lead to profound 
changes in recruitment and employment practices necessary for improving innovation, 
skill management, and revenue streams. The Investment Management Association argued 
in its written evidence submitted to the House of Lords European Union Sub-Committee 
that: 
Board appointments should be on merit and not to fill quotas. The lack of 
women on boards is a symptom of their underrepresentation at senior 
levels from where board members are recruited.  Quotas would not 




Further, several stakeholders emphasized that there is a tradition in the United 
Kingdom where business is not directly regulated but rather mild pressure is applied to 
initiate change. This mild pressure typically takes the form of public shaming and close 
government mentoring (personal interviews). This was the case with corporate board 
diversity where Lord Davies’ reports published the number of women on boards for each 
company, increasing public pressure since companies did not want to appear on the list of 
companies with no women on boards. Further, Cameron personally called chairmen of 
FTSE 500 boards that did not include any women pressuring them to make the necessary 
changes (personal interview). Similarly, shareholders started to organize and exert 
pressure on boards to nominate more women (personal interviews). Here, a regular 
monitoring report with strong backing from the government achieved great moral 
pressure to address women’s underrepresentation on boards without establishing 
additional government regulations (personal interview). 
To sum up, two factors seemed to have led to a failed policy adoption in terms of 
corporate board quotas: coalition principles that emphasize limited government 
regulation which led to the adoption of business-led approaches combined with mild 
government pressure. The cases of father leave policy and corporate board quotas thus 
show that coalition constraints, particularly the content of coalition agreements, play an 
important role in influencing the adoption of feminist policies even after the conclusion 
of coalition negotiations. 
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7.2.  Extending the Argument to the Japanese Case 
Contrary to the British cases, both feminist policies were successfully adopted by 
conservative governments in Japan. This section will focus on both the role of coalition 
constraints in the Japanese context, which I argue to be minimal, as well as the role of 
veto players in the policy making process who potentially were able to use their 
institutional resources to water down the final bill language. An important caveat is in 
order for the case studies in the Japanese context as the analysis relies primarily on 
secondary documents in English (such as newspaper articles) and selected primary 
documents (such as executive policy white papers) available in English. As a result, all 
findings are preliminary and require further study. This section will proceed as follows: I 
will first describe the policy process in Japan before identifying the location of veto 
players in the process. I will then give a background on each policy and tentatively assess 
the validity of my explanatory framework in the Japanese context. 
7.2.1.  Coalition Constraints in the Japanese Context 
Coalition governments are a fairly new concept in Japanese politics because the 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) dominated the political landscape until 1989 (Boling 
2015). When the LDP lost its majority in the upper house (House of Councilors) for the 
first time, coalition building in Japan became essential. The LDP established a coalition 
government to ensure that the party controlled both houses in the Japanese Diet in order 
to facilitate the passage of government bills through both houses (Stockwin 2011). In 
1993, the LDP lost the election to the lower house (House of Representatives) for the first 
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time in its history, ending the one party dominance of the LDP (Hideo 2000). Thus, 1993 
is considered a major break in Japanese post-war politics. 
In 2003, the LDP entered into a strategic partnership with the New Komeito party 
to allow both parties to win more votes (Stockwin 2011). Under this strategic partnership, 
the LDP supports candidates of New Komeito in electoral districts with proportional list 
systems while New Komeito encourages its supporters to vote for LDP candidates in 
single member districts (Gaunder 2011). Formally, initial policy agreements are made 
between the LDP and New Komeito, and it is only after these agreements have been 
made that the LDP drafts policies (Gaunder 2011). New Komeito has some influence on 
policy outcomes with its greatest influence on foreign and security policy. New 
Komeito’s strong commitment to pacifist values typically can rein in the hawkish 
tendencies of the LDP (Stockwin 2011). The changes in the parental leave law, which 
included the father leave policy, were drafted with the support of the LDP. Likewise, the 
LDP, through Prime Minister Abe, called for a corporate board quota of 30 per cent. It is 
not clear where the New Komeito party stands in relation to these polices. The New 
Komeito party is a religious party and as such is highly contested in Japanese politics as 
many consider the party to violate the constitutional separation of religion and politics 
(Mizuho 2014). The party was founded by the lay Buddhist organization Soka Gakkai in 
1964 and emphasizes social welfare and pacifism. Its party platform stresses ‘building a 
culturally advanced society that, as a nation, offers comprehensive social services and is 
genuinely responsive to the real-world needs of ordinary people’ (‘Platform’ 1998). 
Based on a preliminary analysis, New Komeito shares concerns about work-life balance 
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and low fertility rates, but an analysis of the English-version party website did not reveal 
an explicit statement on the revision of Japan’s “Revised Childcare and Family Care 
Leave Law,” the father leave policy specifically, or on the adoption of the corporate 
board quota that would allow me to discern its position on the policy matter. Further 
analysis is needed to determine the policy stance of the party. 
However, the policy stance may very well not matter if New Komeito is unable to 
influence policy decisions within the LDP. As the electoral results show, the LDP 
commanded the majority of seats in the House of Representatives and did not need to rely 
on coalition support to pass policies. Thus, the nature of the coalition was not one of 
electoral necessity, limiting the ability of New Komeito to leverage coalition constraints 
against the LDP. In 2007, the LDP won 296 seats resulting in a single party majority for 
the first time since 1990 (‘IPU PARLINE Database: JAPAN (Shugiin), Elections in 
2005’). In contrast, New Komeito won 31 seats. Further, the coalition of LDP and New 
Komeito was insufficient to form a majority in the upper house thus reducing the 
influence of New Komeito even further. In 2015, the LDP again commanded a single 
party majority in the House of Representatives (‘IPU PARLINE Database: JAPAN 
(Shugiin), Last Elections’ 2015) making it unnecessary for the LDP to rely on New 
Komeito to pass any bills in the House of Representatives. In contrast, the LDP held the 
majority of seats in the House of Councillors but was nine seats short of commanding a 
single-party majority (‘IPU PARLINE Database: JAPAN (Sangiin), Last Elections’ 
2015). Thus, to secure passage of any bill in the upper house, the coalition of LDP and 
New Komeito suddenly became one of electoral necessity. 
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To conclude, this analysis of coalition constraints shows that the influence of the 
New Komeito Party on the LDP is relatively weak due to two main factors: the coalition 
is not one of electoral necessity in the lower house, which is the most important chamber 
of the Japanese Diet, and the New Komeito party controls many fewer seats in parliament 
compared to the LDP. Regardless of the policy stance of New Komeito then, in 2009 
coalition constraints were permissive for the LDP and allowed the party to pursue the 
adoption of the Revised Childcare and Family Care Leave Law which established the 
father quota. I assume that coalition constraints were similarly permissive in the case of 
corporate board quotas in 2015. 
7.2.2. The Japanese Policy Process 
The policy process in Japan is divided into a drafting phase and a legislative phase 
(Cabinet Legislation Bureau 2016). During the drafting phase, a bill is drafted in the 
responsible Ministry – the Department of Labour for both the father leave policy and the 
corporate board quota. During this phase, the Minister of Labour consults with other 
ministries and can opt to convene advisory councils and public hearings to solicit 
feedback on the content of the bill. If the minister convenes an advisory council, the 
council typically consists of industry representatives, academics, policy experts and 
sometimes the media, the public, or unions (Noble 2011). After integrating the feedback 
into the draft, the bill is then submitted to the Legislative Cabinet Bureau for legal and 
technical examination. Once complete, the draft is scheduled for a cabinet meeting where 
it needs to be approved unanimously to move forward into the legislative process. 
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The legislative process is the same for both chambers in the Japanese Diet. Once 
the cabinet submits the bill to the House of their choice (either the House of 
Representatives or the House of Councilors), the bill is sent to the legislative committee 
where committee members question the responsible minister about the bill. In contrast to 
Germany or the United Kingdom, the committee hearings do not call on outside experts 
to testify on the merits of the bill. Once the committee approves the bill, it is sent to the 
House for parliamentary debate and a vote. If approved by the House, the bill is then sent 
to the other House where the same process is repeated. Once the second house has 
approved the bill by a majority vote, the bill is sent to the emperor for signature. 
Figure 18: Formal Policy Process Japan 
 
Invisible in this formal process is the informal power of bureaucrats, business, and 
the Liberal Democratic Party during the drafting phase. The LDP specifically leverages 
its power through the LDP Policy Research Council (Stockwin 2013). According to Art. 
 
246 
42 of the LDP Constitution, the Policy Research Council was established to ‘study, 
research, and plan party policies,’ and its consent is necessary before any policy can be 
adopted as official party policy. Further, Art. 43 specifies that the Council is composed of 
Diet members and other individuals with specific expertise, and Art. 47 lists thirteen 
policy divisions in charge of examining, exploring, and drafting policies in their 
respective issue areas. For both father leave and corporate board policies, the responsible 
division is the Health, Labour, and Welfare division. When the LDP is in government, 
policy development and policy initiative largely occurs outside of the government and 
outside of the purview of the prime minister. 
Within the Policy Research Council, zoku giin (tribe politicians) play an important 
part in the policy making process, particularly in the drafting phase. These are members 
of the ruling party who have a specific policy expertise and who maintain close ties with 
bureaucrats and special interest groups to successfully pass legislation in their respective 
areas (Gaunder 2011). These zoku giin politicians typically belong to the different policy 
divisions of the Policy Research Council and are the driving force behind policy 
proposals (Klein 2011). They use their special policy expertise and strong links to special 
interest groups in the business world as well as personal contacts in the respective 
ministry to develop and push policies through the legislative process. Business 
organizations particularly have developed close ties with the bureaucracy and tribe 
politicians in the LDP allowing these organizations to influence the policy making 
processes to ensure favorable policies for themselves. This contrasts starkly with the role 
of civil society organizations which are typically local in their nature, small, 
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underfunded, and as a result, have little opportunity to influence the policy making 
process or lobby the national government (Kawato, Pekkanen and Yamamoto 2011). 
Contrary to other countries – particularly the United Kingdom and Germany –
 where bureaucrats are only tasked with implementing policies, Japanese bureaucrats 
actually influence the adoption of policies (Stockwin 2013). More specifically, the 
bureaucracy provides the information and expertise necessary to draft the bills (Gaunder 
2011) and top bureaucrats typically coordinate amongst themselves the exact content of a 
bill. They usually reach an agreement on the bill’s content before the bill is submitted to 
the cabinet rendering cabinet approval a mere formality (Noble 2011). The Ministers, 
while formally in charge of the ministry and the bureaucrats – have little policy influence 
themselves. Because the prime minister in the LDP relies on factional support within the 
party, he uses cabinet posts to buy the support of each faction to ensure that he has the 
continued backing of the party. Thus, ministerial posts are distributed among internal 
party factions according to their strengths and cabinets are frequently reshuffled to reflect 
new internal power realities in the LDP. Typically, ministers do not occupy the position 
for longer than a year (Noble 2011). This reality prevents ministers from acquiring 
expertise or influence in their area (Shinoda 2011). As a result, their primary function is 
to represent the interest of the bureaucrats in their ministry and to rely on civil servants 
within their ministers to draft policies. 
This also means that the power of the prime minister rests precariously on ever 
shifting internal party support, which explains the relative institutional weakness of the 
prime ministerial office in Japan (Masuyama and Nyblade 2014). Another reason for the 
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weak institutional position of Japanese prime ministers is the expectations by the LDP 
that the primary responsibility of the prime minister is to win elections, not to lead the 
party (Reed 2011). As a result, the prime minister cannot pursue a specific platform once 
elected because policy proposals are often challenged from within the party. 
Nevertheless, the influence of the prime minister on policy processes was strengthened 
when the Cabinet Office was established in 2001, which allocates greater resources to the 
prime minister to draft his or her own bills (Stockwin 2013). It remains to be seen if the 
Cabinet Office will increase the influence of the prime minister over policies. 
Together, zoku giin politicians, top bureaucrats, and business groups decide 
whether policies are introduced and what form the policy will take. This is often referred 
to as the iron triangle in Japanese politics where top business leaders in cooperation with 
bureaucrats and politicians informally decide on policies, which are then validated by the 
democratic process (Shiozaki 2002). Thus, when locating veto players in the Japanese 
policy process, it is important to consider both informal actors in the policy process such 
as business organizations, bureaucrats, and zoku giin as well as formal actors such as 
cabinet ministers and the prime minister. The next section will determine the location of 
veto players for each policy. 
7.2.3.  The Location of Veto Players in the Japanese Policy Process 
I argue that in the Japanese context, the critical phase in the policy making 
process is the drafting phase where the majority of the analysis needs to take place. It is 
here where veto players, critical actors, and opponents square off and determine the 
content of the bill. Because most of the veto players are located in the informal policy 
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process during the drafting phase and because they do not occupy prominent roles in the 
formal policy making process, I will need to conduct interviews to identify the specific 
veto players in each case. While I am unable to identify these individuals without such 
interviews, I am nevertheless able to specify their location in the overall system which 
are located in these institutions: 
1. Policy Research Council: zoku giin politicians, business organizations 
2. Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare: individual bureaucrats 
Formal veto players are potentially located in: 
1. Executive: Prime Minister and individual cabinet minister; emperor 
2. Legislature: House of Representatives, House of Councilors 
Due to the preliminary nature of this analysis, I can only speak with confidence to 
the formal veto players. Further analysis is required to identify the individual identities of 
informal veto players. Turning to the formal veto players, I argue that the prime minister 
cannot be considered a veto player due to the position’s institutional weakness discussed 
above and the short tenures of Japanese prime ministers. Since 1945, Japan has had 34 
prime ministers (‘Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet’ 2015’) compared to eight in 
Germany (‘Bundeskanzler Seit 1949’ 2015) and 14 in the United Kingdom (‘Past Prime 
Ministers’ 2015). The same is true for individual cabinet ministers. Each member in the 
cabinet has the potential to be a veto player because the cabinet needs to approve each 
policy proposal with a unanimous vote. In reality, however, the informal policy process 
and the institutional weakness of cabinet members ensures that cabinet approval is only a 
formality as bureaucrats in the different ministries have already reached a compromise 
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before the bill lands on the cabinet agenda. The signature of the Emperor, as with the 
Queen in the United Kingdom and the President in Germany, is a mere formality. Thus, 
neither the prime minister, nor the cabinet ministers, nor the emperor are veto players. 
When it comes to the Japanese Diet, the House of Representatives is not a veto 
player because in both instances (father leave policy in 2009 and corporate board quotas 
in 2015), the LDP controlled the House of Representatives. Because the LDP imposes 
party discipline in voting on its members (Noble 2011), it is unlikely that that legislative 
process resulted in significant amendments to the final bill. In contrast, the House of 
Councilors is a potential veto player when a twisted parliament exists, i.e., when the two 
chambers of the Japanese Diet are governed by two different parties. This was the case in 
2009 when the LDP lost the majority in the House of Councilors (‘IPU PARLINE 
Database: JAPAN (Sangiin) ELECTIONS IN 2007’ 2015) and the Democratic Party of 
Japan controlled the House of Councilors. Because each bill requires the consent of both 
houses of parliament, the twisted parliament of 2009 turned the House of Councilor into a 
veto player. In contrast, the LDP and New Komeito coalition controlled both Houses in 
the Japanese Diet in 2015 when corporate board quotas were debated, eliminating the 
veto player position of the House of Councilors. 
As a result, the location and number of veto players differ for each case. In 2009, 
veto players were located in the drafting and legislative phase of the policy process (see 
Figure 11) while in 2015 the veto players were primarily located in the drafting phase 
(see Figure 12). 
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Figure 19: Location of Veto Players (Father Quota 2009)79 
 
Figure 20: Location of Veto Players (Corporate Board Quota 2015)80 
 
                                                
79 The red circles designate the locations of veto players. 
80 The red circles designate the locations of veto players. 
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7.2.4.  The Adoption of the 2009 Father Leave Policy 
In 2009, the conservative government under the leadership of Prime Minister Taro 
from the Liberal Democratic Party adopted the revision to the Childcare and Family Care 
Leave Law from 1992 which establishes the parental leave rights of Japanese parents. 
Under the revision, parental leave is now structured in a manner that encourages fathers 
to take more leave. The revision provides for the following three changes. First, when 
both parents take parental leave, the paid parental leave period is extended from 12 to 14 
months (‘Labor Law’ 2009). Second, if a father takes parental leave following the first 
eight weeks after childbirth, the father can take another parental leave later as an 
exception (‘Introduction to the Revised Childcare and Family Care Leave Law’). Third, 
the revision removed the provision that fathers with a full-time stay at home wife are 
excluded from parental leave benefits (‘Introduction to the Revised Childcare and Family 
Care Leave Law’). Parental leave is now paid at 55 per cent of earnings with a maximum 
ceiling 215,100 yen per month (roughly 1,700 US Dollars). Like Germany, this 
represents a turn towards a dual earner/carer model away from the male breadwinner 
model. 
As in Germany, the father leave policy was structured as a bonus rather than a 
quota. However, based on the preliminary analysis it is unclear whether the father bonus 
was the original policy proposal or whether a father quota – where families who do not 
use the parental leave period reserved for fathers lose part of the paid parental leave – 
was ever seriously considered. If the latter is the case, the constellation of critical actors, 
veto players, and opponents will be critical to understand why the father quota was 
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weakened into a father bonus. However, the preliminary analysis does not allow me to 
determine the individual identities of all three types of actors without having analyzed all 
available primary sources in Japanese and without being able to conduct in-depth elite 
interviews to confirm my analysis. Nevertheless, I am confident that my analytical 
framework will be explanatory in this case. Based on a cursory collection of actors who 
participated in the debate, it is clear that the policy had the support of major companies 
such as Nippon Life, Meiji Jasuda Life, and Goldman Sachs, all of which are potential 
(informal) veto players, as well as prominent LDP politicians (‘Japan encourages fathers 
to take more active role in child care’ 2014; Koh 2010). Further, because the policy was 
adopted, it is unlikely that any opponents to the policy were able to influence or 
controlled veto player positions. Finally, the successful passage of the bill also implies 
that it was supported within the bureaucracy, another potential veto player. However, 
what remains to be seen is whether these potential veto players were merely supportive or 
whether they were critical actors themselves. 
Finally, based on a preliminary analysis of the arguments for and against the 
policy, it is clear that the policy debate in Japan was dominated foremost by demographic 
concerns. The Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare justified the new policy based on 
Japan’s rapidly falling birthrate calling attention to another dip in the birth rate to below 
1.3 (‘Introduction to the Revised Child Care and Family Care Leave Law’ 2015). 
Interestingly, the Ministry also frames the issue of work-life balance as a tool to affect 
demographic changes. Here, the prevailing argument was that in order to encourage 
women to have a second child, men would need to work shorter hours and spend more 
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time doing housework and engage in childcare. Further, a survey conducted by the 
Ministry shows that 30 per cent of men want to take advantage of the father leave, yet 
there is a significant gap of 28 per cent between men who want to take leave and those 
who actually do. What is conspicuously absent is a feminist discourse which dominated 
the debate in Germany around the same policy. While the recognition that changing 
gender roles in the home will improve gender equality overall comes up in the debate 
from time to time, it is considered to be a positive side effect of the policy rather than the 
raison d’être for it. 
To conclude then, the adoption of a father bonus in Japan’s parental leave reform 
seems to be a case of permissive coalition constraints and an advantageous constellation 
of veto players, critical actors, and opponents. However, unless I am able to perform the 
full analysis including secondary and primary sources, I cannot be certain. 
7.2.5.  The Adoption of the 2015 Corporate Board Quota 
When Prime Minister Abe was elected, he popularized the term Abenomics to 
describe his plans to revitalize the Japanese economy, with womenomics being one of 
three pillars of Abe’s economic plan to address economic woes such as a labor shortage 
and economic downturn which will grow more severe because fertility rates remain low 
and people are getting older (Tomoko 2014). The other two pillars are fiscal spending 
and radical monetary easing. As the name womenomics suggests, women played an 
integral part in his plans. The term womenomics was coined by Kathy Matsui of Goldman 
Sachs who has long advocated for raising the number of women in the Japanese 
workforce to address the slow economic decline. A recent Goldman Sachs report finds 
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that if female and male labor participation were equal, Japan’s GDP could increase by 
12.5 per cent (‘Narrowing gender gap could boost Japan’s GDP by 12.5 per cent: 
Goldman Sachs’ 2014). Consequently, Abe has pushed the idea that Japan’s women are 
the key to lasting economic growth stating: 
Corporations have so far been driven by men’s ideas. But half the 
consumers are women. Introducing ideas by women would lead to new 
innovations. (It would present) new values to corporations, and eventually 
throughout society. When we realize a society where women shine, we 
can create a Japan full of vitality. (as cited in Tomoko 2014) 
It’s possible that Japan’s stagnation is essentially men’s fault (…) The 
period in which men with uniform ways of thinking dominated Japan’s 
business community was too long. . . . The mission that I have imposed 
upon myself is to thoroughly liberate the power that women possess. (As 
cited in Cunningham 2013) 
In order to tap into women’s potential, Abe has proposed three policies: improved 
access to child care, three years of maternity leave and increasing the number of women 
on boards (Pesek 2014). In regard to the latter, Abe called for 30 per cent of women in 
leadership by 2020 including at least one woman on every corporate board. This is 
severely needed as Japan lags behind every other industrialized country in terms of the 
number of women on corporate boards: only 1.3 per cent of board seats were occupied by 
women in 2014 compared to 14.1 per cent in Germany and 20.7 per cent in the United 
Kingdom (‘Women on Boards’ 2014). His policy proposal envisioned a 30 per cent 
mandate for women in senior management but the bill was never voted on because Abe 
decided to call a snap election at the end of 2014 (Cunningham 2013; ‘Only half of 
prefectures have set female management quotas’ 2014). Instead, the legislature adopted 
the ‘Bill on Promotion of Women's Participation and Advancement in the Workplace’ in 
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August 2015 which requires companies with 300 employees or more to set individual 
targets for women on boards as well as for female hires (Smith 2014). Thus, the adopted 
law neither included a fixed quota for corporate boards nor determined sanctions for 
companies that fail to reach their own established targets (Mizuho 2015). The question 
here is why Abe was unable to push a corporate board quota law through the policy 
process and instead had to settle for a much weaker board target. As mentioned earlier, 
coalition constraints were permissive either due to the numerical weakness of the New 
Komeito Party or because New Komeito supported the policy. Thus, coalition constraints 
alone cannot explain the weakening of the policy during the policy process. I argue that 
the constellation of veto players, critical actors, and opponents were crucial in changing 
the policy outcome. 
While I am not yet able to identify specific veto players, based on the Japanese 
policy process outlined above, I can approximate the policy preference for at least 
business organizations, which are most likely informal veto players. I also argue that 
Prime Minister Abe is a crucial critical actor because he has made a corporate board 
quota central to his economic revitalization plan. Thus, the question is whether Abe who 
as prime minister is not a veto player himself, was able to influence the relevant veto 
players in favor of his policy. 
Based on a preliminary content analysis of English news sources, it is obvious 
that a majority of businesses was opposed to a fixed quota. Even Kathy Matsui, the brain 
behind the term womenomics, opposes a fixed corporate board quota. Keidanren, Japan’s 
largest business lobby, rejects fixed quotas or targets as undue government interference in 
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business and instead calls on companies to establish a voluntary mechanism to promote 
more women into leadership positions such as networking opportunities (Minoru 2014). 
Likewise, the Japan Association of Corporate Executives opposes fixed quotas and calls 
on companies to set a voluntary target of 30 per cent instead (Maya 2014). While big 
business seems to be largely opposed to a quota, individual businesses such as the 
president of Lexil Group, a producer of home fixtures, argues that if companies fail to 
meet Abe’s 30 per cent target by 2020, a corporate board quote law should be introduced 
(‘Lixil chief says quota system needed to promote female execs in Japan’ 2014). 
Likewise, Yasuko Oshima, a senior economist with Mizuho Research Institute, criticized 
the final bill arguing that the absence of a fixed quota target weakens the effectiveness of 
the bill (Mizuho 2015). But this view is clearly in the minority. The advisory council 
established by the Minister of Labour to consult on the policy proposal avoided 
recommending numerical targets (‘Companies will need to ‘declare’ numerical targets for 
increasing female managers’ 2014). As in Germany, businesses argued that numerical 
targets will be impossible to fulfill because the dearth of women in the labor pool and that 
the real reasons for women’s underrepresentation in board rooms are a lack of childcare 
and the long working hours (Duncan 2015). Thus, it seems likely that business 
organizations worked through their established informal channels in the drafting phase of 
the policy process to ensure that the bill reflected their concerns. 
Finally, looking at the discourse surrounding the corporate board quota debate, 
two findings stand out. First, the need for more women in corporate board rooms is 
exclusively made through arguments emphasizing economic growth. As such, getting 
 
258 
more women into the workforce and into management position was touted as ‘a key to 
Japan’s future growth’ (Pesek 2013). Economists such as Kathy Matsui of Goldman 
Sachs have emphasized for decades that the large number of highly qualified women who 
drop out the workforce represent an untapped economic potential (‘Narrowing gender 
gap could boost Japan’s GDP by 12.5 per cent: Goldman Sachs’ 2014). This focus on 
economic growth underlines concerns that Abe’s plans and commitment to ‘build a 
society where every woman can shine’ is not motivated by deep concerns about greater 
gender equality but rather a means to an economic end. While Abe has embraced 
progressive gender policies as a means to stem economic pitfalls, his plans remain 
noncommittal and superficial (Tomoko 2014). As way of illustration, a mere 12 per cent 
of all LDP candidates in the 2014 election were female, and Abe has refused to appoint 
women to powerful cabinet posts in his administration (Pesek 2015; Mizuho 2014). 
Further, Abe holds very traditional views of women illustrated by his suggestion to 
publish ‘women notebooks’ that warn women not to postpone marriage and childbirth 
and a public statement stressing that mothers should stay home until their children are 
three years old – both statements directly contradicting each effort Abe outlined under his 
womenomics plan (Pesek 2013). Thus, the lack of feminist concerns in the discourse 
should not be surprising. Contrary to Germany, where the discourse predominantly 
centered on feminist arguments and the need to establish gender equality in the business 
sector, Abe’s much touted womenomics including his plans for a corporate board quota is 
only motivated by economic concerns despite, or maybe because of, Japan’s traditional 
culture and entrenched sexism experienced by women in the workplace. 
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It is obvious that the Japanese policy process differs significantly from those in 
the United Kingdom or Germany because certain groups of actors – most importantly 
business organizations, bureaucrats, and zoku giin – are informal veto players. This 
makes it particularly difficult to identify the relevant veto players from a qualitative 
content analysis alone and requires more extensive interviews with policy stakeholders, 
civil servants, and parliamentarians in Japan. While business actors do play an important 
role in Germany and the United Kingdom, they do not reach the role of veto player. 
Likewise, bureaucrats do not play an important role in the drafting of a policy. Instead, 
ministers are powerful and in charge of drafting the bill. As a result, this case study is 
intended to be a first attempt to extend the explanatory framework I developed in this 
dissertation to another country which shares the same policy outcomes as well as similar 
political, socioeconomic, and cultural conditions but has a significantly different policy 
process. 
7.3.  Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was to understand whether the conceptual framework 
developed in this dissertation would also extend to cases outside of Germany. The British 
cases have shown that coalition agreements are important in determining the chances of a 
feminist policy proposal. This is particularly true when a policy proposal emerges during 
the legislative period which has not been addressed in the coalition agreement. When the 
corporate board quota first failed in Germany, it was mainly due to the circumstance that 
the coalition agreement clearly stated that the coalition government would approach 
corporate board diversity from a voluntary approach. Similar to the German case, both 
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proposed feminist policies in the United Kingdom – corporate board quotas and the father 
quota – failed because they violated the core tenant of the coalition agreement: deficit 
reduction and no additional red tapes for businesses. Thus, coalition constraints not only 
play an important role in determining whether a feminist policy is included in the 
coalition agreement but also in circumscribing the type of feminist policy that it is 
possible to adopt later in the legislative period. Feminist policy adoption seems to be 
particularly unlikely in cases where the policy would violate basic principles decided 
upon in the coalition agreement. 
In terms of the influence of critical actors, veto players, and opponents on the 
adoption of feminist policies under conservative governments, it seems likely that this 
hypothesis will hold beyond the German context as well. Looking at the Japanese cases, 
both policies adopted under the LDP represent a weaker commitment to both father leave 
policies and corporate board quotas. This represents an interesting contradiction to the 
German case, where opponents attempted to weaken the quota policy to the same extent 
as in Japan, but were unsuccessful. One reason why outcomes differ in Germany and 
Japanis that the opponents – most likely the business organizations – were informal veto 
players in the drafting phase and accordingly could ensure that the bill included terms and 
conditions reflective of their interests. Further, the German case was only successful 
when the CDU/CSU was in a coalition government with a social democratic party which 
also was able to leverage coalition constraints upon the CDU/CSU. This aided the 
adoption of the policy. In contrast, a social democratic counterpart was missing in the 
Japanese context. Thus, while a strong women’s movement and a social democratic 
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coalition partner is not necessary for the successful adoption of a corporate board policy 
itself, it nevertheless seems to be essential to ensure the policy is not being watered down 
by policy opponents. 
Based on the analysis outlined above, I am confident that my conceptual 
framework will also explain the adoption of feminist policies under a conservative 
government in Japan, particularly the weakening of the policies during the policy process. 
However, further research is needed regarding these two aspects. First, interviews with 
stakeholders are necessary because most veto players are located in the informal drafting 
process. It is only after the identity of critical actors, opponents, and veto players is 
known that I can fully assess the explanatory framework. This is particularly true because 
draft bills are developed by the Policy Research Council of the LDP rather than in the 
responsible ministry. Second, I will need to analyze the verbatim protocols of 
parliamentary debates and committee deliberations in each of the houses of the Japanese 
Diet before I can identify all critical actors. I expect that personal interviews will also 
reveal critical actors who were not necessarily obvious in the formal and public policy 
process. 
Expanding my argument to four additional cases in Japan and the United 
Kingdom has shown that coalition constraints do play an important part in influencing the 
likelihood for successful feminist policy adoption. In instances where feminist policy 
proposals contradicted core elements in the coalition agreement, policy adoption failed 
both in the United Kingdom and in Germany. The Japanese cases seem to indicate that 
the constellation of critical actors, veto players, and opponents is not only important to 
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explain whether the policy will be adopted but also to determine whether the policy is 
weakened. This is supported by the German cases where opponents could weaken the 
final bill when they were able to influence veto players. Unfortunately, in this chapter I 
was not able to fully answer whether my conceptual framework can explain feminist 
policy adoption under conservative governments in Japan due to the preliminary nature of 
the case studies. However, while this chapter is not able to provide definite answers about 
the applicability of my conceptual framework beyond the German context, it has shown 
that coalition constraints do matter for policy adoption and that policy adoption most 
likely is influenced by the constellation of veto players, critical actors, and opponents in 





This dissertation set out to explore the conditions under which conservative 
governments put feminist policies on the legislative agenda and adopt feminist policies. 
The dissertation focused particularly on two types of feminist policies – father leave 
policies and corporate board quotas – a fundamental purpose of which is to address 
gender-based economic inequalities. The research contained herein was motivated by the 
general lack of knowledge concerning the subject area – the general theoretical and 
empirical literature on this subject typically focuses only on the role of left governments 
in promoting feminist policy. This dissertation sought to answer the following question: 
why do conservative governments adopt feminist policies? Looking at three outlier cases 
in Germany, I have shown in chapters 4 through 6 that successful legislative agenda 
setting and policy adoption is driven by two different sets of conditions: coalition 
constraints for legislative agenda setting and an opportune constellation of critical actors, 
veto players, and opponents for policy adoption. In this concluding chapter, I will 
reiterate the empirical findings before discussing theoretical and policy implications of 




8.1.  Empirical Findings 
The main empirical findings were summarized in chapters 4 through 6 when 
analyzing the successful and failed policy outcomes in the German context. This section 
will synthesize the empirical findings in regards to the dissertation’s research question: 
why do conservative government adopt feminist policies? The first part will focus on the 
drivers of legislative agenda setting while the second part will focus on the conditions 
that facilitate policy adoption. 
8.1.1.  Legislative Agenda Setting  
Legislative agenda setting can occur during two different stages in the policy 
making process. Ideally, legislative agenda setting occurs during coalition negotiations 
where the feminist policy is included in the coalition agreement. Table 9 shows that this 
was the case in Germany in 2006 and 2013 when policies were successfully included in 
the legislative agenda. In both years, the conservative party (CDU/CSU) was opposed to 
the feminist policy. The table shows that, in cases where the main coalition party is 
opposed to the policy and the junior coalition partner supports the policy, successful 
legislative agenda setting is likely when coalition constraints are permissive. This means 
that the nature of the coalition must be one of electoral necessity, there is no alternative 
coalition partner available, and the junior coalition partner is roughly equal in electoral 
strength, measured in seats won in parliament after the election. If these conditions hold, 
as they did in Germany in 2006 and 2013, coalition constraints are permissive and, as 




However, legislative agenda setting does not necessarily occur during coalition 
negotiations. Instead, in several instances, the policies were proposed during the 
legislative period long after coalition negotiations were concluded. This was the case in 
Germany in 2013 and in the United Kingdom in 2011 and 2013. In these instances, 
coalition constraints in terms of the nature of the coalition, alternative coalition partner, 
and strength of the coalition partner are not decisive. Rather, it is the content of the 
coalition agreement which determines the likelihood of successful legislative agenda 
setting. Because coalition agreements are binding contracts between the coalition 
partners, policy proposals that violate the policy objectives or basic principles set forth in 
a coalition agreement have little chance of being included in the legislative agenda of the 
government. This was the case in Germany in 2013 where the coalition agreement 
specifically stated that the issue of corporate board diversity will be addressed through 
voluntary measures, thus preventing the adoption of a corporate board quota. Similarly, 
the policy proposal in the United Kingdom in 2011 and 2013 violated the basic principles 









































































































Germany –2006 NO – YES Electoral necessity No Equal included Permissive yes 
Germany – 2013 NO – NO Electoral necessity No Junior violation 
Non-
permissive no 
Germany – 2015 YES – YES Electoral necessity No Equal included Permissive yes 
UK – 2013 NO – YES Electoral necessity No Junior violation 
Non-
permissive no 
UK – 2011 NO – NO Electoral necessity No Junior violation 
Non-
permissive no 
As the research findings show, coalition constraints are important in two ways. 
When legislative agenda setting is debated during coalition negotiations, the negotiation 
power of the coalition partner supportive of the policy is decisive. In contrast, when the 
policy is considered after the conclusion of the coalition negotiations, the content of the 
coalition agreement determines the likelihood of successful legislative agenda setting. 
8.1.2.  Policy Adoption 
Once the coalition government has adopted the policy, policy adoption depends 
on an advantageous constellation of critical actors, veto players, and opponents. Table 10 
shows that where a critical actor occupies primary veto player positions and secondary 
                                                




veto players were supportive of the policy, policy adoption was successful (Germany 
2006 and 2015). 
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Critical actors are particularly important for introducing a government draft into 
the legislative process and ensuring that the draft successfully passes through the 
different stages of the legislative process. The position of policy opponents is also 
crucial. Opponents can weaken the final bill through two different channels: by 
influencing the secondary veto player or by occupying key positions in the drafting or 
legislative phase. Opponents are typically successful in influencing secondary veto 
players if opponents speak for a powerful internal party faction whose support is crucial 
for the success of the party. In these cases, the secondary veto player is likely to make 
concessions to the final bill language to appease the powerful party faction. Similarly, if 
opponents occupy institutional positions in the drafting process where their input is 
required for the draft language, they can attempt to change the final language and weaken 
the bill. Finally, when opponents occupied primary and secondary veto player positions 
(Germany 2013), policy adoption failed. 
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8.2.  Theoretical Implications 
This dissertation makes two contributions to the study of women’s substantive 
representation. First, I show that the presence of women in itself is not enough. For 
women to have a lasting policy impact, they need to control institutional resources. 
Second, I demonstrate that conservative parties can adopt feminist policies even if they 
have not undergone a process of feminization. 
In the subfield of women and politics, there is a long tradition of linking the 
presence of women in parliament to gendered or feminist policy outcomes (Pitkikn 1997; 
Phillips 1995). Dahlerup (1988) and Kanter (1977) first argued that women needed to 
represent a critical mass to advance women’s interests and issues. More recently, Celis 
and Childs (2008) and Mackay (2008) moved beyond the idea of the critical mass and 
held that critical actors – female and male representatives who repeatedly advocate for 
women’s interests to be included in public policies – are crucial to guarantee the 
inclusion of women’s voices in public policy. While the concept of critical actors 
rightfully recognizes that not all women advocate for women’s issues and interests, the 
concept overlooks the fact that not all political actors are created equal. Some have more 
power to influence policy outcomes than others. Advocating for feminist policies is not 
sufficient – critical actors need to have institutional resources at their disposal to push 
these feminist policies through the legislative process. The idea that institutional power 
matters is not new. Annesley and Gains (2010) showed that critical actors need to be 
present in the core executive of the Westminster system in Great Britain if they are to 
influence policy outcomes. What has been missing, and what this dissertation proposes, is 
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a systematic way in which to determine the institutional power of critical actors across 
political systems and policy areas. By combining the critical actor approach with the veto 
player theory, this dissertation allows for a consistent identification of whether critical 
actors command institutional resources to influence policy outcomes. 
More recently, women and politics scholars have shifted their attention to the 
study of conservative parties. Much attention has been paid to the so-called process of 
feminization (Celis and Childs 2014): conscious attempts by conservative party leaders to 
modernize the conservative party by nominating more women and supporting more 
progressive and egalitarian social policies such as equal pay or marriage equality. The 
causal mechanism proposed is such that conservative party leaders recognize that they 
need to win the women’s vote to return to political power and as a result adopt feminist 
policies such as equitable parental leave or corporate board quotas. While this 
explanation has merit, it cannot answer why conservative parties that have not undergone 
a process of feminization nevertheless adopt feminist policies. Addressing this particular 
gap in the literature, this dissertation shows that the inclusion of feminist policies on the 
legislative agenda of the government is prompted by more progressive coalition partners 
who can leverage electoral advantages against the conservative party. This research also 
demonstrates that even in conservative parties, there are conservative women who 
support feminist policies and goals. It is these conservative feminist women who can 
exploit a window of opportunity – permissive coalition constraints and control of 
institutional resources – to push for feminist policies from within the conservative party. 
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8.3.  Policy Implications 
This dissertation shows that conservative parties and governments are not lost 
causes for achieving the substantive representation of women. Quite to the contrary, 
feminist policy outcomes are possible even under circumstances where feminist policy 
adoption seemed the least likely. Specifically, female representatives seem to have the 
greatest impact when they control institutional resources, such as leadership positions in 
parliament, the government, or within the political party. Thus, it is not enough for 
domestic programs (such as Vote Run Lead or the Women’s Campaign School) and 
international programs (such as the National Democratic Institute or the Fund for Gender 
Equality) to recruit and train women to run for office. What is necessary beyond getting 
women into parliament is ensuring that women have access to and control of political 
power and resources: the prime ministership or presidency, powerful cabinet posts, and 
leadership positions across political parties. It is only when women control these 
resources that there is a real chance of women’s interests being included in politics. Thus, 
domestic and international programs need to target political parties themselves to ensure 
that political parties see the value of women in leadership positions and put affirmative 
action in place for women within their own political parties. 
This dissertation has also illustrated that feminist policy adoption is not confined 
to left parties alone but that advocacy coalitions will be able to find conservative 
members who are supportive of their goals. If these conservative members are in 




8.4.  Directions for Future Research 
Because this study is primarily a comparative-within case study of German cases, 
there is a need for more case studies to allow for further assessment of the extent to 
which coalition constraints matter for legislative agenda setting and the constellation of 
critical actors, veto players, and opponents for policy adoption. In particular, the issue of 
equifinality needs to be addressed. It is possible that the adoption of feminist policies is 
different across national contexts or that additional variables might increase or decrease 
the likelihood of policy adoption depending on national context. I have identified two 
specific variables that may play a role: (1) advocacy coalitions and (2) party families. 
Past research on feminist policy adoption has argued that the presence of 
women’s movements facilitates the adoption of feminist policies (see for example Htun 
and Weldon 2012). While I did not find any evidence supporting the claim that an active 
or strong women’s movement facilitated the adoption of feminist policies, the study of 
the German cases did show that a strong advocacy coalition – the Allianz für Familie in 
regards to the father leave policy and the Berliner Erklärung in case of the corporate 
board quotas – is an important vehicle through which critical actors can advocate for the 
respective feminist policy. These advocacy coalitions also provided critical actors with 
support and the backing by popular opinion and important civil society and business 
actors. Similarly, the womenomics program for greater board room diversity and the 
ikumen82 project for the father leave policy acted as catalyst for policy adoption in Japan. 
                                                
82 The Ikumen project was called into action by the Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare in conjunction 
with the debate of the Revised childcare and Family Care Leave Law (Maruku 2013). Ikumen is a 
combination of two words: ikuji (child-rearing) and the English word men (Aoki 2010). The campaign’s 
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In contrast, there was no advocacy coalition in the United Kingdom backing Nicholas 
Clegg’s proposal for a father leave policy or one pushing for corporate board quotas. 
Instead, support for each feminist policy was fragmented and limited in impact. While a 
strong advocacy coalition is not sufficient for feminist policy adoption– after all the first 
attempt to pass a corporate board quota failed despite strong support of the Berliner 
Erklärung – the presence of an advocacy coalition might increase the likelihood of 
feminist policy adoption under conservative governments. 
Finally, it might not be a coincidence that German cases were successful under a 
Christian-Democratic Party. While all parties under consideration in Japan, the United 
Kingdom, and Germany fall on the right side of the political spectrum, they belong to 
different party families. While the Liberal Democrats in the United Kingdom and the 
FDP in Germany belong to the liberal party family, the Conservative Party in the United 
Kingdom and the LDP in Japan fall under the label of conservative parties, and the 
CDU/CSU in Germany belong to the Christian Democratic party family. What they have 
in common is a greater belief in the free market and limited state intervention and more 
traditional social values than left parties; however, variances exist among the different 
types of party families in how much value they attach to economic liberalism or 
traditional family values. Thus, further research should explore whether the type of 
conservative party affects the likelihood of that party to adopt and adopt feminist policies 
                                                                                                                                            
goal was to encourage more men to take parental leave and shed a positive light on men who raise their 
children (‘Japan encourages fathers to take more active role in child care’ 2014). The campaign slogan was 
‘a man who doesn’t raise his children, can’t be called a father’ (Dalton 2015, 46). 
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despite permissive coalition constraints and an advantageous constellation of critical 
actors, veto players, and opponents. 
8.5.  Conclusion 
This research has broken with the common assumption that left governments are 
the ones adopting policies promoting greater gender equality. Much has been written on 
the subject of left governments and their role in establishing policies improving economic 
equality for women. Yet as the issue of father leave policies and corporate board quotas 
has illustrated, conservative governments have played an important role in promoting 
feminist policies. By conducting a comparative within-case study in Germany, this 
dissertation has tested the conceptual framework in circumstances where feminist policy 
adoption should have been the least likely. As such, this dissertation has contributed to 
filling an empirical gap in knowledge in regards to the role of conservative parties and 
governments and the substantive representation of women. 
While this dissertation has studied the adoption of feminist policies under 
conservative governments, I believe that the conceptual framework developed in this 
dissertation could easily be applied to other subfields. The framework should be able to 
explain why political parties adopt policies that on the surface violate their ideological 
underpinnings; for example, pacifist parties sanctioning military force or green parties 
supporting nuclear energy policies. 
First and foremost, however, this dissertation contributes to an ongoing dialogue 
between comparative politics and women and politics studies. I hope to have shown that 
utilizing comparative politics concepts such as veto players and coalition constraints can 
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Appendix A: List of Actors identified in each case study 
Below is a summary of individual actors and/or organizations that actively 
participated in the policy debate surrounding the respective policies in each country by 
speaking up in public or in parliamentary proceedings. Each table breaks all actors down 
in several groups. “Internal Political Actors” are actors who are members of the coalition 
government and “External Political Actors” are actors who are members of parliament 
but not members of parties in the coalition government. “Civil Society Actors’ are 
individuals in civil society, including but not limited to business organizations, women’s 
organizations, academics, or lawyers.  
1.  Germany: Father Leave Policy (Success) 2006 
Total number of actors: 53 
 Support Oppose 
Federal 
Actors 
Legislative leadership positions: Angela Merkel, (CDU 
Chancelor); Ursula von der Leyen (Minister FSWY); 
Frank Müntefering (SPD, Minister of Labor and Social 
Affairs); Christel Humme (SPD family expert, 
committee member, Family, Seniors, Women, and 
Youth); Gerda Hasselfeldt (CSU, Vice President, 
Bundestag); Caren Marks (SPD; vice spokesperson 
committee Family, Seniors, Women, and Youth); 
Herrman Kuess (undersecretary of the Federal Ministry 
for Family, Seniors, Women, and Youth); 
 
Party Leadership: Ursula Heinen (Chairperson, CDU 
women group); Julia Glöckner (chairperson, CDU 
faction youth group); Nicolette Kressl (vice 
chairperson, SPD faction); Ilse Falk (vice chairperson 
CDU faction); Ronald Pofella (CDU General 
Secretary); Hubertus Heil (SPD General Secretary); 
Georg Gysi (Die Linke, Chairperson Faction); Dark 
Niebel (FDP, general secretary); Maria Böhmer 
(chairperson, CDU Women association); Emilia Müller 
(chairperson, CSU women association); Johannes 
Singhammer (chairperson CDU/CSU faction working 
group for Family, seniors, women, and youth); 
 
Political parties of FDP and 
CSU 
 
Party leadership: Miriam 
Gruß (FDP faction, 
spokesperson for family 
policies); Renate Künast 
(Green Party, faction 
chairperson) 
 
General MPs: Anton Schaaf 
(SPD, MP); Norbert Geis 
(CSU, MP): Karin Binder 
(Die Linke, MP);  
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General MPs: Renate Schmidt (SPD, MP); Maria 




Prime Ministers: Roland Koch (CDU, Hessen); 
Christian Wulff (CDU, Lower Saxony); Peter Müller 
(CDU, Saarland); Günther Öttinger (CDU, Baden-
Württemberg); Kurt Beck (SPD, Rhineland-Palatinate);  
 
Peter Ramssauer (CSU chairman state party);  
Silke Lautenschläger (CDU Hessen; Minister for Social 
Affairs); Ursula Männle (MP, CSU); Barbara Stamm 
(MP CSU); Christa Stewens (MPS, CSU) 
Prime Ministers: Dieter 
Althaus (CDU, Thuringia); 
Georg Milbradt (CDU, 
Saxony); Jürgen Rüttgers 
(CDU, North Rhine 
Westfalia);  
 
Markus Söder (CSU, general 






Religious organizations: Cardinal Karl Lehmann; Prof. 
Dr. Hans Meyer (President, Central committee of 
German Catholics); Prof. Dr. Ute Gerhard (President, 
Protestant association for family questions); 
 
Business organizations: Claudia Menne (Head of the 
Confederation of German Trade Union’s (DGB) 
Department for Gender Equality and Women’s Policy) 
 
Civil society – other: Hans Bertram (family expert, 
academia); Dr. Thomas Gesterkamp (author and 
journalist); Dr. Christine Fuchsloh (German Women 
Bar Association); Prof. Dr. Christoph Butterwegge 
(academia) 
Religious Organizations: 
Cardinal George Sterzinsky 
 
Civil Society (other): Prof. Dr. 
Christian Seiler (academia) 
 
298 
2.  Germany: Corporate board quota (Failure) 2013 
Total number of actors: 163 













CDU: Maria Böhmer; Ingrid Fischbach; 
Sigfried Kauder; Eva Klamt; Julia Klöckner; Jan 
Marco Luczak; Rita Pawelski (CDU); Nadine 
Schön; Ursula von der Leyen; Marko 
Wanderwitz; Elisabeth Winkelmeier Becker;  
 
CSU: Dorothee Bär; Josef Göppel; Hans 
Michelbach;  
 
FDP: Doris Buchholz; Sibylle Laurischk; Jörg 
van Essen 
CDU: Thomas Bareiß; 
Michael Fuchs; Stephan 
Harbarth; Matthias Heider; 
Volker Kauder; Kurt Lauk; 
Carsten Linnemann; Angela 
Merkel; Kristina Schröder; 
Erika Steinbach; Andrea 
Voßhoff; Dagmar Wöhrl;  
 
CSU: Gerda Hasselfeldt; 




FDP: Nicole Bracht-Bendt; 
Rainer Brüdele; Marco 
Buschmann; Patrick Döring; 
Miriam Gruß; Sabine 
Leutheusser-
Schnarrenberger; Christian 
Lindner; Jörg von Pohlheim; 
















SPD: Doris Barnett; Willi Brase; Ingo Egloff; 
Elke Ferner; Sigmar Gabriel; Hubertus Heil; Eva 
Högel; Christel Humme; Christine Lambrecht; 
Caren Marks; Andrea Nahles; Stefan Rebmann; 
Karin Roth; Manuela Schwesig; Frank Walter 
Steinmeier; Dagmar Ziegler 
 
Greens: Katja Dörner; Katrin Göring-Eckhardt; 
Renate Künast; Tobias Lindner; Thomas 
Opperman (SPD); Astrid Rothe-Beinlich; Ekin 
Deliköz; Antje Vollmer 
 
Linke: Gregor Gysi; Barbara Höll; Katja 
Kippling; Monika Lazar; Ulla Lötzer; Gesine 
Lötzsch; Cornelia Möhring; Petra Pau; 
 
Civil Servant: Christine Lüders 
 
State Gov’t: Katrin Altpeter (SPD) Baden-
Württemberg; Rainer Haseloff (CDU) Sachsen-
Anhalt; Eva Lemke (Greens) Rheinland Pfalz; 
Angela Kolb (SPD) Sachsen-Anhalt; Hannelore 
Kraft (SPD), Nordrhein Westfalen; Annegret 
Kramp-Karrenbauer (CDU) Saarland; Thomas 
Kutschaty (SPD) Nordrhein Westfalen; Gabi 
Ohler (Linke); Jana Schiedek (SPD) Hamburg; 
Barbara Steffen (Greens) Nordrhein-Westfalen; 
Harald Wolf (Linke) Berlin; 
 
State Legislatures: Mürvet Öztürk (Greens) 
Hessen; 
 
EU: Silvana Koch-Mehrin (FDP); Angelika 
Niebler (CSU); Vivianne Reeding (EU 
Commission);  
 
Former MdB: Lore Maria Peschel-Gutzeit 
(SPD); Angelica Schwall-Düren (SPD); Renate 
Schmidt (SPD); Rita Süssmuth (CDU); 



















Research & Science: Jutta Allmendinger; Ute 
Klammer; 
 
Business: Dagmar Braun (Braun Beteiligungs 
GmbH); Margarete Haase (Deutz AG); Heidi 
Hetzer (Hetzer GmbH & Co. KG); Marli Hoppe-
Ritter (Ritter Sport); Eva Kreien-kamp 
(Hamburg-Köln Express GmbH); Karen-Elise 
Rehlen (Korn Ferry); Thomas Sattelberg 
(Telekom); Friede Springer (Axel Springer AG);  
 
Business associations: Hans Olaf Henkel 
(BDI); Ingrid Sehrbrock (DGB);  
 
Civil Society Groups: Renate Bargsten 
(EWMD); Marlies Brouwers (Dt. Frauenrat); 
Stephanie Bschorr (Verband Dt. 
Unternehmerinnen); Martine Herpers 
(Erfolgsfaktor Frau); Isinay Kemmler 
(IKU.NET e.V.); Helga Lokoschat (EAF); 
Ulrike Mascher (VdK); Ramona Pisal (Dt. 
Juristinnenverbund); Brigitte Scherb (Dt. 
LandFrauen Verband); Monika Schulz-Strelow 
(FidAR); Rosely Schweizer (K. Ahlmann 
Stiftung); Henrike von Platen (BPW Germany); 
ProQuote Medien; ProQuote Medizin; 
Nürnberger Resolution; Deutscher 
Ingenieurinnenbund; 
 
Legal: Seyran Ates; Renate Damm; Jutta von 
Falken-hausen; Jutta Wagner;  
 
Religious Organizations: Maria Flachsbarth 
(KDFB); Karin Kortmann (ZdK); Claudia 
Lücking-Michel (ZdK) 
 
Others: Senta Berger (actress); Maria 
Furtwängler (actress); Steffi Jones (DFB); Verda 
Gäde-Butzlaff (Berliner Stadtreinigung); 
Susanne Klinger (publicist); Karin Nordmeyer 
(UN Women Germany); Alice Schwarzer 
(feminist icon); Herman Sendele (Board 
Consultant); Maria von Welser (publicist); Ute 
Gerhard (Goethe Institute) 
Business: Petra Hesser 
(IKEA); Martina Koederitz 
(IBM); Nicole Leibiner-
Kammüller (IBM); Harald 
Krüger (BMW); Regine 
Stachelhaus (e.on); Annette 
Winkler (Smart); Dieter 
Zetsche (Daimler AG); 
 
Business Associations: 
Manfred Gentz (Dt Börse) 
Klaus Peter Müller 
(Corporate Governance 
Kodex); Eric Schweitzer 
(DIHK); Joachim Sauer 
(BPM); Gabriel Sons 
(Gesamtmetall); Margret 
Suckale (BVAC); Heiko 
Willems (BDI);  
 




Wischhusen (Verband Junger 
Unternehmer);  
 
Legal: Jan Lüttringhaus; 
 
Media: Bascha Mika;  
 
Others: Maria Höfl-Riesch 






3.  Germany: Corporate Board Quota (Success) 2015 
Total number of actors: 71 actors 













CDU: Angela Merkel; Elisabeth Motschmann; Nadine 
Schön; Oswin Veith; Markus Weinberg; Annette Widmann-
Mauz; Elisabeth Winkelmeier-Becker; 
 
CSU: Paul Lehrieder; Gudrun Zollner 
 
SPD: Yasmin Fahimi; Metin Hakverdi; Eva Högel; Christina 
Janz; Ulrich Kelber; Birgit Kömpel; Christian Lange; Heiko 
Maas; Andrea Nahles; Carola Reinmann; Sönke Rix; 






Heribert Hirte; Volker 






















Greens: Ekin Deligöz; Katja Dörner; Katrin Göring-
Eckhardt; Renate Künast; Ule Schauws 
 
Die Linke: Susanna Karawanskij; Caren Lay; Cornelia 
Möhring; Sabine Zimmermann 
 
State Governments: Irene Alt (Greens) Rheinland-Pfalz  
Benjamin I Hoff (Linke) Thüringen; Barbara Steffens 
(Greens) Nordrhein-Westfalen; 
 














Civil Society Groups: Rena Bargsten (EWMD); Stephanie 
Bschorr (Verband Deutscher Unternehmerinnnen); Claudia 
Gläser (Verband deutschter Unternehmerinnen); 
Bundesverband GMFK; Gabrielle Kaczmarczyk (pro Quote 
Medizin); Sylvia Kegel (Dt. Ingineurinnen-verbund); Ingo 
Kramer (Bundesvereinigung dt. Arbeitgeberverbände); 
Ramona Pisal (dt. Juristinnenverbund); Regine Rapp-Engels 
(Dt. Ärztinnenverbund); Bettine Schaefer (pro Quote 
Medien); Brigitee Scherb (Dt. LandFrauen Verband); 
Monika Schulz-Strelow (FidAR); Claudia Specht 
(Erfolgsfaktor Frau); Henrike von Platen (BPW Germany) 
 







Ulirich Grillo (BDI); 
Elke Hanneck 













4.  Japan: Father Leave Policy 2009 
Total number of actors: 10 
 Support Oppose 
Internal 
Actors 





Hidehiko Yuzaki (Governor, Hiroshima Prefecture); 




Civil Society Groups: Tetsuya Ando (Fathering 
Japan), 
Business: Nippon Life, Meiji Jasuda Life, Kathy 
Matsui (Goldman Sachs) 
Others: Mikko Koivumaa (Finish Diplomat)  
 
5.  Japan: Corporate Board Quota 2015 
Total number of actors: 17 actors  
 Support Oppose 
Internal 
Actors 







Business: Sakie Fukushima 
(Keizai Doyukai), Yoshiaki 
Fujimori (Lixil Group Corp) 
 
Others: Yasuko Oshima (Mizuho 
Research Institute) 
Civil Society Groups: Chie Motio 
(GEWEL), Michiko Achilles 
(GEWEL) 
 
Business: Kinbara Kazuyuki 
(Keidanren), Junko Nakagawa 
(Keidanren), Kathy Matsui 
(Goldman Sachs), Hiroko 
Kawamoto (Nippon Airways), 
Tetsuya Shiori (Taisei Corp), Japan 
Association of Corporate 
Executives, Genzo Kimura (Sumi 
Trust) 
 
Others: Tomoya Kondo (Daiwa 
Institute of Research), Takashi 





6.  United Kingdom: Father Leave Policy 2010-2015 
Total number of actors: 21 actors 
 Support Oppose 
Internal 
Actors 
LibDems: Jo Swinson, Nicholas Clegg, 
Baroness Tylor of Enfield 
Conservative: Viscount 
Younger of Leckie 
External 
Actors 
Labour Party: Lucy Powell; Baroness 
Lister of Burtersett; Lord Stevanson of 
Balmacara 






Civil Society Groups: Elizabeth Duff 
(National Childbirth Trust); Kathy Jones 
(Fatherhood Institute)  
Others: Peter Moss (academia) 
Civil Society: Laura Perrins 
(Mothers at Home Matters); 
Sarah Jackson (Working 
Families); Ceri Goodard 
(Fawcette Society) 
Business: John Longworth 
(British Chambers of 
Commerce); David Frost 
(British Chambers of 
Commerce); 
John Allan (Federation of 
Small Businesses); Michael 
Mealing (Federation of 
Small Businesses); Brendan 




7.  United Kingdom: Corporate Board Quota 2010-2015 
Total number of actors: 60 
 Support Oppose 
Internal Actors  Conservative: Matthew Hancock; 
Marina Yannakoudakis (Member of 
European Parliament); Baroness 
Stowell of Beeston; Baroness 
O’Cathain; Alok Sharma; Dominic 
Raab; Mary Macleod; Maria Miller 
(Women and Equalities Minister); 
Theresa May; 
 
LibDems: Vince Cable; Baroness 
Falkner of Margravine; Baron Watson 
of Richmond; Lynne Featherstone 
(Under-Secretary for Equality); Jo 
Swinson 
External Actors Labour: Arlene McCarthy 
(Member, European 
Parliament); Gloria dePiero; 
Chuka Umunna; Seema 
Malhotra 
Labour: Baronesse Nye; Meg Munn; 
Lord Davies 
 




Civil Society Groups: 
Annette Lawson (National 
Alliance of Women’s 
Organizations); Women on 
Boards UK; Discrimination 
Law Association 
 
Business: Scarlett Harris 
(Trade Union Congress); Kate 
Grussing (Sapphire Partners); 
Ashley Steel (KPMG);  
 
Others: Arni Hole (Director 
General of the Norwegian 
Ministry of Children, Equality, 
and Social Inclusion); Sylvia 
Walby (academia); Karen 
Jochelson (Equality and 
Human Rights Commission); 
Benja Stig Fagerland 
(Consultant); Marie O’Riordan 
Civil Society Groups: Helena 
Morrisey (The 30 Percent Club); 
Campaign for Merit in Business; The 
Mentoring Foundation; Heather 
Jackson (An Inspirational Journey);  
 
Business: Association of British 
Insurers; Joanne Segars (National 
Association of Pension Funds); Lesley 
Brook (Brook and Graham); Michael 
Reyner (MWM Consulting); Liz 
Murrall (Investment Management 
Association); Aviva Insurance; 
Employment Lawyers Association; 
Helen Alexander (Confederation of 
British Industries); Will Dawkins 
(Spencer Stuart); Price Waterhouse 
Coopers; Institute of Leadership and 
Management; Simon Walker (Institute 
of Directors); GC100 Investor Group; 
NHO Trading UK Limited; Margaret 
Mountford (Bright Idea Trust); Anya 
Hindmarch (Entrepreneur); inHouse 
Communications; Mark Littlewood 




Appendix B: Interview Protocol (Germany) 
General questions 
1. Why was it politically possible to adopt board quotas and father leave 
policies? 
2. Would the CDU/CSU have adopted either policy without the SPD as a 
coalition partner? 
On the issue of Father Leave Policy 
3. Why were the CSU and the traditional wing of the CDU unable to stop the 
inclusion of Vatermonate in the parental leave reform? 
4. Why was the CSU successful in changing the 10+2 model to a 12+2 
model? 
5. Why was Angela Merkel willing to reform parental leave especially 
including the Vatermonate provision? 
On the issue of Board Quotas (failed outcome) 
6. Was Ursula von der Leyen critical in pushing corporate board quota? If so, 
how? 
7. How did she communicate her preference for a legal board quota despite 
remaining silent in parliamentary debates? 
8. Why was Kristina Schröder unable to push through her Flexi-Quote? 
9. Did Angela Merkel support corporate board quotas? 
10. Do you think that CDU women would have voted with the opposition? 
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11. Why did the conservative members not stall the bill in committee?  
On the issue of Board Quotas (successful outcome) 
12. Why did Angela Merkel change her mind regarding corporate board 
quotas? 
13. Why did the corporate board quota pass?  
14. We know the final bill was changed, where did the pressure come from?  
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Appendix C: Interview Protocol (United Kingdom) 
General Question on coalition government 
15. What was the decision process in the coalition government? Who needed 
to agree/which steps needed to be followed to have a bill introduced in 
parliament? 
16. How constraining do you think was the coalition agreement?  
17. Can you walk me through the steps a bill needs to take from its 
introduction to its passage?  
18. Which minister(s) was in charge of drafting the policy? 
Corporate Board Quota 
1. The issue of women on corporate board was only briefly mentioned in the 
coalition agreement and neither party campaigned on the issue in the 2010 
election. Why did the issue enter the government agenda? 
2. It seems that most people were in favor for voluntary measures with a 
threat of quotas if these voluntary measures fail,  
a. What was the position of you party? 
b. Which actors supported quotas? 
3. Who do you think are the most important actor either in civil society, 
business, or politics? 




b. Which actors were the most outspoken supporters? How did they 
make their support known?  
c. Which actors were the most outspoken opponents? 
4. What role did the coalition agreement or the coalition partners play in 
preventing the policy from being adopted? 
5. Where in the coalition was the decision made to engage with quotas on a 
voluntary basis? 
6. Which actors were most important to get on board? 
7. What activities did your organization engage in to influence the policy 
outcome? 
Father Quota 
19. When did Nicholas Clegg suggest the father quota and why? 
20. Was the father quota ever seriously considered to be included in the shared 
parental leave bill? 
21. At what point did the Father Quota proposal fail and why? 
22. Which actors, other than Nicholas Clegg, were particularly outspoken in 
their support for the father quota? 
23. Which actors were the most outspoken opponents? 
24. What role did the coalition agreement or the coalition partners play in 
preventing the policy from being adopted?  
25. Why did some of the women’s organizations oppose the proposal? 
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26. Was the shared parental leave reform prompted by the EU Parental Leave 
directive? 
27. Which organizations in the consultation phase opposed quota and which 
ones supported it? 
28. What was your position on the Father Quota proposal? 
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Germany 17 3 2 1 7 0 
United 





Appendix E: Raw Data and Classification for Truth Table 








Rate Welfare Culture 
Netherlands BQ 2011 1 40.7 39 59 1.8 family 26.9 
France BQ 2011 0 18.9 13.9 51.7 2 family 32.9 
Japan FLP 2009 1 11.3 8.5 48.6 1.4 market 34.4 
Japan BQ 2015 1 9.47 8.5 49.2 1.4 market 34.4 
Germany FLP 2006 1 31.6 24.7 52 1.4 family 49.7 
Germany BQ 2015 1 36.45 24.7 54.8 1.4 family 49.7 
Iceland FLP 2000 1 34.9 - 79.8 2.1 dual 64.8 
Sweden FLP 1994 1 40.4 47.7 66.8 1.9 dual 79.4 
Norway BQ 2003 1 36.4 41.7 69.1 1.8 dual 80.8 



















Possible Values Source 
Year Year the Policy 
was Adopted, 
i.e., passed into 
law 
 International Network on Leave 
Policy and Research; ‘Legislative 
Board Diversity’ 2014 
Coalition Presence of 
coalition 
government 
1 – Coalition 
Government 
0 – No coalition 
government 
Comparative Political Data Set I 
and II (Armingeon et al. 2015); 
For Japan 2015: IPU Parline 
Database 
Women 





Year of the 
Reform 
1 – critical mass 
(over 30 per cent 
women in 
parliament) 
0 – below critical 
mass 
Comparative Political Data Set I 
and II (Armingeon et al. 2015); 
For Germany 2015 and Japan 









1 – critical mass 




0 – below critical 
mass 




Labor Force Labor 
Participation 
Rate,  per cent 
of female 
population 15+ 
1 – labor 
participation 
above 60 per cent 
0 – labor 
participation 
below 60 per cent 
World Data Bank, Gender 
Statistics 
Fertility Fertility Rate, 
Total (births per 
woman) 
1 – under 2.0 
(below 
replacement level) 
0 – Above 2.0 
(replacement 
level) 




Welfare Type of welfare 
regime 

















1 – egalitarian 
(above 60 per cent 
agreement) 
0 – traditional 
(below 60 per cent 
agreement) 
World Value Survey ‘Being 
 
